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NORVAL D. GLENN

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**ELEANOR SINGER
and JACOB LUDWIG**

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Change in New Zealand**

THE POLLS

**Review: The People and the Press by
*Seymour Sudman***

**Report: The Welfare State in Cross-
National Perspective by *Tom W. Smith***

BOOKS

**Reviews by *William A. Gamson, John
Ferejohn, Tom W. Smith, Allen S.
Whiting, and Lynda Lee Kaid***

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Articles

- The Trend in "No Religion" Respondents to U.S. National Surveys, Late 1950s to Early 1980s 293
NORVAL D. GLENN
- South Africa's Press Restrictions: Effects on Press Coverage and Public Opinion Toward South Africa 315
ELEANOR SINGER and JACOB LUDWIG
- The Demographics of a New Voting Gap: Marital Differences in American Voting 335
HERBERT F. WEISBERG
- The Illusion of Intimacy: Television and the Role of Candidate Personal Qualities in Voter Choice 344
SCOTT KEETER
- The Persistence of Political Attitudes Among 1960s Civil Rights Activists 359
GERALD MARWELL, MICHAEL T. AIKEN, and
N. J. DEMERATH III
- Under Way and Here to Stay: Party Realignment in the 1980s? 376
HELMUT NORPOTH
- International Conflict and Opinion Change in New Zealand 392
JAMES W. LAMARE

The Polls

- Review: The People and the Press 400
SEYMOUR SUDMAN
- Report: The Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective 404
TOM W. SMITH

Book Reviews

- D. Garth Taylor, *Public Opinion and Collective Action: The Boston School Desegregation Conflict* 422
WILLIAM A. GAMSON

Philip Converse and Roy Pierce, <i>Political Representation in France</i>	424
JOHN FEREJOHN	
Eytan Gilboa, <i>American Public Opinion Toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict</i>	428
TOM W. SMITH	
Leonard A. Kusnitz, <i>Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979</i>	429
ALLEN S. WHITING	
David Morgan, <i>The Flacks of Washington: Government Information and the Public Agenda</i>	431
LYNDA LEE KAID	
AAPOR Proceedings	
Conference Report	433
AAPOR Award	435
Presidential Address: Improving the Public's Opinion of Public Opinion	436
J. RONALD MILAVSKY	
Conference Program	448
Annual Membership Meeting	455
MANUSCRIPTS ACCEPTED FOR FORTHCOMING ISSUES	458

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Prospective contributors should refer to the detailed Notice to Contributors that appears in the Summer 1987 issue of POQ.

THE TREND IN "NO RELIGION" RESPONDENTS TO U.S. NATIONAL SURVEYS, LATE 1950s TO EARLY 1980s

NORVAL D. GLENN

Abstract Data from 110 U.S. national surveys are used to study the trend in "no religion" responses from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. The trend was monotonically upward, at least until the 1980s, when there were signs of leveling off or an incipient reversal of the trend. The trend came about through both changes within birth cohorts and cohort succession, and it involved persons of all major religious backgrounds and both men and women. Whether or not the change indicates an important degree of secularization is considered at length. Problems involved in using a dichotomous indicator to gauge change in a quantitative variable are discussed.

The secularization thesis—the notion that modern and modernizing societies move inevitably and monotonically away from the sacred and toward the secular—has always been dominant in the social scientific study of religion (Hammond, 1985:1–6; Wilson, 1985). Secularization has been one of the master trends, along with such changes as industrialization and urbanization, that have transformed traditional societies into modern ones, and according to the basic version of the secularization thesis, secularization continues in societies that are already modern.

In the past few years, however, the basic and simple version of the thesis has been strongly challenged. That modern societies are substantially more secular than traditional ones is hardly in doubt, but it is much less certain that there is continuing, inevitable, and irreversible secularization in modern societies. A recently published edited volume sponsored by the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion presents an abundance of evidence for the persistence of the sacred in contem-

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porary societies (Hammond, 1985), and several authors have emphasized the continued importance of religion in the United States (Swanson, 1968; Greeley, 1972; McCready and Greeley, 1976).

One of the strongest challenges to the basic version of the secularization thesis has come from the researchers who restudied "Middletown" (Muncie, Indiana) in the 1970s. In the second volume reporting findings from the Middletown III study, Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick (1983) compared data collected in Muncie in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1970s and, aside from a decrease in religious endogamy, found no evidence they considered clearly to indicate secularization. Rather, they found such changes as increases in the proportion of the labor force engaged in religious activity, the proportion of total income devoted to religion, the proportion of rites of passage held under religious auspices, the number of churches per capita, and the percentage of the population who attended church regularly. Overall, they concluded, the changes looked more like sacralization than secularization. They also argued that Muncie is not highly atypical, presented some recent national data showing high levels of traditional religious belief and of religious identification, and argued that there has been no decline in the importance of religion in the entire society in recent decades.

The Muncie findings are important and have definite implications for the secularization thesis, but unless Muncie is American society in microcosm, they are not sufficient to support conclusions about trends in the total society. Although Caplow and his associates made considerable use of recent national survey data, they did not use indicators of religiosity for different points in time to infer trends but rather inferred lack of change from data for one point in time. A particularly egregious example of this questionable procedure is their interpretation of national Gallup data on religious preference: "The proportion of the U.S. population who claimed no religious preference in the 1977-1978 surveys was 6 percent, a figure impossible to reconcile with the waning of religion so often mentioned as a contemporary social trend" (p. 28).

It is impossible to reconcile a waning of religion with the 6% of "no religion" responses only if (a) all of the persons with a religious preference are uniformly high in religiosity (a patently false assumption) and (b) the difference between 6% and any smaller percentage cannot reflect an important difference in the distribution of religiosity. In fact, the difference between 6% and a smaller percentage, such as 2%, is likely to reflect an important difference in religiosity.¹ A change of only

1. As Stark and Bainbridge (1985:47) point out, saying that one has no religion does not necessarily mean that one does not believe in the supernatural or have some kind of personal religion. However, it does indicate a lack of identification with institutional religion, and thus it is a negative indicator of institutional religiosity. Of course, institu-




Figure 1. Normal Curves Illustrating Change in a Distribution That Would Produce a Four-Percentage-Point Change in a Lower-Tailed Dichotomous Indicator

four percentage points, from 2% to 6%, in persons so low in religiosity that they report no religious preference may seem small, but it is unlikely that such a change would occur in the absence of considerable change in religiosity among persons retaining a religious preference.

Suppose, for instance, that religiosity is normally distributed, as indicated by the curves in Figure 1, and that the point on the scale of religiosity below which persons will say they have no religion is indicated by A in the figure. The Time 1 curve in the figure represents the distribution when only 2% of the population have no religion and thus are to the left of Point A. The Time 2 curve represents a distribution with the same variance when 6% of the population have no religion. The difference between the two distributions is not trivial, the mean of the Time 2 distribution being one-half of a standard deviation lower than the mean of the Time 1 distribution. Further, if a dichotomous indicator of religiosity were used which divided the population at the mean at Time 1, 19% of the population would shift from the high to the low category from Time 1 to Time 2.

Although the percentage of "no religion" responses to national surveys at one point in time, or during a one- or two-year period, cannot provide compelling evidence of recent secularization or a lack of it, an examination of the trend in these responses during recent decades can provide stronger evidence. In this paper, I use data from 110 U.S. national surveys conducted by three major survey organizations over a 30-year period to see if there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who said they had no religion and to assess the probable importance of any observed increase. The primary purpose is to contribute to current attempts to refine and qualify the basic secularization thesis (Hammond, 1985) and thereby to contribute to the understand-

tional religiosity is the kind that has usually been of concern to social scientists and has distinctly important social implications. The term "religiosity," as it is used in this paper, is short for "institutional religiosity."

ing of religion in modern societies. A secondary purpose is to illustrate some of the methodological and interpretative problems encountered when a dichotomous variable is used as an indicator of an underlying quantitative variable. Since some of the data are organized into a cohort format, they also have implications for questions about how persons of different ages respond to influences for change (see Glenn, 1980).

Methods

Questions about religious preference have been asked on U.S. national surveys periodically since the late 1930s, and many of the resulting data are available from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center or the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. However, the data from the earliest surveys are not comparable with later data, since the early surveys used quota control samples rather than the probability or modified probability samples used for contemporary surveys. Furthermore, the early Gallup surveys, on which the religious preference question was asked most frequently, were designed to represent voters rather than the total adult population (Glenn, 1975). These surveys severely underrepresented women, southerners, and blacks, all of whom were less likely than other persons to report no religious preference, and thus the surveys almost certainly overestimated the proportion of the adult population with no religion. All segments of the population were not adequately represented in the Gallup samples until the mid-1950s. The early National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys pose less serious problems, but the religious preference question was not asked frequently on them, and they did not consistently use probability or modified probability samples until the mid-1950s.

In order to use only data from probability or modified probability samples, I began the series reported in this paper with data from National Opinion Research Center surveys conducted in 1955-1959, and I continued the NORC series by combining data collected during each subsequent five-year period through 1980-1984 (Table 1). Since Gallup has asked the religious preference question several times per year, I combined data from all of the relevant surveys conducted in each of four selected years, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984 (Table 1). I selected the first three years in order to construct a standard cohort table (Table 2) to assess the contributions of cohort succession and within-cohort changes to the observed total change over two decades. I added the 1984 data to bring the story as up-to-date as was possible when I started the study in 1985, and I also used the 1984 data to construct a

Table 1. Percentage of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, Late 1950s to Early 1980s

Date	%	(N)
National Opinion Research Center surveys		
1955-1959 ^a (9 surveys)	2.1	(11,297)
1960-1964 ^b (2 surveys)	3.3**	(3,059)
1965-1969 ^b (3 surveys)	3.0	(4,462)
1970-1974 ^c (4 surveys)	6.2**	(6,081)
1975-1979 ^d (5 surveys)	7.3*	(7,544)
1980-1984 ^d (4 surveys)	7.3	(6,019)
Gallup surveys		
1960 ^e (17 surveys)	2.3	(50,368) ^f
1970 ^e (21 surveys)	3.4**	(66,036) ^f
1980 ^g (19 surveys)	7.4**	(52,441) ^f
1984 ^h (19 surveys)	8.0*	(50,607) ^f

^a Question wording: "What religion do you consider yourself?"

^b Question wording: "What is your religious preference?"

^c Question wording, 1970 survey: "What is your religious preference now?" 1972, 1973, and 1974 surveys: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"

^d Question wording: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"

^e Question wording: "What is your religious preference—Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish?"

^f Weighted. The number of respondents is between 50% and 60% of the reported *N*.

^g Question wording: "What is your religious preference—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or an Orthodox Church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?"

^h Question wording: "What is your religious preference—Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, or an Orthodox Church such as Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?"

*Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .10 level (two-tailed)

**Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .01 level (two-tailed)

nonstandard cohort table (Table 3) to trace within-cohort changes for four additional years.

Even though no serious problems of comparability are posed for either the NORC or the Gallup series by changes in sample design, there were some changes in question wording (see notes a-h of Table 1). This might seem to pose a serious problem for the NORC series, since "no religion" was explicitly offered as a response alternative on the later surveys but not on the earlier ones. Furthermore, the biggest indicated increase in "no religion" responses is from 1965-

Table 2. Percentage of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, by Age, 1960, 1970, and 1980

Age	1960 % (N) ^a	1970 % (N) ^a	1980 % (N) ^a
20-29	2.6 (8,116)	7.1*** (13,336)	12.6*** (12,047)
30-39	2.0 (11,312)	3.5*** (12,044)	8.8*** (9,896)
40-49	1.8 (11,026)	2.4* (13,438)	5.3*** (7,966)
50-59	1.7 (8,755)	2.0 (11,682)	3.7*** (8,014)
60-69	1.4 (6,962)	2.2* (9,606)	3.5** (6,586)
70-79	1.6 (3,431)	1.8 (5,424)	3.6*** (3,954)

SOURCE: Gallup Surveys. See notes e and g of Table 1 for question wording.

^a Weighted. The number of respondents is between 50% and 60% of the reported N.

* Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .10 level (two-tailed)

** Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .05 level (two-tailed)

*** Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .01 level (two-tailed)

1969 to 1970-1974, and three of the four surveys during the latter period were the first to offer "no religion" as an explicitly stated alternative. However, Gallup has never explicitly offered "no religion" as an alternative, and the changes in the NORC percentages closely parallel the changes in the Gallup percentages (Table 1). The only changes in the wording of the Gallup question were the adding of religious categories other than Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish, and it seems extremely unlikely that these changes contributed to the increase in "no religion" responses.²

2. For the earliest surveys included in this study, the population sampled was persons age 21 and older, whereas after persons ages 18, 19, and 20 were given the franchise throughout the country, they were included in the sampled population. However, inclusion of the 18- to 20-year-olds in the earlier surveys would have had little or no effect on the percentages in Table 1, since at that time reporting "no religion" was virtually unrelated to age.

Table 3. Percentage of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, by Birth Cohort, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984

Cohort (Birth Dates) ^a	1960	1970	1980	1984
1950-1959				
Ages	—	—	20-29	24-33
%	—	—	12.6	12.6
(N) ^b	—	—	(12,047)	(11,862)
1940-1949				
Ages	—	20-29	30-39	34-43
%	—	7.1	8.8**	8.8
(N) ^b	—	(13,336)	(9,896)	(8,838)
1930-1939				
Ages	20-29	30-39	40-49	44-53
%	2.6	3.5*	5.3***	5.2
(N) ^b	(8,116)	(12,044)	(7,966)	(6,829)
1920-1929				
Ages	30-39	40-49	50-59	54-63
%	2.0	2.4	3.7***	3.9
(N)	(11,312)	(13,438)	(8,014)	(6,730)
1910-1919				
Ages	40-59	50-59	60-69	64-73
%	1.8	2.0	3.5***	4.1
(N)	(11,026)	(11,682)	(6,586)	(5,594)

SOURCE: Gallup Surveys. See notes e, g, and h of Table 1 for question wording.

^a Birth dates are approximate. For instance, members of the "1950-1959" cohort were born between about the middle of 1950 and about the middle of 1960.

^b Weighted. The number of respondents is between 50% and 60% of the reported N.

* Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .10 level (two-tailed)

** Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .05 level (two-tailed)

*** Significantly greater than the value for the previous time period at the .01 level (two-tailed)

For consistency, I computed only two-tailed significance tests, but since the secularization thesis predicts an increase in "no religion" responses, one-tailed tests are appropriate when an increase is indicated from one date to the next. All of the data are from multistage cluster samples and thus are subject to design effects (Kish, 1965; Frankel, 1971), that is, the standard errors of parameter estimates may be larger than they would be if the samples were simple random. To

allow for possible design effects, I used two-thirds of the real N to compute significance tests in the case of the NORC unweighted samples and one-third of the reported N in the case of the Gallup weighted samples, for which the number of respondents varies between about 50% and about 60% of the reported N . Since differences between percentages, being analogous to unstandardized regression coefficients, are unlikely to have large design effects (Frankel, 1971), these corrections are conservative.

Examination of the basic trend and cohort data suggested the need for some additional analytic procedures, which are described below after discussion of the data in Tables 1–3.

Findings and Interpretation

THE TREND

The Gallup data show a monotonic increase in the percentage of "no religion" respondents over the four dates, and the NORC data show a similar, but not quite monotonic, increase during the six 5-year periods (Table 1). The most important differences between the two series is that the NORC data indicate that the percentage of persons with no religion has leveled off in recent years whereas the Gallup data show a statistically significant increase from 1980 to 1984.

The NORC series shows a total increase from 1955–1959 to 1980–1984 of 5.2 percentage points, and the Gallup series shows an increase from 1960 to 1984 of 5.7 points. Given the very low levels from which these changes started, they *probably* reflect fairly substantial changes in religiosity in the total adult population. For instance, if (a) the distinction between persons who say they have no religion and those who state a religious preference marks a point on the scale of religiosity and (b) the distribution of religiosity was normal with a constant standard deviation, the observed changes indicate that the mean religiosity of the population decreased by .58 of a standard deviation according to the NORC series and by .59 of a standard deviation according to the Gallup series. Changes of these magnitudes would move more than 22% of the population across a point on the scale of religiosity marked by the mean at the beginning of the series.

The indicated changes were greater at the young adult age levels, as later-born cohorts moved into those ages, than they were in the total adult population (Table 2). The percentage of "no religion" responses increased by ten points at ages 20–29 and by 6.8 points at ages 30–39 from 1960 to 1980. Assuming the conditions mentioned in the previous

paragraph, these changes represent changes of .8 and .7 of a standard deviation in the distribution of religiosity and moved 29% and 26% of the persons at the two age levels across points on the scale of religiosity marked by the means in 1960.

However, within-cohort changes as well as cohort succession contributed to the change in the total adult population. Each of the four ten-year birth cohorts represented at all three dates in Table 2 shows a statistically significant increase in "no religion" responses from 1960 to 1980, the mean change being 2.0 percentage points. Although a mean change of this size may seem small, it could represent an important degree of within-cohort change in religiosity. If religiosity in each cohort was normally distributed with a constant standard deviation, and if the "no religion" respondents represented the lower extreme of the distribution, the mean within-cohort change was .3 of a standard deviation, and on the average 12% of the cohort members dropped below the point on the scale of religiosity marked by the cohort mean in 1960.

I must emphasize that the estimates of changes in religiosity given here are to illustrate how large such changes *may have been*, not to show how large they certainly were. Religiosity may not have been normally distributed, and the standard deviation of the distribution may not have remained constant. It is even possible, though perhaps not likely, that mean religiosity has not declined at all in this country in recent decades. This is possible because the increase in the percentage of persons at the low extreme of religiosity could have been offset by an increase in the percentage of persons at the high extreme, that is, there could have been movement toward polarization. Thus, an adequate assessment of the trend in overall religiosity requires supplementation of the "no religion" responses with other indicators—a point to which I return below. However, the data in Table 1 and 2 do indicate that there have been some fairly strong influences for secularization in the U.S. in recent decades to which at least a portion of the population has responded. That portion has almost certainly been larger than the percentage of persons who changed from stating a religious preference to saying they had no religion, and it may have included most of the population.

Although the Gallup data for the total adult population show a continued increase in "no religion" responses from 1980 to 1984, the cohort data in Table 3 indicate that the within-cohort trends have leveled off, at least in the younger cohorts. Furthermore, the percentage of "no religion" responses from persons ages 18–23 in 1984 (not shown in the table) was 11.5, slightly lower than the percentage from persons ages 24–33. This difference is not statistically significant, ac-

Table 4. Percentage of U.S. High School Seniors Who Said They Had No Religion, Annual National Samples, 1976 to 1982

Date	%	(N) ^a
1976	11.4	(14,444)
1977	10.4	(15,153)
1978	9.7	(17,990)
1979	8.9	(15,919)
1980	8.9	(15,750)
1981	9.3	(17,561)
1982	9.5	(17,544)

SOURCE: Monitoring the Future Survey, as reported in Bachman, Johnston, and O'Malley (1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1984) and Johnston, Bachman, and O'Malley (1980a, 1980b, 1982).

^a Weighted. The number of respondents is about the same as or greater than the reported *N*.

cording to the conservative procedure used here for estimating significance ($p = .17$ on a two-tailed test), but it suggests an incipient reversal of the trend for each successive cohort maturing into adulthood to have a higher percentage of persons with no religion than the one before it.

To investigate this issue further, I compiled data on high school seniors from seven surveys conducted from 1976 through 1982 by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (SRC) (see Table 4). The trend in "no religion" responses from 1976 to 1979 was distinctly downward, the difference between the 1976 and 1979 percentages (2.5 points) being statistically significant at the .05 level on a two-tailed test. Since the percentage rose slightly from 1980 to 1982, the difference between the 1976 and 1982 percentages is not statistically significant ($p = .14$ on a two-tailed test). However, the 1982 percentage is lower by 1.9 points, and this finding, when considered in conjunction with the Gallup data, is fairly strong evidence for a cessation, if not an incipient reversal, of the intercohort trend toward higher percentages of young adults having no religion.

Thus it is rather clear when one examines the NORC, Gallup, and SRC data together that the conservative reaction that began in this country in the late 1970s has weakened or offset the influences that produced the steady increase in "no religion" responses during the previous 15 to 20 years. This indicates that some aspects of secularization in modern societies can be stopped and perhaps reversed, at least temporarily.

RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS OF THE "NO RELIGION" RESPONDENTS

Persons with Jewish backgrounds have been unusually likely to have no religion as adults, and apostasy has been relatively rare among Catholics and Protestants in the U.S. (Chalfant, Beckley, and Palmer, 1981; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985:403). It might seem possible, therefore, that the "no religion" respondents to recent national surveys generally have non-Christian family backgrounds and that the secularization indicated by the increase in "no religion" responses has not appreciably involved the Christian majority. A secularization of the non-Christian minority might be concurrent with the kind of sacralization of Christians indicated by the Middletown data.

To cast light on this issue, I tabulated data from the 1973-1983 General Social Surveys on "current religious preference" by "religion in which raised" for each of three broad age levels. The percentages of "no religion" responses are reported in Table 5.

The respondents raised in the Jewish or "other" (mainly non-Christian) religions *were* more likely to report no religious preference than were those raised as Protestants or Catholics, and of course those raised in no religion were most likely to have no religion. However, at ages 18-29, the percentages of "no religion" responses were virtually identical for those raised as Protestants, Catholics, and "other," and the percentage for those raised as Jews was only moderately higher. The differences by age apparently reflect a trend, since the cohort data in Tables 2 and 3 reveal no apparent tendency for religious identification to increase within a birth cohort as it grows older. Thus it is important that there was a distinct inverse relationship between age and reporting no religion except among persons raised in "other" religions.

Another way to view the data is to calculate the percentage of "no religion" respondents who came from each of the religious backgrounds (data not shown in tabular form). More than half (51.8%) were raised as Protestants, more than a fourth (27.0%) were raised as Catholics, and only 3.4% and 1.6% were raised as Jews and in other religions, respectively. Although 15.8% were raised with no religion, 60.7% of those raised without a religion reported a religious preference—an indication that apostasy is often reversed intergenerationally.

Overall, these data show that the trend to no religion has been pervasive, occurring among persons from all of the major religious backgrounds.

MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN THE TREND

Secularization has somewhat different implications when it involves mainly men (as in some parts of Latin America) than when it pro-

Table 5. Percentage of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, by Age and Religion in Which Raised

Religion in Which Raised	Age			
	18-29 % (N)	30-49 % (N)	50 and Older % (N)	All Ages % (N)
Protestant	10.4 (2,177)	5.9 (3,231)	2.3 (3,878)	5.5 (9,286)
Catholic	10.8 (1,152)	7.6 (1,372)	3.0 (1,217)	7.1 (3,741)
Jewish	16.7 (72)	12.3 (106)	5.4 (166)	9.9 (344)
Other	10.5 (38)	10.0 (50)	15.6 (45)	12.0 (133)
All religions	10.6 (3,439)	6.6 (4,759)	2.7 (5,306)	6.1 (13,504)
No religion	57.6 (144)	30.3 (145)	27.3 (110)	39.3 (399)
Total	12.5 (3,583)	7.3 (4,904)	3.2 (5,416)	7.1 (13,903)

SOURCE: Combined data from the 1973 through 1983 General Source Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. See note d of Table 1 for wording of question on current religious preference. Wording of religious origin question: "In what religion were you raised?"

foundly involves both men and women. For instance, it has greater implications for the socialization of future generations when it occurs among both sexes than when it occurs mainly among men. Thus, the increase in "no religion" responses in this country in recent decades may be relatively unimportant if it has occurred mainly among men.

In percentage points, the change from 1960 to 1984 indicated by the Gallup data was almost twice as great for men as for women (Table 6). However, differences between percentages at different levels of the percentage scale would be comparable only in the unlikely event that the underlying variable were distributed so that equal numbers of cases were at each point on the scale (of the underlying variable) within the range of the cases. The distribution of the underlying variable is much more likely to be peaked and unimodal, and if it is, a logit or probit transformation of the percentages will usually make differences at dif-

Table 6. Percentage and Log-Odds of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, by Sex, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1984

Year	Percentage			Log-Odds		
	Males	Females	Difference	Males	Females	Difference
1960	2.7	1.2	1.5	-1.56	-1.92	.36
1970	4.8	2.1	2.7	-1.30	-1.67	.37
1980	9.4	5.5	3.9	-0.98	-1.24	.26
1984	10.7	5.6	5.1	-0.92	-1.23	.31
1960-1984						
Change	+8.0	+4.4		+0.64	+0.69	

SOURCE: Gallup Surveys. See notes e, g, and h of Table 1 for question wording.

ferent levels of the percentage scale more nearly comparable. Such transformations result in precise comparability, of course, only if the distribution of the underlying variable is normal (probit) or approximately so (logit) and has the same standard deviation in all of the compared populations. In Table 6, I present the results of a logit transformation, which is a substitution of the logarithm (common logarithm in this case)³ of the odds ratio (log-odds) for each percentage.

On the log-odds scale, the indicated 1960-1984 change is slightly greater for females than for males, which indicates that the change in religiosity reflected by the change in "no religion" responses was probably as great for women as for men. Thus, the kind of secularization indicated seems to be the kind with the greater implications, especially for the socialization of future generations.

DIFFERENCES IN THE TREND AMONG COHORTS

As I point out above, the trend in "no religion" responses has been a function both of changes within birth cohorts and of cohort succession, that is, the dying of members of the older cohorts and the entry of later-born cohorts into the adult age ranges. According to what is commonly known as the "aging-stability thesis" (Ryder, 1965; Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970; Ingelhart, 1977; Glenn, 1980), the within-cohort

3. Use of the natural logarithm would result in different numbers but the same pattern among the numbers.

Table 7. Percentage and Log-Odds of Respondents to U.S. National Surveys Who Said They Had No Religion, by Birth Cohort, 1960 and 1980

Ages of Cohort Members in 1960	Percentage			Log-Odds		
	1960	1980	Change	1960	1980	Change
20-29	2.6	5.3	2.7*	-1.57	-1.25	.32
30-39	2.0	3.7	1.7*	-1.69	-1.42	.27
40-49	1.8	3.5	1.7*	-1.74	-1.44	.30
50-59	1.7	3.6	1.9*	-1.76	-1.43	.33

SOURCE: Table 2. See notes e and g of Table 1 for question wording. See Table 2 for Ns.

* Significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)

changes should have been greater in the younger than in the older cohorts. The reasoning underlying this thesis is that as adults grow older, for a variety of reasons they tend to become less responsive to influences for change, so that the influences tend to create differences between older and younger cohorts. For instance, according to this view, when there are influences for change in a liberal direction, all cohorts will as a whole become more liberal, but the younger cohorts will change more than the older ones. This difference, along with cohort succession, will produce an inverse relationship between age and liberalism—a relationship that had led to the erroneous conclusion that something about growing older converts liberals to conservatives. If this view is correct, older persons should respond less, on the average, than younger ones to influences for secularization.

The 1940-1960 changes in "no religion" responses for four 10-year birth cohorts are shown in Table 7, both in raw percentage points and on the log-odds (logit) scale.

The change in percentage points was greatest for the youngest cohort, being 59% greater than the change for the second youngest cohort and 42% greater than the next largest change (for the oldest cohort). This pattern would seem to support the aging-stability thesis in that it suggests greater changeability in the cohort that aged from 20-29 to 40-49 than in any of the older cohorts. However, the changes in log-odds, which are almost certainly better indicators of changeability, do not support the thesis. The greatest indicated change is in the oldest cohort, which aged from 50-59 to 70-79. Although the youngest cohort changed more than the middle two, its change was only 19% and 7% greater than the changes in the middle two cohorts.

Thus, adults of virtually all ages seem to have been susceptible to the influences for secularization that produced the increase in "no religion" responses. So far as one can tell from these data, aging beyond young adulthood does not lead to greater resistance to ideological change, and there is some other evidence that points to the same conclusion (Glenn, 1980). However, for this purpose as for others, the percentage of "no religion" responses is too tenuous an indicator of religiosity by itself to support any strong conclusion. It is possible, for instance, that the relationship between change on the lower tail and total change in the distribution of religiosity differed among the cohorts. Among persons with a weak identification with religion, older persons may give up the identification as easily as do younger persons, while among persons strongly committed to religion, younger persons may weaken their commitment more readily than do older ones.

RELATIONSHIP OF SHORT-TERM TO LONGER-TERM CHANGE

The data in Table 1 cover 30 years, whereas the Middletown data cover more than half a century. It is possible that this incomparability in the periods covered at least partially accounts for the fact that the data presented here indicate secularization while the Middletown data do not. Perhaps by beginning the time series in the 1950s, which was presumably a time of unusually high religiosity, I detected a short-term trend that has run counter to a longer-term one. If so, the changes since the late 1970s may indicate the resumption of a long-term trend rather than a brief pause in such a trend.

Data published recently in *The Gallup Report* (The Gallup Organization, 1985:27-28) seem to support this interpretation. The percentage of "no religion" responses to Gallup surveys is reported for 1947 and at five-year intervals thereafter through 1972 and for each year from 1974 through 1984. The reported percentage for 1947 is 6, and it is 2 or 3 for subsequent years until 1972, for which it is 5. For 1974, 1975, and 1976, it is 6—the same as for 1947. This seems to indicate that most of the change shown in Table 1 was simply a return to a previous level of persons with no religion.

However, the 1947 percentage reported by Gallup must not be taken at its face value. According to Glenn (1975:Table 1), the Gallup surveys of that era underrepresented nonwhites by at least 5 percentage points, underrepresented Southerners by at least 12 or 13 percentage points,⁴ and underrepresented persons with less than 12 years of school by about 10 percentage points—and persons in all of these underrepre-

4. This is according to the definition of the South used by Gallup, which differs from the census definition.

sented categories were unusually unlikely to say they had no religion. (For instance, in the early 1960s, the percentage of Southern whites reporting no religion was only about half of the percentage for white respondents in the rest of the country, according to Gallup data—Glenn and Hyland, 1967:Table 5.) The representation of women in the 1947 samples is unclear, since Glenn did not report data for that year but showed the 1946 samples to be 37.7% female (substantial underrepresentation) and the 1948 samples to be 49.8% female (adequate representation). In any event, the percentage of American adults with no religion in 1947 was almost certainly somewhat lower than the 6% shown by the Gallup data, though it may have been higher than the 2% or 3% shown for the 1950s and early 1960s.

If much of the change shown in Table 1 was a return to a previous level, that of course does not necessarily mean that the change was counter to the longer-term trend. Fertility was higher and divorce rates were lower in the 1950s than at some previous times, but changes since the 1950s in fertility and divorce have been consistent with longer-term trends. It seems likely that the secularization since the 1950s is also consistent with the longer-term trend, but in view of such evidence as the Middletown data, no very confident conclusion can be made on the issue until more evidence is in.

OTHER INDICATORS OF RELIGIOSITY

I point out above that data on "no religion" responses by themselves are inadequate indicators of the overall trend in religiosity and point out that changes in other parts of the distribution may not conform to, and may even offset, an increase in persons at the lower extreme of religiosity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider all available evidence, or even all evidence from national surveys, on the recent trend in religiosity in the U.S., but some of the most directly relevant of the additional evidence can help to assess the meaning of the increase in "no religion" responses.

For instance, it seems useful to look at a dichotomous indicator of religiosity that divides national survey respondents on the upper tail of the distribution to see if movement on the two tails seems always to be consistent or if it is sometimes in opposite directions or unsynchronized. No completely adequate indicator of this kind is available, the best apparently being the percentage of persons who say they attend religious services several times per week. Although frequency of attendance of religious services is not a very good indicator of religiosity, it is probably better at identifying persons at the extremes than at discerning degrees of religiosity between the extremes. For example, it is likely that virtually all of the persons who attend religious

Table 8. Comparison of Lower-Tail and Upper-Tail Dichotomous Indicators of the Religiosity of the U.S. Adult Population, 1972 to 1984

Date	% of Respondents Who Said They Had No Religion	% of Respondents Who Said They Attended Religious Services Several Times a Week
1972	5.2	6.3
1973	6.4	7.5
1974	6.8	7.9
1975	7.6	6.9
1976	7.6	8.9
1977	6.1	8.1
1978	7.8	8.1
1980	7.2	7.5
1982	7.3	8.4
1983	7.3	8.5
1984	7.3	9.3

SOURCE: The General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center.

services several times per week, or who are motivated to say they do so, are highly religious. The main deficiency of this indicator is that not all highly religious persons are included in the category of very frequent attenders, due to such influences as physical disability and heavy work and family responsibilities.

The "frequent attendance" and the "no religion" indicators from the 1972 through 1984 General Social Surveys are compared in Table 8.⁵ Since the "no religion" percentage leveled off after 1978, I concentrated on the first seven years of the series and correlated each of the indicators with year and with the other indicator. Both the "frequent attendance" and the "no religion" percentages correlated positively with year (.682 and .645, respectively), and the two indicators correlated positively with one another (.559)—an indication that movement on each tail tended to offset movement on the other tail. That is, as the percentage of persons on the lower extreme of religiosity in-

5. The GSS question on attendance of religious services is: "How often do you attend religious services?" The interviewers were instructed to use the nine coding categories, which range from "never" to "several times a week," as probes if necessary.

creased, so did the percentage of persons on the upper extreme. The regression of "frequent attendance" on year was .27 and the regression of "no religion" on year was .29. Since the latter was slightly the higher of the two and the "frequent attendance" percentages were a little farther from zero, the indicated increase in religiosity on the upper tail is not quite as great as the indicated decrease on the lower tail. However, the two indicators may not be equally valid, and thus one cannot be certain that the change on the upper tail did not completely offset the change on the lower one.

After 1978, the "no religion" percentages obviously bore virtually no relationship to year, but the "frequent attendance" percentages continued to increase, the correlation with year being .974 and the regression of the percentages on year being .42. Thus, the two measures together indicate an increase in religiosity from 1980 to 1984.

These findings illustrate the hazards of using as an indicator of an underlying quantitative variable a dichotomous variable that divides the population on one tail of the distribution. One would conclude that religiosity either decreased or increased in the population from 1972 to 1978 depending on which indicator was used. Direct assessment of either set of percentages alone would lead one astray, but routine application of log-linear analysis to either set of data, as is often done in such cases, would lead one even farther astray, since the log-odds would indicate greater change in one direction than would the percentages.

However, the 1972-1978 period is only a small proportion of the three decades covered by the data in Table 1, and it is by no means certain that the overall change since the late 1950s has been toward polarization with little change in mean religiosity. Rather, several other indicators of religiosity from Gallup surveys indicate a probable decline in mean religiosity among adults in the U.S. in recent decades. A recent issue of *The Gallup Report* (The Gallup Organization, 1985) gives trend data on responses to a number of questions concerning religious attitudes and behavior, and if one disregards data collected before the Gallup samples adequately represented all segments of the population, most of the trends indicate a decline in religiosity and the remaining few indicate little or no change. For instance, the data indicate definite declines from the late 1950s or early 1960s to the early 1980s in the percentages of respondents who said that religion can answer all or most of today's problems, that religion was very important in their lives, that they were members of a church or synagogue, that they attended religious services in the past week, that they prayed to God twice a day or more frequently, and that they believed the Bible to be the actual word of God. These trends were very nearly monotonic, although some of the measures reached their lowest point in the late

1970s and increased slightly in the early 1980s. Some of the changes were fairly substantial. For instance, the percentage who said religion can answer all or most of today's problems went from 81 in 1957 to 61 in 1985, the percentage who said religion was very important in their lives went from 70 in 1965 to 56 in 1984, and the percentage who said they believed the Bible to be the actual word of God went from 65 in 1963 to 38 in 1984.

In contrast, there was virtually no change in the percentage who said that they read the Bible at least daily, that they believed Jesus Christ is God, that they believed in Hell, and that they believed in Heaven. Expressed belief in life after death and in God as a universal spirit declined only slightly, but the decline in the latter may be of some importance since the percentages were very close to 100, being 97 or 98 in the late 1950s and the 1960s and 94 or 95 in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In general, these trend data on religious attitudes, beliefs, and behavior support the inferences made from the trend in "no religion" responses under the assumption that the distribution of religiosity was normal with a constant standard deviation. At least some of the variables, such as stated importance of religion in life, can be considered dichotomous indicators of religiosity, and they changed about as much as dichotomous indicators that divided the distribution near its mean should have changed, according to the inferences reported above. Therefore, it seems that in *this particular case*, and for the total period from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, inferring change in the total distribution of religiosity from change on the lower tail would lead to approximately correct conclusions. Apparently, any trend toward polarization was restricted to a small portion of the total period, or else change on the upper tail did not conform to change in most of the rest of the distribution.

Conclusions

The data presented here on "no religion" responses to U.S. national surveys of course are not conclusive evidence on secularization in this country in recent decades, but when they are considered along with survey data on religious attitudes, beliefs, and behavior, the evidence for secularization is persuasive.

The evidence is not totally consistent with the basic and simple version of the secularization thesis, however, since secularization seems to have ceased in the 1980s and may be reversing. The cessation or reversal may be temporary, but it is inconsistent with the view that continuous secularization is inevitable in modern societies. Even though continued secularization may be inevitable in the long run,

there seem to be periodic reactions against it that temporarily slow, stop, or reverse it. One might speculate that since religion serves some basic human needs, a decline in religion will cease or be reversed if the emergence of functional substitutes does not keep pace with the decline.

Furthermore, there remains the problem of reconciling the findings of this study with those from the Middletown III study (Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick, 1983), which seem to indicate sacralization, or at least no substantial secularization, in recent decades. One might be tempted to dismiss the Middletown data as being from an atypical portion of American society, as indeed they may be. However, Muncie probably is not highly atypical, since the Muncie data and national data that are roughly comparable generally show similar trends. For instance, both show a decline in traditional Christian beliefs and a decline in religious endogamy.⁶

Another way to reconcile the findings of the two studies is to conclude that Caplow and his associates used inadequate indicators of secularization-sacralization. Consider, for instance, the estimate of Caplow et al. that the proportion of total income devoted to religion increased. One might argue that this change was largely a function of an increase in per capita income (in constant dollars) and of a decrease in the proportion of income needed for basic necessities. The proportion of income devoted to some kinds of nonessential secular activities undoubtedly increased also, as did the proportion devoted to some kinds of services now considered to be essential, such as mental health services. Similarly, one might argue that the increase in the proportion of the labor force engaged in religious activity reflects the general expansion of the service sector and the churches' taking on several essentially nonreligious functions, such as marriage counseling, adult education, providing of recreational opportunities, and the like.

Perhaps this argument is too facile; in any event, it is an argument that the findings of Caplow et al. do not necessarily indicate sacralization rather than an argument that considerable secularization has occurred. The fact that the churches have been able to take on additional functions might be considered evidence against secularization.

It seems, therefore, that the only honest conclusion to be reached about recent secularization in the U.S. is that no simple and dogmatic conclusion can be reached. On balance, the evidence indicates that secularization has occurred, but not in a linear fashion, and some forms of religious activity and some dimensions of religiosity may have been quite persistent. The data on "no religion" responses reported here are a useful addition to the evidence on secularization, but a careful and

6. For national data on the trend in religious endogamy, see Glenn (1982).

objective assessment of much additional evidence will be required to attain a truly good understanding of what has happened to religion in the U.S. and to the religiosity of the American people during the past several decades.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESS RESTRICTIONS

EFFECTS ON PRESS COVERAGE AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA

ELEANOR SINGER AND
JACOB LUDWIG

Abstract The 2 November 1985 ban on photographic and sound recordings by the South African government provided an opportunity to investigate hypotheses concerning the effect of the ban on U.S. media coverage of South Africa and on public opinion toward South Africa. We hypothesized that the ban would result in (1) a decrease in coverage of protest-related stories, (2) a tapering off of the volume of coverage, and (3) a decline in the prominence of the South Africa story. We further hypothesized that (4) all of these effects would be stronger for broadcast than for print media, that (5) if the press ban reduced coverage of events in South Africa, there would be less attentiveness to the South African problem among the general public in the United States, and that (6) sympathy for the black population would decrease as a result of the press restrictions.

We found that the press restrictions did not have the effects predicted, either on press coverage or on United States public opinion. Relative to levels of political violence in South Africa, coverage levels did decline. However, the decline did not occur abruptly in November, but appeared as a continuation of decreases that had already begun in September, prior to the press restrictions.

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On 2 November 1985, beset by racial protest, the South African government in Pretoria imposed a ban on photographic and sound recordings of protest activities, with the purported aim of denying protesters an international "stage," and of thus reducing the level of protest activity and violence.

For those interested in issues of press freedom, and in the relationship between news coverage and public opinion, the South African ban constituted a rare natural experiment, which promised the opportunity to investigate several hypotheses. Here we investigate six hypotheses. The first four focus on media reactions to the ban; the final two concern public opinion.

We expected that the press ban would result in a reduction of media coverage of events in South Africa—in part by its effect on the behavior of journalists, but also, and perhaps more important, by its effect on the behavior of those who have the power of "deciding what's news" (Gans, 1979). We assumed that the press restrictions would result in a reduction in the vividness of coverage, and hypothesized that the blandness thus imposed on the South Africa story would lead to other changes. Specifically, we hypothesized that the ban would result in (1) a decrease in coverage of protest-related stories, (2) a tapering off of the overall volume of coverage, and (3) a decline in the prominence of the South Africa story relative to other newsworthy stories.

As we reflected on the probable changes in media coverage that would result from the government restrictions, a fourth hypothesis suggested itself: (4) We expected that the restrictions on photographic and sound recordings would have a stronger effect on broadcast than on print media, since the latter rely less heavily on photographic coverage and still less (if at all) on sound recordings.

The two final hypotheses concern the effects of the press restrictions on U.S. public opinion. (5) The fifth hypothesis derives from the agenda-setting literature (e.g., McCombs and Shaw, 1972, and, especially, Cook et al., 1983; Leff, Protess, and Brooks, 1986) and predicts that, if the press ban results in reduced coverage of events in South Africa, there will be less attentiveness to, or awareness of, the South African problem among the general public living outside of South Africa itself.¹

Some critics of the press restrictions have argued that their imposition was expressly calculated to soften negative world opinion toward the South African government by censoring graphic depictions of the intensity of the conflict and of the harsh official confrontation and

1. Although agenda setting has generally been operationalized by asking people what they consider "the most important problem facing this country," the term clearly has a more general meaning: that attention by the media makes issues more salient for the public.

repression of protest activity. That is, if sympathy for the black South African cause (and antipathy for the government) derived from the images of repression shown in U.S. newspapers and on television, the ban would result in a shift in sympathy away from the black population and toward the white government.

(6) Accordingly, we decided to test a sixth hypothesis: that sympathy for the black population would decrease as a result of the press restrictions.

Effects on Media Coverage

Notwithstanding sometimes heroic efforts on the part of individual reporters to get the story out, South African-based journalists—faced with prison sentences of up to ten years or fines up to about \$8,000 or both—manifested a prudent willingness to adhere to the letter of the official order. As a result, according to Miriam Lacob, “scenes of violent confrontations between young blacks and South African military and police have largely disappeared from the television screens. The flow of dramatic photographs into newspapers and magazines has slowed to a trickle” (Lacob, 1986). For us, the crucial questions concerned whether the decline in the vividness of coverage possible in South Africa would cause news directors either to reduce the volume or prominence of coverage or to alter the content, and whether the effects would be similar for print and broadcast news.

Peter J. Boyer, whose front-page story in the *New York Times* (on 29 December 1985) bears some responsibility for stimulating this research, quotes the general manager of foreign news for NBC as saying, “We can still tell the story, but like the famine story last year it is a visual story and you need to see it.”

Nevertheless, if the assertions of news executives are to be trusted, the media in this country are not only loathe to appear to be easily manipulated by Pretoria, but are also self-consciously committed to maintaining a balance of reporting on world events based on the relative importance of those events. Thus Boyer, in the same article, quotes a vice president of ABC News in New York as saying, “I think there is more of an awareness not to turn down a story from South Africa because it's picture-poor, a marginal story, than with other stories from other areas.” The foreign editor of CBS News went so far as to suggest that the restriction might, in a roundabout way, enrich the coverage of the broader story by diverting attention from the more visually compelling symptoms, toward the less dramatic underlying causes. Boyer quotes Dan Rather expressing his confidence in the press with the optimistically inverted aphorism “Words are sometimes worth a thousand pictures.”

In order to test our hypotheses about the effects of the press ban on media coverage, we monitored coverage of the South Africa story both in the *New York Times* and on the evening television newscasts of the three major networks, using for this purpose the *New York Times Index* and the Vanderbilt Television News Archive's *News Index and Abstracts*.

From the *Times Index*, stories concerning South Africa were counted (to measure the volume of coverage) and were classified as front page or other (to measure assigned prominence) and as protest or other. Television news stories about South Africa on ABC, CBS, and NBC were likewise counted and classified as protest or other and as falling within the first three minutes of a broadcast or later (to measure assigned prominence). "Protest stories" in both media included all stories focusing on events or incidents of protest or demonstration by blacks in South Africa against the racial policy of apartheid; all other stories were coded as "other."²

The *Times's* coverage of South Africa does not represent "typical" coverage, even among large and relatively internationally oriented newspapers in this country. It was selected because it was expected that its coverage of South Africa (as of international affairs more generally, being "deeper" than most U.S. newspapers in this regard) would be especially sensitive to the South African government's restrictions on the press. However, a replication of the analysis using Newsbank, which indexes newspapers nationwide, leads to conclusions no different from those based on the *Times*.³

The opinion data on which we draw later in this paper were obtained in August and October 1985 and March 1986, but we began to monitor trends in media coverage at the beginning of May 1985 and continued

2. Examples of protest stories include those about riots, violence against the police and white South Afrikaners, and refusals to follow the restrictive practices of the government. Included in the "other" category were stories about economic sanctions, editorials against apartheid, and demonstrations by U.S. citizens against South African policy. We wish to thank Anastasios Kalomiris and Mary Corcoran for compiling and coding both the print and the television coverage data.

3. Newsbank (Newsbank, Inc., New Canaan, CT) is a reference service providing access to the contents of newspapers from 100 cities around the country, with an average of two cities per state. (In New York, six cities are covered, with the *Post* and the *News*, but not the *Times*, representing New York City.) Articles of broad interest are selected and reproduced on microfiche each month; a monthly printed index is cumulated quarterly and annually. The distribution of South Africa stories from July 1985 through March 1986 is as follows (only quarterly data were available for July–September 1985 and January–March 1986): July–September 1985—30 protest, 188 other, 218 total; October 1985—3 protest, 16 other, 19 total; November 1985—1 protest, 35 other, 36 total; December 1985—2 protest, 40 other, 42 total; January–March 1986—8 protest, 40 other, 48 total. While this distribution resembles that of television more than that of the *Times*, it offers no more support than either television or the *Times* for the hypothesis that media coverage of South Africa would decline following the press ban.




Figure 1. *New York Times* Coverage of South Africa Before and After Imposition of Press Restrictions 2 November 1985 (Source: *New York Times Index*)

to do so through the end of February 1986, four months after the press restrictions had gone into effect. Trends in the *Times*'s coverage are graphed in Figure 1; those in the three evening newscasts, combined, in Figure 2. Each figure graphs the number of protest stories, the total number of stories about South Africa, and the number of these stories which were assigned prominent positions (i.e., front-page or first-three-minute stories).

The first thing to note is that media coverage of events in South Africa did not fall off sharply in November in response to the 2 November press ban. And although fewer stories were carried on TV news than were featured in the *Times*, the overall patterns of variation are rather similar.⁴ All three indices (total stories, protest stories, and prominently featured stories) for both media peaked in August, began to decline in September—two months before the imposition of the press restrictions—and continued their decline in October. Four of the six indices (all except for the total number of South Africa stories and

4. However, the *percentage* of South Africa stories dealing with protest is considerably higher for television (ranging from a high of 87% in July to a low of 33% in February, averaging 58%) than for *Times* coverage (ranging from a high of 30% in July to a low of 6% in January, averaging 15%).




Figure 2. Combined ABC, CBS, and NBC Television News Coverage of South Africa Before and After Imposition of Press Restrictions 2 November 1985 (Source: Vanderbilt News Archive's *News Index and Abstracts*)

the number of protest stories featured on television) declined again in November, but relative to the earlier decreases, these further declines were small. Furthermore, each of the indices showed an upturn in December. The increase was especially marked for television news coverage. Although most of the indices declined from their December levels in January and February, it is not all clear that these changes were related to the press restrictions imposed in November.

But to view these data without regard to the "newsworthiness" of events in South Africa is to leave out a crucial part of the analysis. If the level of conflict there increased dramatically, for example, then a general pattern of stability or decline takes on added significance.⁵

5. Even taking account of events in South Africa does not solve the problem, of course. Newsworthiness—perhaps especially for television news, since coverage must be fit into a precisely defined time period—is a relative attribute. The level and (especially) prominence of coverage of a particular event depends not just on its objective importance, but on its *relative* importance compared with other news events.




Figure 3. Deaths Relating to Political Violence Before and After Imposition of Press Restrictions 2 November 1985 (Source: The South African Institute of Race Relations)

Conflict is newsworthy. One approximate indicator of the level of political conflict in South Africa is the number of protest-related deaths. Moreover, such a measure also allows us to evaluate the hypothesis put forward by the South African government when it imposed the press restrictions: that, denied an international audience, protest activities would be reduced, leading to a reduction in violence.

Data on political violence in South Africa were obtained from the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), a private Johannesburg-based organization that monitors and reports on the state of political conflict between the black population and the South African government. Among other kinds of "tracking" activities, SAIRR keeps careful records of the number of persons killed in protest-related violence, and provides these figures to the South African Press Association. Their "death toll" numbers are drawn from police records and reports of deaths culled from a comprehensive set of South African newspapers.⁶

Figure 3 presents these figures for the period from May 1985 through February 1986. Clearly, the data do not lend support to the official contention that the presence of cameras and tape recorders at protest

6. The authors are grateful to John Morrison of SAIRR and to Dr. Gavin Stewart of Rhodes University and SAIRR for providing the death count figures, along with detailed descriptions of their sources and procedures.

events is an important source of violence, and that banning them would reduce the level of violence.

In order to use the SAIRR death toll figures as a yardstick against which to assess the effect of the press ban on media coverage of South Africa, we employed a difference-of-standard-scores method. All seven indices (three number-of-stories counts—total, prominent, and protest—for television news and the *Times*, and the SAIRR death counts) were transformed into scores with means of zero and variances of 1.0, over the ten-month period covered in the foregoing figures. The standardized death counts for each month were then subtracted from that month's standardized coverage score for each of the six coverage indices. Calculated in this way, the resulting index provides a simple descriptive measure of how closely coverage "tracks" political violence.⁷ If, for a particular month, the death toll is exactly average and the number of stories is also exactly average, the difference score will be zero, indicating perfect tracking. The same zero score will result if both measures are one standard deviation above or half a standard deviation below their respective averages. If, on the other hand, the coverage score is higher than the death toll score, the difference score will be positive, indicating relative overcoverage; a negative difference score indicates relative undercoverage.

Figures 4 and 5 plot difference scores (standardized coverage scores minus standardized death counts) for *New York Times* and network television coverage, respectively.

With one exception (prominence on television), all of the difference profiles—and particularly those based on *New York Times* coverage—show the highest degree of overcoverage in September. It is noteworthy that this overcoverage lags just behind the most intense levels of political violence (and the highest coverage levels), as if coverage were subject to a kind of inertia, and maintained its relatively high levels for a time after the political violence had dropped off. All six difference scores declined substantially in October, with prominence dropping below the zero "parity line" in both figures. All six scores declined again in November, when the press ban—according to our expectations—should have suppressed all of the scores most forcefully, but in only one case (protest stories in the *Times*) was the decrease as precipitous as the drop-off observed between September and October. Moreover, all of the difference scores rebounded in December, with the three television-based scores actually exceeding parity levels, and all except for front-page stories in the *Times* exceeding the

7. As we have said, the number of protest-related deaths is an approximate indicator of the level of political violence and an even cruder approximation of newsworthiness. Thus, the same number of deaths occurring in one confrontation would be much more newsworthy than an equal number spread over a series of smaller events.




Figure 4. *New York Times* Tracking of Protest Activity Before and After Imposition of Press Restrictions 2 November 1985 (Sources: *New York Times Index*; the South African Institute of Race Relations)




Figure 5. Combined ABC, CBS, and NBC Television Tracking of Protest Activity Before and After Imposition of Press Restrictions 2 November 1985 (Sources: Vanderbilt News Archive's *News Index and Abstracts*; the South African Institute of Race Relations)

lowest levels observed during the pre-ban period. All six difference scores declined in January, and again in February, when they showed the most severe levels of undercoverage observed across the ten-month period from May 1985 to February 1986. But, as we have already noted in discussing the raw coverage figures, it is not at all clear whether undercoverage in January and February can be attributed to the press restrictions imposed at the beginning of November.

What, then, can we conclude about the effect of the press ban on American media's coverage of the South Africa story?

1. First, none of the three indicators we used—total coverage, prominence, and protest-related stories—showed a dramatic decline between October and November, especially when measured against the drop from September to October.
2. But, second, when measured against the amount of protest-related activity that was occurring (as indexed by the SAIRR death count figures), it is clear that coverage tended to drop below par in the four months following the imposition of press restrictions, whereas it had tended toward overcoverage in the six preceding months. Whether this relative decline is attributable to the press ban, to the "natural decline" of the South Africa story, or to a flux of competing news is a question we cannot answer from the data we have.
3. As for Hypothesis 4 (that the effects of the ban would be more visible for television coverage than for *Times* coverage), the data presented in Figures 4 and 5 show no support for it. Indeed, for each of the three coverage indices, the decline from pre-ban to post-ban coverage was at least marginally greater for the *Times* than for television news coverage, and the difference between media is quite marked in the case of total number of stories.

Effects on Public Opinion

U.S. public opinion about the South African situation was assessed in three surveys conducted by The Gallup Organization over an eight-month period in 1985 and 1986, spanning the crucial 2 November date.

The first survey was fielded in mid-August 1985, approximately two and one-half months before the press restrictions were imposed and at the height of the pre-ban level of violence in South Africa; the second was conducted in mid-October, just a few weeks before the official edict. The third survey measurement was made in early March of 1986,

approximately four months after the ban was announced.⁸ We originally thought of the first two surveys as giving us an indication of the stability of opinion about South Africa; the timing of the third was dictated by the schedule of Gallup omnibus surveys.⁹ In the first and third surveys, a national random-digit telephone sample of 1000 adults was interviewed as part of the regular Gallup telephone omnibus, while the second measurement involved face-to-face interviews with adults in a representative national sample of 1500 households contacted as part of the regular Gallup personal omnibus survey.¹⁰

8. The Gallup personal and telephone omnibus designs are based on probability samples down to the block/small geographic segment level and the household level, respectively. Below this level the samples are based on quotas by sex: interviewer assignments require that a specific number of interviews be conducted with men and a specific number with women in each of the Gallup Organization's sampling locations (of which there are over 350). For the telephone survey, the last two digits of the telephone number are re-generated for listed telephone numbers falling within the geographic areas that were selected as primary sampling areas for Gallup's personal surveys. In the August 1985 telephone omnibus 1009 interviews were completed, and 1297 potential respondents refused to be interviewed. The parallel ratio for the March 1986 telephone survey was 1004/1365. For the October 1985 personal survey, the ratio was 1540/1990. Personal omnibus survey data are weighted to Census Bureau (Current Population Survey) parameters for adults 18 years and older in the U.S. population; telephone survey data are weighted to parameters for adults in telephone households.

9. Research on time lags in agenda setting suggests that opinion data are most strongly correlated with the preceding two months of media content (Winter and Eyal, 1981). This suggests that the October opinion measure reflected media content from mid-August to mid-October (when coverage was declining) and the March measure, from mid-January to mid-March (when *Times* coverage was stable and television coverage was declining). But since media coverage did not show the predicted decline subsequent to 2 November, the question of whether the post-ban opinion measure was delayed too long to capture the effects of declining coverage is moot.

10. This mixture of survey modes is unfortunate from a research design point of view since it is not possible to rule out a mode of interview effect, but we have no reason to believe that our analysis suffers from such an effect. In describing the results of perhaps the most closely controlled experimental comparison of telephone and face-to-face interviewing modes, Groves and Kahn (1979:118) reach the conclusion that their measurements of public opinion on social issues across modes show no significant evidence of a mode effect. They do note a weak trend toward higher levels of missing data in the telephone mode, but no consistent evidence of this effect is visible in our data.

More persuasively, we performed two analyses to investigate whether differences in the characteristics of respondents interviewed in the personal and telephone surveys could have affected our trend results. First, we deleted respondents who said that they had no telephone from our October personal survey dataset. Retabulation of the October data presented in Tables 1-3 after deletion of these (119) respondents has almost no effect on these data: no single percentage in any of these tables changes by more than two percentage points (and only one percentage changes by this much). We took the additional step of reweighting this restricted dataset to our telephone omnibus parameters for education, age, race, sex, and region, taking special care that the education distribution (education being the most likely culprit in personal-telephone mode effects) matched that of the March telephone omnibus dataset exactly. The retabulation of these reweighted data again provides no evidence that the mode of data collection affected our October results: the largest change from the percentages reported in Tables 1-3 was one percentage point.

Table 1. How Closely Followed Recent Events in South Africa

	13-15 August 1985	11-14 October 1985	4-10 March 1986
Very closely	17%	13%	13%
Fairly closely	46	43	43
Not very closely	36	40	44
No opinion (Vol.)	1	4	0
Number of interviews	1009	1540	1004

SOURCE: The Gallup Organization, Inc.

QUESTION: "How closely would you say you've followed the recent events in South Africa—very closely, fairly closely, or not very closely?"

In each of the three surveys, the series of questions about South Africa began with a question about attentiveness:

How closely would you say you've followed the recent events in South Africa—very closely, fairly closely, or not very closely?

The marginal results for each of the three time points are presented in Table 1.

The attentiveness figures in Table 1 provide no support for Hypothesis 5—that is, there is no indication that attentiveness to events in South Africa declined as a result of the 2 November press ban. They do, however, provide modest support for the more general hypothesis underlying this specific formulation. Between August and October, both print and television coverage of South Africa showed a substantial decline, and attentiveness during that period, as measured by the percentage of those following events there either very or fairly closely, showed a more modest but statistically significant drop ($p < .01$).¹¹

No further decline in attentiveness is noticeable between October and March, nor does media coverage show a clear direction during that period—although television coverage first surpasses (in December and January) and then (in February) drops below its October level, as can be seen in Figure 2.

11. This and all tests of significance reported subsequently are two-tailed *t*-tests, using an estimated design effect of 1.7 to correct the tests for the effects of the clustered sampling design and the weighting of the data. The strict applicability of the calculations, of course, depends on the approximation of our probability/quota design to a complete probability design.

Table 2. Sympathies in the South African Conflict

	12-15 August 1985	11-14 October 1985	4-10 March 1986
Black population	59%	50%	64%
South African gov't	11	11	12
White population (Vol.)	1	1	0
Both equally (Vol.)	4	10	5
Neither (Vol.)	3	7	3
No opinion (Vol.)	23	20	15
Number of interviews	1009	1540	1004

SOURCE: The Gallup Organization, Inc.

QUESTION: "In the South African situation, are your sympathies more with the black population or more with the South African government?"

Hypothesis 6 asserted that opinion toward the black South African population, highly favorable in the summer of 1985, would become less favorable as vivid depictions of official repression disappeared. The hypothesis was tested with data from the same three Gallup surveys already cited above. All three asked a question about sympathies in the South African conflict:

In the South African situation, are your sympathies more with the black population or more with the South African government?

Table 2 presents the distribution of responses to this question in each of the three surveys.

The percentage expressing sympathy for the black population declined significantly ($p < .005$) between August and October, only to increase again significantly ($p < .005$) between October and March. This volatility stands in sharp contrast to the trend in the percentage expressing sympathy for the South African government, which shows no change at all over the three measurements.

Instead, the decline in the percentage saying they are sympathetic toward the black population coincides with an increase in the percentage of those expressing equivocal opinions, especially those volunteering that they are sympathetic toward "both equally." By the same token, the increase in sympathy for the black cause in the March survey coincides with a decrease in equivocation.

The decline in sympathy for the black population from August to

October, and the increase in those expressing support for both the white government and the black population (or for neither), appears to be consistent with the reasoning behind Hypothesis 6. That is, a decline in coverage of confrontation is accompanied by reduced sympathy for blacks, though not by increased sympathy for the white government. However, between October and March, there is a significant increase in sympathy for blacks, without any corresponding increase in coverage.¹² Thus, the relationship between amount of coverage of events in South Africa and sympathy is clearly not a simple one.¹³

In order to explore further the relation between attentiveness to events in South Africa and sympathy for the black population, the total sample at each of the three time points was separated into those who said they had followed recent events in South Africa either "very" or "fairly" closely (whom we will call the "attentive" group), and those who said "not very closely" (the "not-attentive" group). Table 3 presents the distribution of responses to the sympathy question across the three waves separately for the attentive and the not-attentive subgroups.

The most important finding in Table 3 is that the August to October decline in sympathy for the black population is almost entirely due to the not-attentive group: the percentage expressing sympathy for the black population among those who say they have been following the South Africa story closely shows no statistically significant change between the August and October measurements. Between October and March, sympathy for the black population increases among both the attentives and the not-attentives, although the increase is larger for the latter group.

Summary and Conclusion

1. The South African government's restrictions on press coverage of protest activities did not have the effects predicted, either on the level of violence in South Africa or on United States public opinion toward the black population. There was no reduction in violence in South Africa and no reduction in attentiveness or decrease in sympathy for blacks by the American public in the wake of the press restrictions.

12. Although television coverage in general actually undergoes first an increase and then a decrease during this period, the index that is most central to Hypothesis 6—number of protest stories—shows a pattern that is probably better described as relatively stable at first (through January) and then declining (in February).

13. The variable most obviously omitted from consideration is South Africa-related events occurring in the United States during this period.

Table 3. Sympathies in the South African Conflict Separately by Attentiveness

	12-15 August 1985		11-14 October 1985		4-10 March 1986	
	Not Attentive	Attentive	Not Attentive	Attentive	Not Attentive	Attentive
Black population	46%	67%	34%	63%	53%	74%
South African government	11	11	9	13	12	11
Both equally (Vol.)	3	4	9	12	2	7
Neither (Vol.)	4	3	9	5	5	2
White popula- tion (Vol.)	0	1	1	1	0	0
No opinion (Vol.)	37	14	38	6	28	5
Number of interviews	361	648	647	893	424	580

SOURCE: The Gallup Organization, Inc.

QUESTION: "In the South African situation, are your sympathies more with the black population or more with the South African government?"

NOTE: The attentive group comprises those who have followed recent events in South Africa "very" or "fairly" closely.

On the contrary, the number of protest-related deaths in South Africa, as reported by the South African Institute for Race Relations, showed a gradual increase between September and February, following a sharp decline from August to September. And U.S. sympathy for the black population increased significantly between October and March after showing a significant decline between August and October.

2. The main reason for the lack of change in attentiveness on the part of the American public appears to be that the absolute *amount* of coverage of South Africa in U.S. media was not sufficiently affected by the press ban. News coverage of South Africa (whether indexed by the total number of stories, the number of stories depicting protest, or the number receiving prominent placement, and whether television news or *New York Times* coverage is used as the criterion) had already declined sharply in September and October from its August levels; it declined only insignificantly further in November, and actually increased in December.

3. However, *relative to political violence* (as indexed by the number

of protest-related deaths), coverage levels have declined since the ban. In that sense, our first three hypotheses (that the press ban would result in decreased coverage of protest in South Africa, a decrease in the prominence of those stories that were presented, and an overall decrease in the coverage of the South Africa story) were supported. However, the support was weaker than expected, and the decline in coverage (relative to levels of political violence) did not occur abruptly in November, as expected. Rather, the November decreases appeared as a continuation of decreases that had already begun in September, prior to the press restrictions.

But had it not been for the ban, coverage might have kept pace with political violence, and under those circumstances we might have seen an increase in attentiveness between October and March, instead of the plateau we in fact observed.

4. Our hypothesis that broadcast news coverage would be more affected than print media coverage is not supported when the hypothesis is evaluated on the basis of our monthly coding of total number of stories, number of protest stories, and number of prominent stories for both television news (ABC, NBC, and CBS networks combined) and *New York Times* and Newsbank coverage. It is possible that there really were different effects of the ban on broadcast and print media, and that we might have captured them if we had focused our attention on other variables (e.g., the use of photographs) or used a different coding of content.

5. Although we can demonstrate no effects of the *press ban* on public opinion, there is some support for the existence of a relationship between *media coverage* and attentiveness. The number of stories about South Africa, as well as the number given prominent placement and the number devoted to protest, dropped sharply both on television and in the *Times* between August and October. During that period, attentiveness to events in South Africa declined significantly. The changes in coverage following the press ban were much less dramatic, and there were no further changes in attentiveness.

6. Sympathy for the black population in South Africa, like coverage and attentiveness, declined between August and October. But sympathy for blacks increased substantially between the October and March surveys, even though there was no consistent increase in the overall amount of coverage, the prominence of coverage, or the amount of coverage devoted to protest activities during that period of time. Thus, while a decline in coverage may result in a decline in sympathy for the black population, an increase in coverage is clearly not required for an increase in sympathy to occur.

One possible explanation for the increase in sympathy after the press

ban is that even without vivid exposure and dramatic photographs, the story was getting through. (Ironically, some journalists said that interest in the South Africa story had been waning in the weeks before the ban, and that the imposition of press restrictions stimulated a renewal of attention.) In response to a question asked in the March survey ("In the last few months do you think protest activities in South Africa have increased, remained about the same, or decreased?"), only 13% of respondents said they believed that the violence in South Africa had abated. Among the attentive especially, there was a (correct) perception that the level of protest had actually increased (45% of attentives answered "increased," compared with 31% of the not-attentives). And Miriam Lacob (1986) notes that South Africa was still receiving substantially more coverage in the United States than almost any other international story. Influences other than the media's coverage of events in South Africa—e.g., protests in the United States and talk of sanctions against the South African government—may also have played a role.

Taking into account the findings reported here, what can we say more generally about the relation between media coverage of an issue and public opinion? To what extent, if any, is the volume of media attention to an issue effective in placing it on the public agenda? And what is the relation between the content and amount of media coverage of an issue and the direction of public opinion on that issue?

Earlier research on agenda setting has come to differing conclusions on these questions, depending at least in part on the methods used by the researchers. So far as issue salience is concerned, studies using time series analysis—the regression of one series of independently derived measurements on another, e.g., the amount of media attention to an issue during a specified period and mention of that issue as a "most important problem" by cross-sectional samples during the same or a lagged period—generally find large effects of media attention on public awareness (e.g., Funkhouser, 1973; MacKuen and Coombs, 1981). So do laboratory experiments of agenda-setting effects (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder, 1982). On the other hand, studies regressing the salience of an issue to an *individual* on that individual's attention to media coverage of that issue have tended to find much smaller, more qualified effects (e.g., Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller, 1980). The same is true of those studies employing field experimental procedures and measurement of issue salience before and after exposure to a media campaign (e.g., Cook et al., 1983; Leff, Protess, and Brooks, 1986).

As for the effects of media content on public attitudes toward an issue, the findings have been generally muted, though some studies—

e.g., Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube, 1984, and Cook et al., 1983—have reported such effects even after relatively modest media stimuli.

Our own data suggest that, paradoxically, the media affect primarily those who ordinarily pay them little heed. The public that defines itself as "attentive" at any given time, we believe, is made up of two groups. The first and, in our study, larger group consists of those whose attentiveness to an issue is rooted in their social and demographic characteristics (e.g., education, friends who are interested in politics), and is largely independent of media attention. The second, smaller group becomes attentive to an issue when the media give it a good deal of play, and loses interest again when the media's attention shifts to another issue. Thus the total size of the attentive group for an issue fluctuates with the amount of media attention to that issue, although its core consists of individuals who are relatively unaffected by such fluctuations.

Furthermore, we hypothesize that it is the media-instigated attentives—those whose interest in an issue is captured only by dramatic media coverage—whose attitudes are more likely to be influenced by the amount and content of such coverage. Thus, in our study, sympathy toward blacks in South Africa dropped between August and October—a period during which the total amount of media coverage as well as the prominence of the story and the coverage devoted to protest activity dropped dramatically. But sympathy toward blacks dropped primarily among those who said that they had not been paying a great deal of attention to events in South Africa, a group that increased as the volume of media coverage declined.

This finding accords with research by Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982), who found that those who "counterargued" (internally) while watching a series of television newscasts in a laboratory setting were less influenced by the television agenda than those who did not counterargue. The "counterarguers" were the politically involved: they had a higher level of political knowledge, were more active politically, and claimed to follow public affairs closely. "Those with little political information to begin with," Iyengar and his colleagues state, "are most vulnerable to agenda-setting."¹⁴

More generally then, our study suggests the influence of the media "at the margin"—among those whose knowledge about, and interest

14. Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (1982) argue from their experiment that large agenda-setting effects exist, ignoring the fact that, were it not for a \$20 incentive, their low-involved subjects would be unlikely to watch a week's worth of television news without interruption. They also ignore the role of events in shaping the media's agenda, claiming that in deciding what to cover, "editors and journalists are influenced most by organizational routines, internal power struggles, and commercial imperatives" (p. 855)!

in, an issue depends largely, if not entirely, on media attention. Depending on the issue, of course, this group may at times be uncomfortably large.

Postscript

Since November 1985, the South African government has several times tightened its restrictions on the press. In June 1986 the restrictions were extended to coverage of violence that did not involve photographic or audio equipment; unlike the earlier restrictions, these rules were viewed as aimed primarily at print journalists. In December 1986 the restrictions were broadened again, and journalists were told to submit reports of protest in writing for formal censorship. On 30 January 1987 the police commissioner was authorized to ban publication of "any matter." The Johannesburg bureau chief of the *New York Times* was expelled from South Africa in January, and his designated successor was not permitted to enter the country.

According to Alex S. Jones, writing in the *New York Times* of 1 March 1987 (p. 20), these restrictions have succeeded in reducing coverage of news from South Africa both in print and on television between June 1986 and January 1987. Thus, our relatively optimistic conclusions about the effects of the initial press restrictions may have to be tempered in light of subsequent developments, although our experience with the coverage data presented in this paper leads us to be wary of over-time comparisons limited to a specific pair of months. In any event it is clear from the results of the Gallup Organization telephone omnibus ($N = 1015$) fielded in March 1987 that public opinion has not been strongly affected. Attentiveness has shown, at most, a marginal decline compared with the March 1986 reading reported in Table 1 ($.10 > p > .05$), and there have been no changes in sympathy of even borderline statistical significance based on the same 12-month comparison ($p > .10$).

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THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A NEW VOTING GAP

MARITAL DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN VOTING

HERBERT F. WEISBERG

Abstract There is now a marriage gap in presidential voting in the United States, with married people voting about 10%–15% more Republican than unmarried people. This voting difference developed in the 1972 election, and it is also evident in party identification. The proportion of unmarried people has doubled since 1964, so this cleavage is important. The gap can be explained statistically in terms of race and income, but still may give politicians the opportunity to gain votes by appealing to voters on the basis of family issues.

Survey researchers have long probed social group differences in voting. They have come to expect certain demographic variables to be related to the vote while others are seen as so irrelevant that they are never examined. Yet familiar voting cleavages can diminish in importance, while new differences can emerge. We generally think of social group differences in the vote as resulting from divergent issue appeals or from mobilization of groups into parties by group leaders, and such appeals and mobilization would be noticed enough for us to look specifically for their effects. However, group voting differences can also emerge more subtly because of the changing demographics of the population. As a result, it is important for us to examine periodically the full range of social group differences in voting.

When one so examines voting in the 1984 American presidential election, one finds the largest voting differences on the basis of race and income, followed in order by differences based on marital status, religion, gender, and region. These differences are familiar ones, ex-

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cept for the unexpected marital difference. In the 1984 presidential election, Ronald Reagan won 63% of the vote of married people, compared to just 51% of the vote of unmarried people. These figures, as well as others in this report, are based on the 1984 American National Election Study, conducted by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS), but an identical difference was obtained in the exit poll of 8,696 voters taken by the *New York Times*/CBS News Poll (New York Times, 1984; Dowd, 1984).

In part, this "marriage gap" may be due to differing appeals by the parties. The Republican party has relied in recent elections more on "family issues," and thus it may appeal more strongly to the family vote. But an understanding of this new voting difference requires an understanding of the changing demographics of American society during this period. The purpose of this article is to describe the marriage gap in voting, while placing it in its appropriate demographic setting.

The Nature of the Marriage Gap in Voting

The marriage gap was not new in 1984. Looking back at the CPS surveys for the last several elections, there was little difference in the presidential voting of married and unmarried people in 1964 or 1968, but the current marriage gap developed in 1972 with a 15% voting difference in that election (see Table 1). In 1976 and 1980, the married vote was 9%–10% more Republican than the unmarried vote among those voting for the two major party candidates. Table 1 shows the 1964–1984 Republican presidential vote proportion by detailed categories of marital status. While the differences are sometimes small, since 1972 each category of unmarried voters has voted less Republican than have married voters.

While the marriage gap has existed since 1972, it has received little notice. The first public attention (Clymer, 1983; Plissner, 1983) followed its detection in the exit polls taken by the *New York Times* and CBS News for the 1982 election. There has been even less scholarly notice of the marriage gap. Indeed, marital status has rarely been examined as a predictor of voting, except for Carroll's (1986) discussion of the voting difference between married and single women in 1980 and 1982.

The magnitude of the marriage gap is middling. It is much smaller than the differences in voting between whites and blacks (the former more Republican by 54% in 1984), between rich and poor Americans, and between Protestants and Jews (30%), but it regains some importance in that more voters are unmarried than are black, in poverty, or Jewish. Furthermore, in 1984 the marriage gap was somewhat larger

Table 1. Republican Vote by Marital Status, 1964-1984

	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984
Married	32.1% (1825)	54.2% (2676)	68.6% (2456)	51.6% (2370)	59.0% (1246)	62.6% (1798)
Unmarried	32.3% (353)	52.6% (719)	53.5% (776)	41.6% (788)	49.9% (479)	50.8% (815)
Never married	34.4% (125)	55.2% (290)	48.5% (412)	45.1% (338)	51.3% (224)	47.2% (371)
Widowed	33.3% (162)	56.4% (296)	67.9% (218)	44.0% (225)	49.2% (124)	48.9% (174)
Divorced	26.2% (42)	52.9% (87)	56.1% (98)	37.4% (153)	49.0% (96)	59.8% (184)
Separated	25.0% (24)	11.4% (44)	26.1% (46)	26.9% (73)	48.0% (25)	51.2% (43)
Unmarried couple living together	—	—	—	—	—	51.2% (43)

SOURCE: American National Election Studies. All data are weighted by the number of adults in the household.

NOTES: Entries show the Republican percentage of the two-party vote. Numbers of cases are shown in parentheses. No value is given when there are 10 or fewer cases in a cell.

than most other social group voting differences which traditionally are considered important, including those between Protestants and Catholics (9% difference), between men and women (7%), and between northern and southern whites (-4%).

The importance of the marriage gap is increased by the fact that 36% of the eligible electorate were unmarried in 1984.¹ Furthermore, this voting difference is amplified by a turnout difference: married people vote in greater proportions than unmarried (by 11% according to these 1984 data).

This voting difference did not develop separately from ideology or partisanship. Married people are about 13% more likely to be conservative in politics than are the unmarried. Married people are also about

1. The results in this paper are weighted by the number of adults in the household (Kish, 1965). This weighting is usually skipped because it generally has little effect on results, but it is important here since there is an obvious relationship between marital status and number of adults in the household. Actually, as Hess (1985:55) found, the weighting had little effect on most attitudinal results but did affect demographics such as the proportion of people who are married. The National Election Studies sample overstates the proportion married by about 3% when compared to 1984 Census estimates (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984), mainly at the expense of the never marrieds.

8% more likely to be Republican in their party identification, a difference that has existed since 1972.

The marriage gap is exacerbated by the more familiar (and smaller) gender gap. A gender gap emerged in the 1980 election, with more men than women voting for Reagan, and that gender gap remained intact in the 1984 election. Reagan did best with married men (65.9% of their vote in 1984), next with married women (59.5%), then unmarried men (55.8%), and worst with unmarried women (47.7%).

The Demographic Basis of the Marital Gap

Understanding the development of the marriage gap requires knowledge of the changing demographics of marriage in the United States. In the last two decades, the proportion of unmarried voters doubled, from about 18% of the public in 1964 to 36% in 1984. This reflects many trends at the same time. Granting the vote to 18- to 20-year-olds increased the number of young voters who were never married. The median age of first marriage by 1984 was 23 for women and 25 for men, the highest values since the turn of the century.² The postponement of marriage further increased the number of unmarried voters. The divorce ratio (defined by the Census Bureau as the number of currently divorced persons per 1,000 currently married persons who live with their spouses) more than tripled since 1960, jumping from 35 to 121 in 1984. This increase in divorces and separations added further to the unmarried voter pool. Additionally, the number of unmarried couples in the United States approached two million by 1984, triple the value of 1970. Putting all of these increases together, the marriage gap emerged just as the number of unmarried voters became large enough to have important political effects.

The marriage gap, however, differs fundamentally from more common demographic differences in voting. Most demographic differences result from early socialization, as when religious or ethnic groups are socialized distinctly into the party system. By contrast, marital status is obviously not due to early life socialization. Instead, the marital status differences are due to decisions and events from the teenage period through middle and old age. The changes in life situations from never-married to married and then to separated, divorced, or widowed could still have political effects, but we should be suspicious of whether the marital voting differences are totally due to changes in

2. The demographic statistics in the text of this paragraph are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984. Klein (1984: chap. 4) provides a perceptive discussion of changing patterns of marriage set within the political context.

marriage situations. This raises the issue of whether the marriage gap is simply a reflection of other voting differences.

Race, gender, and age are three demographic variables antecedent to marriage that must be considered in exploring the nature of the marriage-vote relationship. Since age has a curvilinear relationship with marriage, it will be broken into five categories: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-64, and 65 and over. In the regression analysis that follows, separate dummy variables are included for the two younger and two older age ranges.

Model I in Table 2 shows the results of a path analysis of the 1984 Reagan vote. Only significant paths are included. The first equation shows that marriage is indeed related to age (with lower rates of marriage for the youngest and oldest age categories), race, and gender. The second equation shows that marriage retains significant exploratory power when included as a predictor of vote along with race, gender, and age. Race has the greatest effect, with marriage next ($b = .075$, with a standard error of .022), while gender³ and age are less significant.

Race renders the marriage gap partially spurious. Marital status differs markedly by race. In 1984, about two-thirds of whites were married compared to only one-third of blacks. Since blacks have been voting overwhelmingly Democratic in recent elections, this racial difference in marriage rates induces a voting difference between married and unmarried people. The marriage gap in 1984 decreases by half upon controlling for race: instead of an overall 12% marriage gap, married whites voted Republican more than unmarried whites by 6% (significant), and married blacks voted Republican more than unmarried blacks by 4% (not significant). As the middle columns of Table 3 show, racial differences help account for the marriage gap in the elections of 1972-1984, but a marriage gap persists among whites.⁴

Income is the other relevant factor in understanding the marriage gap (Clymer, 1983; Dowd, 1984). It is a critical intervening variable in the relationship between marriage and vote. As Model II in Table 2 shows, family income is a key determinant of the 1984 presidential vote (see also Wattenberg, 1985), and income varies by marital status. In part, this reflects the higher family incomes for married couples when both are employed outside of the house, while unmarried voters are generally limited to a single income. Race, age, and gender have direct effects on income in addition to their indirect effects through their effects on marital status. Race still has a direct effect on vote when

3. It is unnecessary to examine gender more carefully, as the marriage gap does not substantially change with gender controlled.

4. By contrast, the marriage gap among blacks is generally insignificant and inconsistent in direction and so will not be considered further here.

Table 2. Path Analysis of 1984 Reagan Vote

Model I		Model II			
Demographics → Marriage → Vote					
	Marriage	Reagan Vote	Demographics	Marriage	Reagan Vote
White	.150***	.321***		.150***	.294***
Male	.064***	.047*		.064***	.091***
Age					
18-24	-.380***	.054*		-.380***	.054*
25-34	-.047*			-.047*	
45-64					
> 64	-.116***			-.116***	.061*
Married		.071***			.169***
Income		.111***			.141***
R-squared	.177***			.177***	.206***

SOURCE: 1984 American National Election Study. All data are weighted by the number of adults in the household.

NOTES: Entries are path coefficients for recursive models shown above. Values are given only for significant paths.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3. Marriage Gap by Race and Income, 1972-1984

	Overall	Whites	Blacks	Whites, with Income Controlled
1972	15.1** (3232)	8.0** (2932)	8.9* (257)	5.5* (2860)
1976	10.0** (2578)	9.4** (2840)	-4.1 (228)	3.2 (2659)
1980	9.1** (1725)	5.4 (1510)	-.7 (203)	5.9 (1364)
1984	11.8** (2613)	6.0** (2324)	4.3 (234)	-1.3 (2105)

SOURCE: American National Election Studies. All data are weighted by the number of adults in the household.

NOTES: Entries are regression slopes, showing the differences between the Republican proportion of the two-party vote among married people and the same among unmarried people.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

income is included in the equation, but marriage no longer has a significant direct effect. Marital status affects voting mainly through the income differences between married and unmarried people.

If the marriage gap is partially explained by race and family income taken separately, it disappears completely when both factors are taken into account. In separate regression analyses for whites in 1972, 1976, 1980, and 1984, marital status does not have an impact on the vote when family income is included in the equations. The last column of Table 3 gives the regression slopes; they are inconsistent in sign and generally not significant. Table 4 shows the Reagan vote for whites in

Table 4. Reagan Proportion of 1984 White Vote, by Family Income and Marital Status

Family Income	Married (N)	Unmarried(N)
<\$7,000	45.2% (42)	46.2% (91)
\$7-14,000	52.1% (165)	54.5% (123)
\$14-30,000	62.9% (539)	60.8% (166)
\$30-60,000	68.7% (630)	63.9% (144)
>\$60,000	83.6% (152)	79.2% (53)

SOURCE: 1984 American National Election Study. All data are weighted by the number of adults in the household.

1984 by income and marital status. There is some indication of interaction here, with Reagan doing better among lower-income unmarrieds and higher-income marrieds, but the main message is that voting differences between married and unmarried whites of the same income category are small and inconsistent in direction. The breakdown by income for blacks is not shown since the marriage gap is not significant among blacks.

Thus, the marriage gap is largely a combination of racial and income voting differences. When Democratic politicians appeal to blacks and poor people while Republican leaders appeal to whites and richer Americans, the demographics of marriage lead to a marriage gap in voting.

Conclusions

A marriage gap in voting developed in the 1972 election and has persisted through 1984. Married people are now regularly voting more Republican than single people by 10%–15%. This voting difference partly reflects the differing racial bases of the parties and partly reflects the income differences in their support coalitions.

This statistical explanation obviously reduces the political significance of the marriage gap. However, the marriage gap can be relevant politically, even if it can be accounted for statistically by the demographics of marital status. Party leaders who now find that their traditional racial and income appeals have led to a marriage gap in voting may choose to focus their appeals more directly on family issues that would increase this division (Fineman, 1986). Thus, changing demographics provide the political parties with new opportunities as well as new challenges.

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THE ILLUSION OF INTIMACY

TELEVISION AND THE ROLE OF CANDIDATE PERSONAL QUALITIES IN VOTER CHOICE

SCOTT KEETER

Abstract The role of television in the increased candidate orientedness of voters in U.S. presidential elections was examined using data from eight National Election Studies conducted by the Survey Research Center at The University of Michigan. The importance of candidate personal qualities and traits was estimated using voter responses to open-ended questions about the candidates. Candidate personal qualities became more important for television dependent voters during the 1960s, and in each post-1964 election were less important for voters who relied on newspapers than for those who relied on television. The differences did not appear to be a function of the higher level of education of newspaper readers.

The availability of over thirty years of carefully collected survey data has made possible the study of change in how voters choose among presidential candidates. An important finding of studies utilizing these data is the increased importance of candidate personal qualities (see, among others, Popkin et al., 1976; and Kirkpatrick et al., 1975). Coincident with this change has been the birth and development of television, now the most widely used medium of political information. This paper examines the role of television in the increased candidate-orientedness of the public, and offers empirical support for the proposition that television has facilitated and encouraged vote choices based upon the personal qualities of candidates.

Television's potential for affecting the criteria of choice in elections was noted from the start. Looking ahead to the first "TV election," Jack Gould, television critic for the *New York Times*, wrote in the summer of 1952 that

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... a TV-aware electorate is not going to be voting for a man merely on the basis of his reputation, or his thoughts as recorded in the printed word, or his disembodied voice as it comes out of a loudspeaker. Television makes the candidate of today a human being at one's elbow, who is going to be judged on the same terms as a man greets any new acquaintance. (Gould 1972:21)

Since then, television's image-making power is thought to have been influential in most elections, particularly in the Nixon-Kennedy debates, in Nixon's return to politics in 1968, and in Carter's campaign of trust and honesty in 1976.

And yet the search for clear evidence of television's impact has been mostly futile. As Joseph Wagner's (1983) review of research indicates, except for event-specific or group-specific phenomena, the quantitative literature has for the most part confirmed the "minimal effects" thesis. Beyond this, content analyses of television and newspapers suggest that the two media present very similar images of candidates (Hofstetter, 1976; Meadow, 1973; Evarts and Stempel, 1974; Patterson, 1980). Voters' perceptions of the personal qualities of candidates do not appear to vary with the particular mix of their information sources (Patterson and McClure, 1976; Miller and Jackson, 1973).

However, while voters may hold similar images of candidates regardless of how they obtain political information, the importance of candidate images—relative to other information—may be greater for voters who depend upon television. Despite similarities with other media, television by its nature provides a qualitatively different product. It provides the candidate as a person. This is a function of the visual and *actual* nature of television's content, and is reinforced by practices of its news organizations and personnel that serve to downplay cognitive content. Doris Graber's analysis of campaign news on television and newspapers supports this view:

The skimpiness of television issue coverage, particularly the dearth of quotes by candidates, meant that people who relied primarily on television for campaign information learned little about the candidates' stands on issues and even less about the candidates' priorities. This left the television viewer with information weighted heavily in favor of using characteristics of the man, rather than issue positions, as voting criteria. (Graber, 1976:300–301).

Wagner (1983:415–426) provided evidence that the television's slighting of issues leaves the television-dependent voter less able to discriminate between candidates on the basis of issues (see also Clarke and Fredin, 1978). Thus, voters choose as best they can. Television makes information about candidates personal qualities cheaper to obtain than

information about issues. And regardless of its accuracy, such information obtained through television seems more credible. As Benjamin Page put it, "perceptions of personality are no longer limited to hearsay" (Page, 1978:264).

This paper will examine changes in the electoral importance of candidate personal qualities since the advent of television, and assess the role played by television in those changes. While the general topic is the rise of candidate-orientedness, the specific focus is upon the importance of voters' perceptions of candidates' personal characteristics that could be created or shaped through vicarious "encounters" with candidates on television. The central research question is whether the type of medium a voter depends upon for campaign information is related to the importance of candidates' personal qualities in the voter's choice. Of course, most Americans are exposed to televised political information. Campaign spot advertising and upbeat news have seen to that. Consequently, ascertaining television's effects is difficult. But voters' dependence upon television varies sufficiently to permit a comparison using survey data.

Method

The data are from eight presidential election studies conducted by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) at The University of Michigan. These data have been the staple of most voting behavior research in the United States. Voters' chief source of information was determined by items that asked respondents to identify the medium they "got the most (campaign) information from" (1952-1968) or "rely on most for news about political and current events" (1976 and 1980). This question was not asked in 1972 or 1984, but because some respondents in the 1972 study were included in a three-wave panel (1972-1974-1976), their responses to a comparable question in 1974 can be used to divide the 1972 sample.¹

The criteria used by citizens to evaluate the candidates were determined using the series of open-ended questions that asked respondents

1. The wording for the item in the studies from 1952 to 1968 was: "Of all the ways of following the campaign, which one would you say you got the most information from—newspapers, radio, television, or magazines?" After 1956, radio and magazines combined accounted for less than 10 percent of the choices of respondents. In 1974 and 1976, the wording was: "Which do you rely on most for news about politics and current events—newspapers or television?" In 1980, the question read "In general, which do you rely on most for news about politics and current events, television, newspapers, magazines, or radio?" The marginals for 1976 were: 65% "television," 19%, "newspapers," and 17% "both" (volunteered). For all years, only those respondents who said "newspapers" or "television" were included in the analysis. Other researchers who have compared television viewers and newspaper readers include Clarke and Fredin (1978), Robinson (1976), and Wagner (1983).

"Is there anything in particular about [candidate] that might make you want to vote for [against] him?" These questions were asked early in the interview, prior to other substantive questions about the candidates that might contaminate the answers by suggesting criteria of evaluation. Respondents were prompted for up to five discrete answers (three in 1972) to each of the four questions. Typically, over 80% of voters had something to say about each candidate. These responses provide an excellent measure of the particular candidate attributes salient to citizens. Scholars using these data ordinarily group the responses according to common themes, corresponding to theoretical "criteria" underlying voter decision-making. For convenience, the CPS performs this grouping in its codebooks, employing such categories as "candidate leadership qualities," "personal qualities," and "party connections" (see Stokes, 1966; Miller and Miller, 1976; and Glass, 1985, for examples of this method).

The present study employed four categories, two of which pertained to candidate characteristics. One of these was "executive capacity and experience," including mentions of the candidates' activities and associations in politics. Among such references were: "He was a good governor," "comes from a good family," "a military man," or "He's a patriot." The second category of references to the candidates was "personal qualities and traits," including, for example, "good smile," "humble," "a good speaker," "honest," "sincere," "trustworthy," "good sense of humor," "smart," or the opposites of these. While television may promote a comprehensive candidate-orientedness in voters, the separate categories for experience and personal qualities facilitate a more narrow focus on the specific hypothesis that seeing the candidates on television encourages vote choices based on personal traits.

The third category of voter response included references to issues, ideology, or groups in society likely to be helped or hurt by the candidate. A fourth category was necessitated by the rather large number of unspecific responses. Frequently given evaluations such as "He's a good man" or "I don't like his policies" (and being unwilling or unable to name specific policies) indicate affection or disaffection, but are so devoid of substance as to preclude a sound judgment about the nature of the criteria used by the voter. To avoid discarding information while not confounding the other categories, these responses were assigned to a category called "vague."

The pertinence of different kinds of comments about candidates was ascertained using a multivariate candidate choice model, which included variables for the four components described above, plus party identification, attitudes toward the parties, age, education, and income. Multiple regression analysis permits the estimation of the impor-

tance of each variable—including the four criteria: policies, personal qualities and traits, executive capacity and experience, and “vague”—to the vote.

The construction of the four candidate criterion variables was straightforward. Each respondent said what was liked and disliked about each candidate. These responses were sorted into the four categories. Within each category, the extent to which a particular candidate is advantaged or disadvantaged was determined by subtracting the number of unfavorable remarks from the number of favorable remarks for each candidate, and then taking the difference of those two values. This net score in each category then becomes one indicator of how the respondent may vote. Multiple regression analysis, using a linear probability model and ordinary least squares, allows us to see the extent to which the respondents' net score in each category is associated with the vote—in other words, the “weight” of each component.² For example, if one candidate receives many more favorable mentions on issues than does his opponent, his advantage in the issue category will be large. But despite this, if the voters are more concerned with, say, that candidate's perceived lack of moral fiber, and they vote against him on that basis, then his favorable issue score will be relatively uncorrelated with the vote, and the weight of issues will be low. The voters liked his stand on issues, but they voted on other grounds.

A test of the hypothesis that television promotes candidate-orientedness can be made by separating respondents by media use and comparing the relative importance of references to candidate characteristics for those who depend upon television and those who depend on newspapers.

2. Similar models have frequently been used in research on voting behavior, despite generally recognized difficulties. A chief objection to regression is the use of a dichotomous dependent variable (the vote). Kagay and Caldeira performed analyses similar to mine for the elections from 1952 to 1972, using both regression and probit analysis. The results with the two methods were virtually identical (Kagay and Caldeira, 1975:12, appendix). For a dissenting view, see Aldrich and Cnudde (1975).

The exact equation for each election is as follows: $VOTE$ (dichotomous; Democrat = 1, Republican = 0) = $EDUCATION$ (as coded by the CPS; for the most studies it was years of formal education) + AGE (in years) + $INCOME$ (as recorded by the CPS but recoded to produce a ratio scale) + $PARTY IDENTIFICATION$ (Democrat, independent, Republican) + $NET SCORE OF RESPONSES ABOUT CANDIDATE PERSONAL QUALITIES AND TRAITS$ + $NET SCORE OF RESPONSES ABOUT CANDIDATE EXECUTIVE CAPACITY AND EXPERIENCE$ + $NET SCORE OF RESPONSES ABOUT CANDIDATE POLICIES$ + $NET SCORE OF VAGUE RESPONSES$. The net score terms were computed as follows: [(# of favorable responses about Democratic candidate) - (# of unfavorable responses about Democratic candidate)] - [(# of favorable responses about Republican candidate) - (# of unfavorable responses about Republican candidate)].

Wallace and Anderson voters were excluded from the analysis in 1968 and 1980, respectively.

Results

Table 1 shows the results of the analysis for the four criteria based upon the open-ended questions, plus party identification (the demographic variables and attitudes about the parties have been omitted from this presentation). The table includes the unstandardized regression coefficients (*b*'s), standard errors, and sample sizes for each media use group. For ease of comprehension, the trends for executive capacity and experience, personal qualities and traits, and party identification are plotted in Figures 1, 2, and 3 respectively.

In Figure 1 (executive capacity and experience) we see no clear pattern. This criterion was particularly important in 1956 and 1976. In three of the four most recent elections, the *b*'s were larger for the television group than for the newspaper group.

For the category of personal qualities and traits (Figure 2), the expected pattern appears. Candidate personal qualities and traits have been more important for the television group than for the newspaper group in every election since 1964.³ In the first two elections—1952 and 1956—the weights for personal qualities were relatively low for the television group (*b* averaged under .02). In 1960, the weight doubled to .034. In 1964 and 1968, the weight rose to .05, then to .09 in 1972, .07 in 1976, and back to about .05 in 1980. The weights for personal qualities for the newspaper group also rose from 1956 to 1960, but since that time—with the exception of 1972—they have remained at a relatively low level, smaller than those seen for the television group.

Could the differences in the importance of candidate personal qualities be a spurious consequence of the different kinds of people attracted to television and newspapers? Perhaps cognitive political sophistication is related both to media use and to the criteria used for voting. Sophisticated citizens might be less likely to use candidate personal qualities as a basis for choice, and also to use newspapers for information. If we may take education as a surrogate for cognitive political sophistication, a test for spuriousness is possible.

However, as David Glass's (1985) analysis demonstrated, level of education is not systematically related to the weight of candidate personal qualities. Citizens with lower levels of formal education are not more likely than those with higher levels to choose candidates on the basis of candidate personal qualities. Controlling for education does not eliminate the differences in the weight of candidate personal qualities between television viewers and newspaper readers. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis for 1976, including both media use and

3. The statistical significance of differences between the media-use groups was computed using the formula $(b_1 - b_2) / (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2)^{1/2} = z$. The differences for 1968 ($p < .03$) and 1976 ($p < .002$) were significant beyond the .05 level in a one-tail test.

Table 1. Weights for Components of the Candidate Choice Model, 1952 to 1980, by Respondents' Chief Source of Information

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Executive Capacity								
Newspaper readers								
slope	.040	.085	.052	.051	.042	.025	.057	.071
standard error	.015	.016	.018	.022	.020	.036	.013	.020
Television viewers								
slope	.007	.050	.082	.043	.063	.047	.085	.063
standard error	.012	.013	.015	.016	.014	.036	.010	.015
Personal Qualities								
Newspaper readers								
slope	.019	.018	.048	.040	.020	.079	.035	.038
standard error	.016	.013	.009	.011	.013	.025	.010	.019
Television viewers								
slope	.016	.016	.034	.049	.050	.087	.074	.045
standard error	.011	.010	.007	.008	.009	.028	.008	.012
Issues, Groups								
Newspaper readers								
slope	.054	.057	.078	.055	.051	.067	.050	.057
standard error	.021	.017	.011	.011	.014	.016	.012	.013
Television viewers								
slope	.057	.039	.052	.033	.044	.085	.051	.074
standard error	.016	.012	.009	.007	.011	.018	.008	.009
Vague References								
Newspaper readers								
slope	.080	.043	.068	.109	.078	.042	.074	.061
standard error	.026	.024	.016	.018	.019	.037	.020	.024
Television viewers								
slope	.055	.071	.076	.095	.057	.105	.062	.072
standard error	.021	.016	.011	.012	.012	.039	.012	.016
Party Identification								
Newspaper readers								
slope	.131	.171	.219	.136	.240	.214	.228	.204
standard error	.027	.026	.020	.024	.032	.025	.025	.028
Television viewers								
slope	.186	.216	.239	.144	.164	.169	.175	.193
standard error	.021	.021	.011	.017	.021	.026	.015	.020
Number of Cases								
Newspaper readers	251	300	333	275	186	254	327	171
Television viewers	402	591	851	577	440	283	894	470

SOURCE: National Election Studies of the Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan.




Figure 1. Weight of Executive Capacity

education. The small number of cases in some groups urges caution, but the results actually underscore the apparent media effect, since candidate personal qualities were most important for *college-educated* television viewers.

It should be noted that while the weight of personal qualities has increased since the 1950s, the incidence of these comments has changed little over the period. Two measures of this—the percentage of all respondents that made at least one mention of candidate personal qualities, and the proportion of all mentions that fell into this category—show no trend over time. This suggests that the *salience* of such attributes relative to others has changed little. People have long thought about and discussed the candidates as people. However, the *pertinence* of such attributes to the vote clearly increased, at least through 1976, for those voters dependent upon television for their political information.

The pattern of increase in the weight of candidate personal qualities for the television-dependent group—in particular the rise from the 1950s to 1964—comports well with contemporary analyses of the his-




Figure 2. Weight of Personal Qualities

Table 2. The Importance of Candidate Personal Qualities and Traits, by Education and Media Use, 1976

	Less than High School Diploma	High School Diploma	At Least Some College
Newspaper readers			
slope	.027	.035	.033
standard error	.079	.026	.011
N cases	37	107	184
Television viewers			
slope	.067	.055	.085
standard error	.019	.015	.013
N cases	251	328	316

SOURCE: 1976 National Election Study, Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan.

tory of political television. Among others, Robinson (1977:25-26) has argued that both the audience and the content of political television changed markedly in the early 1960s. Political programming in the 1950s was sparse, relatively dull, and sufficiently lengthy for easy avoidance (exceptions to this pattern existed, of course: Eisenhower made use of spot advertising as early as 1952, Edward R. Murrow's "See It Now" was popular, and the debates between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy commanded large audiences). The modernization of the medium, as manifested in longer, more provocative newscasts and extensive use of short campaign ads, occurred in the early 1960s. At the same time, programming developments and the declining cost of television receivers combined to change the social composition of the audience for political television during this period. Although television's penetration into American homes was rapid, the correlation between social status and the viewing of programs about the presidential campaign remained fairly high through the 1960 election. In 1964, that association had vanished.⁴

The increase in candidate-orientedness for the television group was not accompanied by a decrease in the weight of other substantive criteria. As the data in Table 1 indicate, the overall weight of policy and vague mentions has not changed very much, although sharp oscillations in both are seen.

Was any factor, then, *less* important for the television group? One answer to this question is found in the data for the weight of party identification (see Figure 3). They provide support for Philip Converse's "modified floating voter hypothesis" (Converse, 1962). Converse argued that uninformed citizens would vote their party identification unless moved by short-term information, which, given their low level of attention to politics, was unlikely to reach them. Well-informed citizens were also likely to vote according to party, since they tended to be more committed to a particular party for programmatic reasons. Party identification was thus a good predictor because citizens most likely to veer from it were least likely to be nudged by new information. As plausible as this hypothesis is, little evidence has been found to support it (Dreyer, 1971; Zukin, 1977; Joslyn 1977; Bybee et al., 1981).

Yet the development of television as a true *mass* medium for political information in the early 1960s greatly increased the likelihood that citizens with relatively little interest in politics would be exposed to short-term campaign information. The pattern in Figure 3 fits well with this interpretation. In the three elections prior to 1964, party

4. Gamma between family income and the viewing of programs about the campaign followed this pattern: 1952, .46; 1956, .48; 1960, .36; 1964, .03.




Figure 3. Attitudes on American Troops and German NATO Membership, 1970–1984.

Favor U.S. Withdrawal: Percentage replying "welcome" in response to the question "If you would read in the newspapers tomorrow that the Americans withdraw their troops from Europe, would you welcome or regret that?" *Source:* Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 12; data from IfD.

German NATO Membership: Percentage in favor of the Western alliance in response to the question "In your opinion, what would be the better policy, should we continue our firm military alliance with the Americans, or should we attempt to be neutral, like Switzerland, e.g.?" *Source:* Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 17; data from EMNID, IfD, SINUS.

hypothesis talks about the dramatic break away from prior attitude patterns as being concentrated among younger cohorts.

However, even such a crude analysis indicates that there might be some problems with this hypothesis if applied to the public at large. Over the fifteen years that the data in Figures 1 through 4 describe, considerable generational replacement had to take place, but the trends in the time series simply do not show that the opinions commonly ascribed to the new generations have become more frequent. On the contrary, these trends point instead in the opposite direction, even though these generations' share of the samples has become bigger each year. If one tries to save the argument by claiming that the new attitude patterns have lain dormant, in spite of generational replacement, until polarized debates set in after the NATO decision of 1979, there still is little evidence, because this would have to manifest itself in clear-cut shifts in aggregate public opinion in the early 1980s. Such




Figure 4. Attitudes on the Possibility of Defense and the Importance of Armed Forces, 1970–1984.

Defense Possible: Percentage replying "strong enough" in response to the question "Assuming that the Russians and the National People's Army of the GDR would attack us, do you believe that NATO, including the Bundeswehr [i.e., the FRG's army], would be strong enough to protect us effectively, or do you think that the Russians would overwhelm us?" Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 23; data from EMNID, IfD, SOWI.

Bundeswehr (very) Important: Percentage replying "important" or "very important" to the question "In our times and with the current situation of the world, do you believe that the Bundeswehr is very important, important, not that important, unimportant, superfluous, or dangerous?" Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 30; data from SOWI, Federal Ministry of Defense.

shifts, however, cannot be discerned. With this initial doubt in mind, let us now have a closer look at whether age really was the crucial dividing line along which national security attitudes in the Federal Republic have lined up in the past couple of years.

Generational Replacement or Partisan Polarization?

Table 1 represents the polarization of 16 different defense policy attitude items from summer 1981 to summer 1983 according to age and partisan preference of the respondents. Since these items came from many different surveys and the data were taken from published material, the delineation of age cohorts was not the same in all cases. For all

Table 1. Polarization of National Security Attitudes by Age and Party Preference

Question (Month/Year)	Extreme Percentage in Any Age Group		Dif- fer- ence	Percentage among Party Voters		Dif- fer- ence
	30 and Below	40 and Above		Green Party	CDU/ CSU	
1. There is a military threat to FRG (5/83)	44	47	3	46	77	31
2. FRG should accept the neutron bomb (8/81)	26	31	5	10	42	32
3. Agreement with INF deployment in respondent's area (6/83)	18	23	5	3	35	32
4. Opposition against INF in FRG (2/83)	59	51	8	73	40	33
5. FRG should accept U.S. leadership (5/82)	26	35	9	21	39	18
6. Détente should be continued (3/82)	71	61	10	84	52	32
7. FRG should leave NATO under no circumstances (3/82)	74	84	10	58	87	29
8. NATO is necessary for FRG (5/83)	82	93	11	56	96	40
9. FRG-U.S. relations are "good" (8/82)	49	62	13	44	61	17
10. Agree with production of neutron bomb (8/81)	29	42	13	13	54	41
11. If Geneva talks fail, continue talks and do not deploy INF (7/83)	86	72	14	96	62	34
12. Peace in Europe has become less secure in previous year (5/83)	57	72	15	73	27	46
13. Warsaw Pact is militarily superior (5/83)	35	52	17	24	52	28
14. Nuclear weapons are unacceptable for Christians (4/83)	65	38	27	85	33	52
15. Would participate in protest demonstrations in case of INF deployment (8/83)	27	0	27	49	2	47
16. Peace movement is necessary for FRG (5/83)	69	35	34	93	35	58
Mean			14			36

SOURCES: All questions except nos. 6, 7, and 15 were asked by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (FGW), and published in its "Politbarometer" reports. Questions 6 and 7 come from CONTEST-CENSUS in Frankfurt, and no. 15 was asked by EMNID. Complete question wordings, response distributions, and breakdowns by age, sex, etc., can be found in these institutes' reports, or in Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: tables 107-122.

items, therefore, the two age cohorts below 30 years and above 40 years that were widest apart in their responses were identified (first and second columns of Table 1). The difference in their opinions (third column of Table 1) is the maximum polarization between any two age groups, and the rows of Table 1 have been ordered with increasing magnitude of this difference. The maximum distances of opinion according to partisan preference without exception occurred between those who intended to vote for the CDU/CSU, and for the Green party, respectively, so columns four through six of Table 1 describe attitudes of these two partisan groups and their polarization.

The "successor generation" in the early 1980s clearly differed from older West Germans in its opinions on national security. On all sixteen items the extreme value for younger people shows them to be more antimilitary, anti-U.S., and anti-NATO. However, most of these differences are far from being dramatic, especially if one considers the way they were computed, i.e., searching for the *maximum* polarization between any younger and any older cohort. Moreover, only for four items (9, 13, 14, 16) is the majority reversed, and only for two of these items (14 and 16) is this reversal very strong: While about two-thirds of the respondents in the extreme cohort below 30 years held nuclear weapons to be basically unacceptable for Christians, and the peace movement to be necessary for the Federal Republic, only slightly above one-third of those in the extreme cohort over 40 years shared these views. With an average difference of 14 percentage points, the polarization according to age really does not support the notion of a radical break of the views of the "successor generation" from those of older Germans, even on such issues as the neutron bomb (ERW), NATO membership, or INF deployment. It is undoubtedly true that most antimilitary and anti-U.S. activists of the early 1980s have been younger people, but the reverse, that the young tend to be antimilitary and anti-U.S. activists, simply is not supported by the available data.

As can be seen in Table 1, public opinion on each item tended to be polarized much more strongly along partisan lines. With an average difference of 36 percentage points between sympathizers of the Green party and of the CDU/CSU, the former conform much more closely to the notions often advanced about the "successor generation" as a whole. Polarization along both criteria is least dissimilar for perceptions of the military balance, and for opinions on U.S.-West German relations (items 13, 5, and 9), and it is much more pronounced along partisan than along generational divides for all items relating to INF deployment, ERWs, détente, and threat perception. For eight items there is a reversal of majority between adherents of the Green party and of the CDU/CSU. In four cases this reversal is only moderate (items 1, 9, 10, 13), but for the other four items (4, 12, 14, 16) compara-

tively small minorities within one group correspond to outspoken majorities within the other group, and vice versa. However, even in spite of this rather significant extent of partisan polarization, majorities of both groups agree on such issues as support of German membership in NATO, skepticism about American leadership, the necessity to continue détente, and on preferring further disarmament talks over INF deployment.

The question now, of course, is what this all means in terms of the "successor generation" hypothesis. First, it is obvious that the wholesale departure from previous attitude patterns regarding national security issues is *not* characteristic of youth as a whole, but mostly of those younger people who sympathize with the Green party. In the 1987 Bundestag elections the Green vote in the 18–24 (25–34) age bracket was 15.5% (17.4%), so even equating the Green electorate with the better-educated segments of the younger cohorts would be a gross exaggeration. And even the Green electorate itself with its strong bias toward youth is quite far from being a monolithically antimilitary, anti-NATO, anti-U.S. bloc, as Table 1 shows. Younger people *outside* the Green electorate show little resemblance with the "successor generation" stereotype.

Second, the fact that the covariation of national security opinions is so much stronger with party preference than with age forces us to rethink the problem of causality. Between partisan preferences and attitudes on specific political issues a variety of causal patterns is conceivable. At the one extreme you have those who intend to vote for a particular party because it is closest to them on the issues that they judge most salient. At the other extreme are those who like a particular party best for a variety of other reasons and for the sake of consistency accept this party's positions in areas that are less salient for them. Regarding different political problems one and the same individual can easily fall into both groups. In the Federal Republic there is, of course, another political issue area that heavily, if not primarily, mobilizes Green support, namely, environmental problems. The fact that even the comparatively strongly mobilized Green electorate is far from monolithic in its defense policy opinions demonstrates that it is possible for Green voters to disagree with "their" party in this issue area. It is therefore equally possible that some of those who toe the party line in these opinions do not do so because these are the attitudes that tie them to this party, but simply because they support its proclaimed stand in most ongoing political debates, even if they do not center around the issues that have constituted the initial allegiance.

Such an interpretation of elite–mass interactions is much broader than the "successor generation" hypothesis, indeed comprises it as a special case. It is possible that societal conflict and elite political de-

bates are brought about by the polarization of mass attitudes due to generational replacement, but it is equally possible that polarization at the mass level in part *results* from polarization of elite conflict over particular issues. In the short run, both processes might look very similar at the aggregate level, but they should differ considerably in terms of long-run consequences. Generational replacement is a slow historical process that cannot be halted and can be only slowly counteracted by life cycle effects. Polarization along party lines both at the elite and at the mass level, on the other hand, can come about quite quickly, with the issues of the day, relevant issue publics, and dividing lines more or less in flux.

From the data presented so far it seems safe to conclude that the "successor generation" hypothesis can hardly be proclaimed as the clear-cut winner. This becomes even more obvious if one considers the changes of defense policy attitudes that could be observed in the early 1980s for adherents of even the two major established parties of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, changes that to a considerable degree occurred irrespective of age. For reasons of space it is impossible here to trace at any length how the SPD's electorate followed the party's withdrawal from support of NATO's 1979 decision; it happened gradually at first and then quite rapidly after the overthrow of the Schmidt government in late 1982. Only a small but impressive example of the direct impact of partisan attitudes on national security opinions will be presented.

From 1981 through 1984 "Forschungsgruppe Wahlen" in Mannheim regularly polled whether peace in Europe was evaluated as having become more or less secure over the past year. In the total population, perceptions of peace as having become less secure fell between 1981 and 1984 from 67% to 27% (1982, 57%; 1983, 37%), while perceptions of no change or greater stability of peace increased from 33% to 73%. Whether this trend signals either the dissolution of earlier alarmist notions or evaluations that things were already so bad they couldn't get worse is irrelevant here. All we are concerned with is the breakdown of this trend according to party preference for the CDU/CSU or all other parties combined, presented in Figure 5.

In 1982 CDU/CSU voters were exactly like the rest; in 1981 they had been somewhat more pessimistic. In 1983, however, their pessimism regarding the stability of peace dropped by more than 30 percentage points and then paralleled the general downward trend, but at a much lower level. On the whole, within these three years pessimism among CDU/CSU voters fell by almost 60 percentage points, among all others by less than 30. The reason for this phenomenal short-term development clearly is the change in government. With "their" party in power, most Christian Democratic voters simply accepted the new govern-




Figure 5. Attitudes on the Stability of Peace by Partisanship, 1981-1984

ment's position that there was no reason to worry about the stability of peace in Europe, even with Western INF deployment imminent. Neither the strong aggregate short-term downward trend of pessimism (that was evident even among Green voters whose pessimism fell from 82% to 63% between 1981 and 1984) nor its clear-cut differentiation along partisan lines can be made to square with generational explanations. Instead, we see that even "cognitions" of factual conditions in the "real world" of security policy can change quickly and dramatically according to partisan attitudes.

Attitudes, Nonattitudes, and Information on National Security

Up to here it has (implicitly) been assumed that people who are being polled for their opinions on defense policy actually do have such attitudes, and that these attitudes can be adequately measured. As long as one only wants to follow trends of response distributions over time or to compare them between subsamples, as has been done so far, this assumption does not pose much of a problem—at least as long as one is willing to additionally assume that those without attitudes believe the

same and that distortions of measurement are the same all the time and within all subsamples. However, when it comes to what polling is all about for most of its consumers, i.e., to say what public attitudes really look like and how they are distributed, things are far more complicated. In this final section this problem will be approached in three steps: First, we will have a closer look at the range of survey results that were obtained on the double-track decision and its implementation in the Federal Republic. Assuming that the variations that can be observed might have something to do with the knowledge people have about these things, some data on levels of relevant information will then be presented. Third, and finally, we will briefly report some methodological experiments to test the impact of question formats and wordings on national security opinions.

The major survey research institutes in the Federal Republic did not conduct such experiments of their own in the early 1980s. They were too busy trying to find out what people *really* thought about the NATO decision and INF deployment. In doing so a whole variety of questions on this subject were asked, sometimes almost exactly at the same time, and a variety of contradictory findings were reported—and greedily absorbed into the political debates. In that way, however, a large-scale experiment was conducted involuntarily.

Table 2 contains results from eight different questions on the double-track decision and INF deployment that were asked between only one to eight different times between January 1981 and October 1983 by various institutes. For all these questions except one, a high proportion of refusals (between one-fourth and one-third) to choose from the closed-ended responses is visible. This exception is whether INF should be deployed after the scheduled date if no success were to emerge from the Geneva talks, a question that also produced the largest antideployment majority. Opposition still greatly outnumbers favorable responses for the next two questions, but with the invocation of Soviet SS-20s targeted on Western Europe in the fourth question the gap begins to close. Questions 3 and 5 are particularly interesting because they form the only genuine split-half experimental design. The third question was put to a subsample in October 1981 without explaining the number of SS-20 warheads targeted on Western Europe and the fact that there were no comparable weapons in the West. Not surprisingly, there is a reversal of the majority between the two question formats; given this prior information in question 5 more respondents favored deployment than opposed it. In spite of this experiment, the version *containing* this information was continued and the other was not.

Even though there is no reference to *new* nuclear weapons in question 6, at that time it had to become interpreted in terms of imminent

Table 2. Attitudes on INF Deployment and the Double-Track Decision, 1981-1983

Question	No. of Surveys	Dates of Surveys	Attitudes on INF and NATO's Double-Track Decision		Percent Don't Know, Undecided
			Percent Favorable	Percent Opposed	
1	6	5-9/83	24(25)	72(75)	4
2	4	5/81-1/82	28(38)	45(62)	27
3	1	10/81	28(39)	44(61)	28
4	2	8-10/83	34(44)	43(56)	23
5	4	1/81-4/82	38(52)	35(48)	27
6	5	7/81-4/82	40(61)	26(39)	34
7	1	8/83	46(68)	22(32)	32
8	8	5/81-8/83	51(70)	22(30)	27
Mean			37(49)	39(51)	24

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are percentages without "don't know" or "undecided."

QUESTIONS: 1. If the Geneva talks fail to yield an agreement until fall, what should be done? Deploy INF (with or without continuing negotiations) vs. continue talks without deployment. (FGW, Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft in Bad Godesberg [INFAS]; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: tables 81-83)

2. NATO plans to deploy American INF in Europe, and in the FRG, to balance Soviet INF. Do you welcome this or not? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 49)

3. Do you favor deployment of new nuclear missiles, that can reach the Soviet Union, in the FRG or not? (United States International Communications Agency [USICA]; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 52)

4. If the Geneva talks fail to yield an agreement until fall and the Soviet Union keeps its SS 20 missiles targeted on Western Europe, should new American INF be deployed in the FRG according to the double-track decision or not? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 84)

5. Question as in 3, with previous information: As you might know, the Russians have about 450 nuclear warheads on new missiles, the SS 20s, targeted on Western Europe, whereas NATO does not have such missiles that are targeted on the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, . . . ? (USICA; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 51)

6. Do you believe that nuclear weapons in Europe help prevent a Soviet attack, or do you think that they make a Soviet attack more likely? (USICA; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 56)

7. Assuming we can only choose between leaving NATO or deploying the new American missiles in the FRG, what should we do? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 85)

8. In the double-track decision NATO nations have agreed to balance Soviet INF by deploying similar missiles in Central Europe while initiating negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of armaments. Do you think that this double-track decision is good or not good? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 47)

INF deployment. Precisely because there is no such reference, favorable responses exceed opposition, but there is a great deal of insecurity. Question 7 shows how people can be pushed into favoring INF, even though new deployment in the Federal Republic is explicitly mentioned, by posing withdrawal from NATO as the alternative. Question 8, finally, by focusing on the NATO decision and mentioning its intention to negotiate arms reductions, produces the highest share of favorable responses. Thus, in the early 1980s a wide range of results of surveys on this topic was available to choose from. Depending on one's predilections one could claim either that only one-fourth or that more than half of the West German population agreed with the December 1979 decision and its implications. If, as is often done, don't knows and undecided respondents are excluded, one could describe about 70% as either in favor or opposed, depending on the survey results utilized.

Logically this does not make sense, of course. However, as soon as one allows the possibility that many respondents reply to such questions without these matters being of much personal salience and without a great deal of relevant information or experience, these seeming inconsistencies are not at all surprising. As the problem of personal salience of national security issues has been dealt with at great length elsewhere (Rattinger, 1985; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986), it should suffice here to simply recall the low importance ascribed to the preservation of peace as a political problem for the Federal Republic (Fig. 1), or to consider the high proportion of undecided respondents in Table 2. If low personal salience and low information are combined, we come into segments of opinion where so-called nonattitudes (Converse, 1970) increasingly play a role. Under such conditions survey responses are still made (if only to please the interviewer), but they are not a reliable and valid measure of the attitude to be assessed, because such an attitude barely exists. Instead, responses will be influenced by a multitude of other factors, like contextual information, question wording, and affects vis-à-vis the actors that are being referred to, etc. Within this realm of nonattitudes, many "logically" incompatible responses make perfect sense, even for one and the same individual. This "logic" of choosing whatever "feels best" in a given situation presupposes, of course, that there is little knowledge of the relevant facts and of strategic intricacies. Let us, therefore, now briefly turn to the question of how much people know about these things.

As Table 3 shows, the range of statements on people's information on the double-track decision and related matters that could be supported by data is even wider than for opinions on these things themselves. However, it does not take too close a look to discover that actually those questions that show large proportions of respondents as

Table 3. Information About INF, the Double-Track Decision, and the Geneva Talks, 1981-1983

Question	No. of Surveys	Dates of Surveys	Percent Informed, Correct Answer	Percent Not Informed, Wrong Answer	Percent Don't Know, No Answer
1	1	12/81	86(86)	14(14)	0
2	1	2/83	83(83)	17(17)	0
3	3	5/81-8/83	75(77)	22(23)	3
4	1	8/83	67(67)	33(33)	0
Mean "soft" items (1-4)			77(78)	22(22)	1
5	1	2/82	55(83)	11(17)	34
6	1	2/83	27(49)	28(51)	45
7	1	9/83	20(20)	78(80)	2
8	1	3/81	15(25)	46(75)	39
9	2	5-7/81	10(18)	46(82)	44
Mean "hard" items (5-9)			23(35)	43(65)	34
Mean all items			50(60)	33(40)	17

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are percentages without "don't know" or "no answer."

QUESTIONS: 1. In Geneva, Americans and Russians have recently started negotiations on disarmament. Have you heard about this or not? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 39)

2. In the context of the Geneva disarmament negotiations, you increasingly hear about the so-called zero option. This means . . . [explanation]. Have you heard about the zero option? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 41)

3. In December 1979 NATO has agreed upon the so-called double-track decision, in order to . . . [explanation]. Have you heard or read about this decision? (EMNID, INFAS; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: tables 32-33)

4. In the FRG American Pershing I missiles have been deployed now for an extended period of time. Did you know this? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 43)

5. Do you know whether or not the U.S. and the Soviet Union currently negotiate about limitations of INF in Europe? (USICA; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 40)

6. Do you happen to know who proposed the zero option, the Germans, the Americans, or the Russians? (IfD; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 42)

7. Assuming new INF will be stationed according to the double-track decision: Will this increase or decrease the number of nuclear warheads in the FRG, or will it remain the same? (EMNID; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 44)

8. If you hear or read the word "NATO-Nachrüstung" [i.e., INF deployment according to the double-track decision], can you tell me what this means? (IfD, open-ended; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 35)

9. In your opinion, what is NATO's double-track decision about? (INFAS, open-ended; Rattinger and Heinlein, 1986: table 34)

correctly informed have to be classified as very "soft." In items 1 through 4 the existence of the Geneva talks, the zero option, the double-track decision, and the presence of Pershing I missiles in the Federal Republic were mentioned and even partially explained. Only then were people asked whether they had previously been aware of all of this. With a question format like this the only surprising thing is that the percentages claiming to have been aware are not even higher. One-third of respondents admitting to not having known about the Pershing I missiles is an admirable degree of honesty, but most likely still falls considerably short of the actual amount of ignorance.

As one proceeds to the "hard" knowledge items (those that do not supply what they ask for) refusals soar to one-third of samples and well above. Question 5 is not yet completely "hard," as the way it is asked suggests that there *are* such negotiations. Moreover, had each of the respondents who have not admitted ignorance simply flipped an honest coin, 33% of the total sample still would have given a correct answer. Similarly, for questions 6 and 7, regarding who proposed the zero option and on the number of nuclear warheads in the Federal Republic after deployment of new INF, the percentages of correct responses have to be set against the proportions that would be obtained by random guessing. For question 6, with three alternatives provided, this percentage would be 18, so there is a surplus of only 9 percentage points of the total sample being correctly informed over random expectation; for question 5 this surplus is 22 percentage points.

Question 7 is fascinating. Because it proceeds from the assumption of new INF deployment, respondents are very confident that they can reply (only two percent "don't know"), and they overwhelmingly state that the number of warheads would go up, an answer that is indeed suggested to the nonexpert by the question. However, the double-track decision actually called for more old warheads to be withdrawn than new ones deployed, so "*decrease*" would have been the correct answer. Not surprisingly, this was chosen by virtually no one. If one therefore also classifies "remain the same" (meaning no increase) as correct, as has been done in Table 3, one sees that an honest coin would have led to "correct" responses for an additional 29% of the total sample. The actual level of information falls considerably short of random expectation, so it is fair to say that very few people really *knew* what would happen to the number of nuclear warheads in the Federal Republic.

The open-ended questions 8 and 9 show that correcting for random responses in the previous questions *does* bring us closer to an adequate assessment of the level of information in the population at large. With 40% or more "don't knows," only 15% and 10% of total samples in 1981 could adequately characterize the meaning of "Nachrüstung" and

the contents of the double-track decision, respectively.³ With such a low level of knowledge we can safely conclude that a considerable number of nonattitudes will certainly be obtained when questions like the ones in Table 2 are asked on these matters.

In order to get a better understanding of the effects that variations of survey instruments can have under such conditions of low personal salience of, and low information on, the subject matter to be surveyed, a series of experiments with a small sample of local students were performed in summer of 1985⁴ (see Schuman and Presser, 1981, for the logic and many results of such studies). As we briefly report some results from this study, it should be understood that, if anything, we are going to *underestimate* the impact of different question formats, because students generally are better informed about defense policy than the rest of the population and ascribe greater personal importance to this policy arena. The experiments on which we will report here fall into three classes. First, we investigate the effects of omitting or explicitly offering "don't know" alternatives or neutral "middle" responses. Second, the effects of minor variations of question wording are assessed. Third, we will have a look at the impact of reversing question order.

Explicitly offering "don't know" or "middle" response categories or not is a purely formal device on which different survey research institutes have very different philosophies. Table 4 demonstrates that such responses are seldom volunteered but are quite popular when they are permitted, and that the amount of uncertainty among respondents varies considerably between items. However, that can only be detected if such answers are explicitly allowed. Only then does it become visible, for example, that uncertainty about Soviet trustwor-

3. The distinction between "correct" and "wrong" was made by the author on the basis of the grouped responses reported by the survey institutes. The criteria for being "correct" were rather mild ones: For question no. 8, all responses referring to new or modern weapons for NATO were regarded as correct (even without reference to *nuclear* weapons, or to *missiles* to be stationed in *Europe*); for question no. 9 all responses referring to *simultaneous* negotiations and preparations for deployment of new weapons were classified as correct.

4. In June 1985 90 students of the University of Bamberg were interviewed for their attitudes on nuclear weapons and national security with a standardized questionnaire (32 items) within a split-half design. Interviews lasted about 25 minutes, on the average. All of approximately 120 students from one particular dorm (housing students from all schools of the university) were to be interviewed within two days; 30 of them could not be contacted or refused to participate. Interviewers were students from a class on national security policy and its social context the author taught in summer 1985 (in the U.S. system it would have been called a graduate course). Randomization of forms was achieved by tossing coins; 47 respondents were thus interviewed with the standard questionnaire, 43 with the experimental questionnaire (in Tables 4-7 these are referred to as versions A and B, respectively). Concerning the relative positions of one pair of questions in the interview a split-four design was used (see note to Table 6). I thank all students who were involved for their interest and their contribution.

Table 4. Split-Half Experiments on Students' National Security Attitudes with Explicit "Don't Know" and "Middle" Categories

Question	Form	Percent "Liberal" Response	Percent Middle Response	Percent "Conser- vative" Response	Per- cent Don't Know
1. Acceptance of nuclear deterrence	A	90	—	5	5
	B	85	—	5	10
2. Should FRG become neutral	A	60	—	35	5
	B	40	—	42	18**
3. Freedom or peace more important	A	58	—	35	7
	B	54	—	28	18*
4. Can Soviets be trusted to honor treaties	A	55	—	38	7
	B	33	—	34	33***
Mean questions 1-4	A	66	—	28	6
	B	53	—	27	20
5. Accept member of Green party as defense minister	A	60	7	23	10
	B	50	15	30	5
6. More or less military expenditures for FRG	A	85	12	3	0
	B	63	28**	7	2
7. Possibility of military defense of FRG	A	30	0	63	7
	B	20	42***	38	0
8. Acceptance of U.S. troops in town	A	55	25	20	0
	B	38	55***	7	0
Mean questions 5-8	A	58	11	27	4
	B	43	35	21	1

NOTES: *Questionnaire form A*: "Don't know" (questions 1-4) or "middle" category (questions 5-8) not offered ($N = 47$). *Questionnaire form B*: "Don't know" or "middle" category offered ($N = 43$). Significance measures are based on a one-tailed Z-test for difference of proportions of "don't know" or "middle" responses.

QUESTIONS: 1. Can you accept the notion that the national security of the Federal Republic is based upon a concept of nuclear deterrence, or can't you accept this notion (or don't you have an opinion)?

2. What kind of foreign policy should the Federal Republic pursue: Should we continue our military alliance with the Americans, or should we try to be neutral, like Switzerland, e.g. (or don't you have an opinion)?

3. Nobody knows what is going to happen, but what do you think: If some day we might be faced with the choice to surrender Europe to the Soviets or to defend ourselves with all the means we have, what would be more important, to defend democratic freedom, even if this means war, or to prevent war, even if this means living under a communist government (or don't you know)?

4. Do you think that the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor the treaties it has concluded with the Federal Republic and with the Western powers, or don't you think it can be trusted (or don't you have an opinion)?

5. Could you accept a member of the Green party as defense minister, (would you care about this at all,) or couldn't you accept that?

6. Do you think that in the future the Federal Government should spend more, (the current amount,) or less on military defense?

7. Assuming the Federal Republic would be attacked by the East, do you think NATO could defend against such an attack, (do you think successful defense would be uncertain,) or do you believe that defense would not be possible?

8. Do you like the idea that U.S. troops are stationed here in town, (do you care about this at all,) or don't you like it?

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

thiness is much stronger than about the desirability of West German neutrality, or that indifference is the most frequent reaction to U.S. troops in town.

In the second group of experiments it was attempted to push respondents in the experimental group even further into the antimilitary and anti-U.S. camp (already quite popular with students, of course) by small modifications of question wording. Table 5 shows considerable success in this regard. Reminding people of conditions in the GDR and of a possible risk that assisting West Germany and Berlin might pose to the United States were least effective in reducing enthusiasm about a military person as defense minister or trust in U.S. security guarantees, respectively. The tiny word "even" (*sogar*), tied to the use of nuclear weapons for military defense of the Federal Republic, made quite a difference in terms of support for this course of action. Defining the same time period for comparison of judgments on the quality of West German-American relations either by the number of years or by reference to the tenure of President Reagan in office dramatically reversed majority judgment between the two groups. In these experiments we also see that variations of questions wording can either increase or decrease respondents' insecurity. Questions 2 and 4 are examples of the former, 1 and 3 of the latter. The Reagan question in particular illustrates what "nonattitudes" on foreign and defense policy mean, even with a student sample: How can the average person make a judgment of changes in relations between the United States and the Federal Republic? As soon as a clue is offered that evokes well-defined affective connotations (like the U.S. president does for many students), such judgments are made more readily and in line with the clue.

The experiments finally to be described on question order effects go far beyond what generally is done in analyzing survey data. If a defense policy item is not completely isolated in an interview, the rest dealing with other subjects, it is conceivable that responses to former questions shape later answers as much as nuances of question design do. This is not necessarily an indication of nonattitudes but can also reflect different interpretations of question meaning due to context. The two questions in Table 6 obviously evoke some kind of reciprocity norm and therefore are expected to be particularly subject to such transfer effects, and indeed, they are clearly visible. In the aggregate, in the student sample 10% more replied that the Soviet Union should withdraw INF from the GDR to further détente than said the same thing for American INF in the Federal Republic. However, for both superpowers there was more agreement with this demand when this question followed second, and, as expected, this transfer effect was strongest when the two items immediately followed each other. In the USSR-

Table 5. Split-Half Experiments on Students' National Security Attitudes with Variations of Question Wording

Question	Form	Pro-U.S., Promilitary	Anti-U.S., Antimilitary	Don't Know
1. Soldier as defense minister	A	18	75	7
	B	7	90**	3
2. Defense with nuclear weapons	A	25	75	0
	B	2	88*	10
3. Quality of U.S.-FRG relations	A	48	37	15
	B	30	65***	5
4. Trust in U.S. assistance	A	75	15	10
	B	61	26*	13
Mean (B version minus A version)		-17	17	0

QUESTIONS: 1A. Should the FRG's defense minister be a soldier?

1B. In the GDR the defense minister normally is a soldier. Should the FRG's . . . ?

2A. Do you favor military defense of the FRG, if nuclear weapons have to be used for that purpose?

2B. Do you favor military defense of the FRG, *even* ("sogar") if . . . ?

3A. Have U.S.-FRG relations improved or deteriorated over the past five years?

3B. Have U.S.-FRG relations improved or deteriorated since President Reagan came into office?

4A. Do you believe that the U.S. would assist the FRG and West Berlin in crisis situations?

4B. Do you believe . . . , or don't you believe that the U.S. would take that risk?

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

U.S. sequence 70% (Soviet withdrawal) and 80% (U.S. withdrawal) agreement were obtained, respectively; in the reverse order these percentages are 90% (Soviet withdrawal) and 60% (U.S. withdrawal). Substantively, and politically, these are very different messages: 10% more for United States than for Soviet Union withdrawal in one case, 30% less in the other. We know, however, that this difference is simply the product of a small modification in method.

In Table 7 we do not have two "symmetrical" questions, but rather questions reflecting two different cognitive representations of the Federal Republic's security environment. We see that, in the aggregate, there was no transfer from perceptions of the military balance to judgments on whether the Federal Republic could be subjected to political pressure by the Soviet Union due to its military potential. When the order is reversed, however, such effects are obvious, response insecurity and perceptions of Eastern superiority declining strongly after people have made their judgment on the possibility of political blackmail. It is interesting to note that these effects are minimal for the one-third

Table 6. Split-Half Experiment with Variations of Question Order: Students' Attitudes on INF Withdrawal

Question	Agreement (Form)		Transfer Effect (Second minus First)
	Asked First	Asked Second	
Questions Separated by Eight Other Items (<i>N</i> = 45)			
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GDR	74 (A)	90 (B)	16*
U.S. should withdraw INF from FRG	74 (B)	72 (A)	- 2
Questions Immediately Following Each Other (<i>N</i> = 45)			
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GDR	70 (A)	90 (B)	20**
U.S. should withdraw INF from FRG	60 (B)	80 (A)	20*
Total (<i>N</i> = 90)			
Soviet Union should withdraw INF from GDR	72 (A)	90 (B)	18**
U.S. should withdraw INF from FRG	67 (B)	76 (A)	9

QUESTIONS: In order to get détente in Europe going again, it is necessary that the Soviet Union (U.S.) starts to withdraw its theater nuclear weapons [i.e., INF] from the GDR (FRG). Do you agree or not?

In the standard questionnaire A the USSR question was asked first; in the experimental questionnaire B the U.S. question was asked first. For these two questions there were two versions of each questionnaire with different distances between these two questions. Form A was used for 24 respondents with these two questions immediately following each other, and for 23 respondents with eight items separating them; for form B these numbers were 21 and 22, respectively.

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$.

of students that see the Federal Republic subject to Soviet pressure, whereas among the other two-thirds, who first reject such a possibility, there is then a quite massive need to bring the second answer in line with the first one, resulting in a substantial drop of "don't knows" and "perceptions" of Warsaw Pact superiority. If even students, with their comparatively good knowledge of defense policy and with above average personal salience of these matters, can react so strongly to the context of questions in their responses to basic perceptual items, it is not hard to imagine that what is published as survey results on national

Table 7. Split-Half Experiment with Variations of Question Order: Students' Attitudes on the Military Balance and Its Political Importance

Question	Response	Asked First	Asked Second	Transfer Effect (Second minus First)
Total (<i>N</i> = 90)				
Can FRG be blackmailed by Soviet Union	Yes	37	36	- 1
	No	63	64	1
		(<i>N</i> = 43)	(<i>N</i> = 47)	
Who is stronger in military power	Warsaw Pact	35	20	- 15*
	NATO	23	35	12
	Both equal	17	33	16**
	Don't know	25	12	- 13*
		(<i>N</i> = 47)	(<i>N</i> = 43)	
FRG Can Be Blackmailed (<i>N</i> = 33)				
Who is stronger in military power	Warsaw Pact	21	26	5
	NATO	24	20	- 4
	Both equal	30	27	- 3
	Don't know	25	27	2
		(<i>N</i> = 16)	(<i>N</i> = 17)	
FRG Cannot Be Blackmailed (<i>N</i> = 57)				
Who is stronger in military power	Warsaw Pact	44	16	- 28**
	NATO	22	44	22**
	Both equal	9	37	28***
	Don't know	25	3	- 22***
		(<i>N</i> = 27)	(<i>N</i> = 30)	

QUESTIONS: In your opinion, can the Soviet Union use its military potential for political blackmail of the FRG?

Considering the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, who is stronger?

In the standard questionnaire A the question on the military balance was asked first; in the experimental questionnaire B the question on the possibility of blackmail was asked first.

p* < .1. *p* < .05. ****p* < .01.

security public opinion at large frequently will have come about through similar, and possibly even stronger, processes and distortions. But all we usually get to know is response distributions; most of the time their background remains obscure.

Conclusion

The thrust of this article is largely nihilistic. We have shown that assertions about public opinion on defense policy in the Federal Republic having been transformed radically since the December 1979 NATO decision and thus having become a key factor requiring major policy changes in order to regain societal consensus are grossly overstated. We have also shown that normal partisan strife is at least as important as the notion of generational succession for explaining the polarization of mass opinions that has occurred. Finally, we have argued that, in spite of the importance public opinion surveys were ascribed in the political battles of the first half of this decade, there is little evidence of a rapid increase of relevant knowledge in the population at large and little certainty as to what its positions on the implementation of the double-track decision really looked like. Instead, a large amount of volatility of public opinion on these matters due to the pervasiveness of nonattitudes has to be acknowledged, even for the alleged core of "new realities" in the social context of defense policy, i.e., the young and better educated. The public's views in the Federal Republic on national security and nuclear weapons since 1979 have been important and interesting, and they deserve further study, but the joyful or alarmist diagnosis of a sudden "revolt of the masses," led by an emergent "successor generation," falls short of the complex realities that still need to be understood more adequately.

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THE POLLS—A REPORT

AIDS

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In 1981, a new, mysterious, and deadly disease known as AIDS was identified. At present there is no cure for it and no vaccine to prevent its transmission. Efforts to control the spread of AIDS are hampered by the long latency between infection and symptoms (an average of at least four years) and by the fact that once an individual is exposed to the virus presumed to cause AIDS, he or she can infect others without knowing it. The disease has been termed a pandemic; by 1986, 1.5 to 2 million people in the United States were believed to have been exposed to it.

To the best of our knowledge, the first survey of public opinion about AIDS was carried out in June 1983. Between then and November 1986, the cutoff date for this article, we identified 22 surveys on this topic. Four were carried out in 1983, nine in 1985, and another nine in 1986. Almost all have been nationwide, and they represent more than 200 questions that the public has answered about AIDS—what they know about the disease, how vulnerable they think they are, what they think the government should do, and what, if anything, they are doing to protect themselves. These data provide the best gauge we have of the public's knowledge about and reaction to AIDS and how their concerns and views may be changing.

In selecting questions for this article, our main criterion was the availability of trend data. In some cases, however, we have reported responses to items for which there are as yet no trends, because we believe they are likely to be asked again in the future.

We have organized this summary of the poll results in terms of six dimensions: awareness of the disease, concern about it both as a seri-

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ous medical problem in general and as a problem for one's own health, perceptions about the likelihood of its spread, beliefs about methods of transmission, attitudes toward measures for protecting the public, and reported changes in one's own behavior to avoid exposure.

Between June 1983 and August 1986, the percentage of the population who said that they had heard or read about AIDS increased from 77% to 99%. There are now virtually no differences among demographic categories in the percentage of those aware of AIDS. During the same period of time, the percentage who personally knew someone with AIDS increased only from 3% to 6%, though in cities with a high concentration of AIDS cases, the percentage was much higher. In New York City, for example, it was 16% in September 1985.

Media coverage appears to have obliterated the "awareness gap", between population subgroups, but other gaps in knowledge still exist. For example, those with the least amount of education are least likely to be well informed about methods of transmission. And those with less accurate knowledge about how AIDS can be transmitted are much more likely to express concern that they or someone they know will get AIDS, to say that they or someone they know avoids places frequented by homosexuals, and to favor government regulations, including quarantine for people with AIDS.

At the same time, those who are realistically at greater risk are also most likely to express concern about AIDS. Young people—those under thirty, single people, those living in urban areas in which a high number of cases has been identified, and blacks all express greater than average concern about contracting AIDS. They are also more likely to say they have changed their behavior, including sexual behavior, in order to avoid exposure to AIDS. Because of the lack of space, we have not shown these demographic breaks, but they are consistent across all surveys for which we have seen the data.

So far as the spread of AIDS is concerned, the data summarized below indicate no trend of increasing concern about AIDS as a problem for one's own health. But some (though not all) questions indicate increasing concern about the spread of AIDS beyond present at-risk groups to the general population.

The data on beliefs about transmission indicate widespread accuracy at the extremes, with some confusion about intermediate modes. For example, virtually everyone knows that AIDS can be transmitted by sexual contact, both homosexual and heterosexual, and by blood transfusions. At the other extreme, virtually no one believes that it can be contracted by being in the same room as someone who has AIDS. But with respect to kissing, sharing a drinking glass, and eating food prepared by someone who has AIDS, public opinion is divided. Substantial minorities express the belief that AIDS can be transmitted in these

ways even though public health experts insist that it cannot. And as of late 1986 there did not appear to have been any increase in accuracy over time.

The evidence is mixed with regard to attitudes toward regulation. On some matters, such as fighting to have a child with AIDS removed from school, the percentage saying they would fight has decreased over time. On other matters, such as taking school employees with AIDS off the job, the percentage saying employees should be removed has increased. And on still other matters, such as favoring quarantine for those infected with AIDS, there appears to have been no change in aggregate opinion over time.

There is a slight increase in the number of those reporting that they are changing their behavior as a result of AIDS. Gallup, for example, finds a small but steady increase in the percentage saying that they or people they know avoid homosexuals, stay away from places where homosexuals may be present, and refuse elective surgery that would require blood transfusions. (Another behavioral indicator, not reflected in these opinion data, is the increasing recommendation of some doctors that patients donate their own blood prior to surgery.)

The data also provide evidence that the public credits the media as being an important source of information about AIDS. In response to questions by the *Los Angeles Times* (December 1985), 25% of the public said that they had been "paying most attention recently" to stories about AIDS in the media, and this figure was higher than that for any of the other seven topics they were asked about, including hijackings and the budget deficit. In fact, 72% reported hearing about or reading three or more stories about AIDS "in the last seven days." In the last half of 1985, a time when eight of the surveys whose findings are summarized here were conducted, the evening newscasts of the major networks were carrying an average of almost twenty stories per month on AIDS.¹

One cannot, of course, say that the public's answers to poll questions mirror what the media have reported. The public remembers some things and not others, and they add to and subtract from what they have heard or read. At the same time, different media build up some stories and downplay or ignore others. Despite all of this selectivity and distortion, the poll data reveal that the general population is aware of AIDS and has some basic knowledge about how the disease spreads. In addition, those realistically at greater risk are the ones most likely to say that they are concerned about contracting the disease. There is variation from survey to survey in question wording and in the number and type of response categories, but, on balance, we see more

¹As compiled from *Television and Abstracts: A Guide to the Videotape Collection of the Network Evening News Programs* in the Vanderbilt Television Archives. There was some variation among the three networks, but not a great deal.

agreement than disagreement across surveys in the public's answers.

Because information and education are the only means now available to control the spread of AIDS, the poll results are of interest to the public health community. From this standpoint, they provide good information about the public's awareness and level of knowledge. But the data are of limited utility in one important way: they are less informative than they might be about changes in behavior to avoid exposure to the AIDS virus. Only seven of the surveys asked specific questions about precautionary measures, if any, that the respondent was taking. The lack of such items and the paucity of trend data in this area are a weakness.

The poll results reported here were obtained from published and unpublished sources, the Roper Center, survey organizations, ABC, CBS, and NBC, *Newsweek*, and the *Los Angeles Times*. With the exception of two New York City surveys (ABC/DN 9/85 and Gallup 6/85), all surveys are based on nationwide samples. The sample sizes are at least 1,000 for all but the following six surveys:

Gallup	7/1983	N = 767
Gallup	8/1985	N = 759
Gallup	11/1986	N = 756
ABC/ <i>New York Daily News</i>	9/1985	N = 505
CBS/ <i>New York Times</i>	9/1985	N = 762
CBS	10/1986	N = 823

Responses totaling less than 0.5% have not been shown in the tabulations.

We wish to thank the organizations that shared unpublished data with us for this article. Further information about the surveys can be obtained from the appropriate organization.

- ABC/DN—American Broadcasting Company/*New York Daily News*
- ABC/WP—American Broadcasting Company/*Washington Post*
- CBS—Columbia Broadcasting System
- CBS/NYT—Columbia Broadcasting System/*New York Times*
- Gallup—The Gallup Organization
- Harris—Louis Harris and Associates
- LAT—*Los Angeles Times*
- NBC/WSJ—National Broadcasting Company/*Wall Street Journal*
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Contact: Direct and Indirect

Roper: Have you heard about the disease called AIDS that attacks a person's disease immunity system and is frequently fatal?

	8/83	8/85	8/86
Yes	91%	97%	99%
No	8	2	1
DK	1	1	1

Gallup: Have you heard or read about a disease called AIDS—acquired immune deficiency syndrome?

	6/83	7/83	6/85	3/86
Yes	77%	91%	95%	98%
No	23	9	5	2

ABC/WP, ABC/DN, CBS/NYT, LAT, CBS, Gallup: Do you personally know anyone who has AIDS?

	<i>ABC/WP</i> ^a 6/83	<i>Gallup</i> ^b 8/85	<i>ABC/WP</i> ^c 9/85	<i>ABC/DN</i> ^c 9/85	<i>CBS/NYT</i> 9/85	<i>LAT</i> ^d 12/85	<i>CBS</i> 10/86	<i>Gallup</i> 11/86
Yes	3%	4%	6%	16%	2%	5%	5%	6%
No	97	96	94	84	98	94	94	94
DK/No op.	—	—	—	1	—	1	1	—

^a Do you know anyone who suffers from AIDS?

^b Do you personally know anyone who has contracted the disease called AIDS?

^c Do you personally know anyone, either living or dead, who contracted AIDS?

^d Do you personally know anyone who has tested positive for AIDS, or has contracted AIDS?

By "know," I mean someone who you would speak with at least once a month on the phone or in person.

Concern About AIDS as a Serious Medical Problem and Problem for Own Health

CBS/NYT, CBS: Think about some serious diseases or medical problems facing the country today. Which two or three do you think are the most serious?*

	<i>CBS/NYT</i> 9/85	<i>CBS</i> 10/86
Cancer	74%	75%
AIDS	51	55
Heart disease	41	38
Substance abuse	2	6
VD/Herpes	5	4
Diabetes	5	4

* Only the most frequently mentioned diseases are shown here. Multiple answers were allowed.

CBS/NYT, LAT, CBS: Now think about *your own* situation. Which two or three diseases or medical problems are *you* most concerned about getting?*

	<i>CBS/NYT**</i> 9/85	<i>LAT***</i> 12/85	<i>CBS**</i> 10/86
Cancer	59%	56%	64%
Heart disease	31	11	31
AIDS	13	12	12
VD/herpes	—	—	—
Diabetes	5	3	6

* Only the most frequently mentioned diseases are shown here.

** Multiple answers were allowed.

*** Alternatives were enumerated for respondents; only one response was allowed.

LAT: 12/85: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today: crime, or AIDS, or government spending, or inflation, or the moral decline of society, or unemployment, or the possibility of war, or what?

	<i>Knowledge of AIDS</i>		<i>Fear of AIDS</i>		
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>All*</i>
Crime	14%	18%	17%	15%	26%
Education	11	9	9	10	16
AIDS	5	5	9	4	8
Budget	19	18	15	20	30
Inflation	8	8	10	9	14
Morals	10	10	7	11	17
Unemployment	13	14	16	12	23
War	14	10	12	12	20
Others	5	5	3	6	8
Not sure	1	3	1	1	2
Refused	0	0	1	0	0

* Up to two responses were recorded for each respondent. Subgroup percentages are for most important problem only.

Gallup: Are there any new public health problems which especially concern you?

	7/83	8/85
Yes	41%	44%
No	58	55
DK	1	1
If yes, which ones?*		
AIDS	24	32
Herpes	14	4
Pollution/toxic waste	1	2
Other	13	12
DK	1	1

* Alternatives not enumerated for respondents; more than one response allowed.

NBC: How concerned are you about AIDS as a problem to your own health? Would you say you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, or not at all concerned?

	11/85	1/86*
Very concerned	27%	26%
Somewhat concerned	32	35
Not at all concerned	40	38
Not sure	1	1

* No difference by whether or not respondent has homosexual friends.

Concern About Spread

Gallup: Lately there has been some discussion in the news about the disease called AIDS. How worried are you that you or someone you know will get AIDS?

	8/85	11/86
Very	14%	19%
A little	27	25
Not very	27	25
Not at all	31	30
DK	1	1

ABC/WP, ABC/DN, CBS/NYT, Harris, CBS: Are you afraid that you might get AIDS?

	ABC/WP ^a	ABC/DN ^a	CBS/NYT	Harris ^b	CBS
	9/85	9/85	9/85	11/85	10/86
Yes	26%	42%	17%	10%	15%
No	73	57	79	87	83
DK/no opinion	1	1	4	3	2

^a Are you afraid that you might pick up the AIDS virus yourself or aren't you afraid of that?

^b Do you think that *you* run any risk of catching AIDS, or not?

CBS/NYT, NBC: So far, most of the people with AIDS have been homosexual men and intravenous drug users. Do you think AIDS will spread beyond those groups who already get it so that many people in the rest of the population will get AIDS, or don't you think so?

	CBS/NYT	NBC ^a
	9/85	1/86
Yes, will spread	61%	76%
No	20	15
Depends (vol.)	7	—
DK	12	9

^a As of now, most of the people with AIDS in the U.S. are homosexual men and intravenous drug users. Do you think AIDS will spread beyond these groups so that other people in the country will get AIDS, or don't you think so?

ABC/WP, ABC/DN: So far three-quarters of AIDS victims have been homosexual males. The rest of the victims have mainly been drug addicts or recipients of blood transfusions. Do you think that AIDS is spreading so that it is now a threat to the general public in the U.S. or not?

	ABC/WP	ABC/DN
	9/85	9/85
Yes	79%	79%
No	18	17
DK	4	4

Gallup: At the moment, cases of AIDS are largely confined to homosexuals, hemophiliacs, other people receiving blood transfusions, and intravenous drug takers. How likely do you think it is that AIDS will eventually become an epidemic for the public at large?

	8/85	11/86 ^a
Very likely	27%	36%
Somewhat	35	37
Not too likely	26	18
Not at all	7	5
DK	5	4

^a How likely do you think it is that AIDS will eventually become an epidemic for the public at large?

ABC/WP: To the best of your knowledge, is the number of diagnosed cases of AIDS in the U.S. closer to a million or closer to 10,000?

	9/85
Closer to a million	29%
Closer to 10,000	63
DK/no opinion	8

LAT: From what you have heard and read, how many people in the United States have been exposed to the AIDS virus and will therefore test positive for the presence of AIDS antibodies? Just your best guess.

	12/85
To 2m	49%
To 26m	12
To 50m	4
To 74m	2
To 98m	1
To 122m	2
To 146m	1
To 170m	0
To 194m	0
To 218m	0
To 240m	1
Refused	28

Methods of Transmission

I'm going to read you a list. For each item, please tell me if you think that it is or is not a way for someone to catch AIDS from someone who has it. Can you catch AIDS from:

(The introduction and precise wording of the mode of transmission varies slightly from survey to survey.)

	Gallup 7/83	ABC/ WP 9/85	ABC/ DN 9/85	CBS/ NYT 9/85	NBC 11/85	LAT 12/85	NBC 1/86	Gallup 4/86	CBS 10/86	Gallup 11/86
Casual contact										
Yes	25%							6% ^a		17% ^b
No	59							81		78
DK	16							13		5
Intimate sexual contact (having sex)										
Yes		95%	95%	91%			63%*		93%	79% ^c 91% ^d
No		2	3	2			25		1	10 3
DK		4	2	7			12		6	11 6
Blood transfusion										
Yes		95%	97%	95%			55%*			
No		2	2	1			33			
DK		2	2	4			12			
Sharing (using) intravenous (hypodermic) needles										
Yes		92%	95%	91%						
No		3	3	2						
DK		5	3	7						
Kissing										
Yes		50%	56%	32%					29%	
No		36	28	42					51	
DK		14	16	26					20	
Using same drinking glass										
Yes		28%	38%	47%	33%		38%		36%	
No		55	45	34	44		45		43	
DK		16	17	19	23		17		21	
Being sneezed on										
Yes		22%	33%				32%			
No		62	50				53			
DK		16	17				15			
Sitting on a toilet seat										
Yes		16%	26%	28%		24%			23%	
No		69	60	49		63			57	
DK		15	14	23		13			20	
Shaking hands (being touched)										
Yes		7%	7%	11%						
No		85	86	73						
DK		9	7	16						
Working (being) in the same office (room) with someone who has AIDS										
Yes					12%	5%			6%	
No					70	84			81	
DK					18	11			13	
Donating blood										
Yes							33%			
No							63			
DK							4			
Food handling or preparation										
Yes					29%	19%	31%*			
No					47	65	55			
DK					24	16	14			

* Asked only of those who think it will spread. Percentages have been converted to total sample.

^a Do you believe a person can get AIDS by being in a crowded place with someone who has it?

^b Casual contact, such as sharing a water glass, shaking hands, or riding in the same elevator with a person who has AIDS.

^c Heterosexual contact with a person whose blood has tested positive for AIDS.

^d Heterosexual contact with a person who has an active case of AIDS.

ABC/WP, ABC/DN: Assuming there is no intimate physical contact, do you think it is safe or unsafe to associate with someone who has AIDS?

	<i>ABC/WP</i>	<i>ABC/DN</i>
	9/85	9/85
Yes, safe	57%	46%
No, unsafe	36	44
DK	7	10

Gallup: I am going to read you some statements about AIDS. For each, please tell me if you think the statement is probably true or if you think it is probably false? Think it is probably true that:

		(NYC)
	6/85	6/85
Some people can get AIDS when they receive blood transfusions	92%	90%
Drug users who share needles have a high risk of getting AIDS	84	86
Most people who have AIDS are homosexual men	80	73
Some wives and girlfriends of drug users have gotten AIDS	68	71
There is a great danger that AIDS will soon spread to all kinds of people in our country	66	69
You can get AIDS by being in a crowded place with someone who has it	9	15

LAT, CBS: There is a test to determine whether or not a person has the AIDS virus. As far as you know, does everyone with a positive test for the AIDS virus get AIDS, or not?

	<i>LAT^a</i>	<i>CBS</i>
	12/85	10/86
Yes	28%	10%
No	29	54
DK/no opinion	42	36
Refused	1	—

^a Medical researchers have discovered a virus that is closely linked with AIDS, called HTLV Three. Like all viruses, this one causes the body's immune system to manufacture antibodies which fight the virus. From what you have heard or read, is it your impression that a person who tests positive to these antibodies will probably get AIDS?

Gallup: Next I have some questions about screening tests for AIDS. As far as you know, when someone without any AIDS symptoms tests positive for AIDS virus antibodies in the blood, does this mean the person . . .

	11/86
Has been exposed to the virus, but is not necessarily infectious to others or likely to develop the disease?	37%
Is infectious to others and may develop the disease?	29
Is infectious to others and is certain to develop the disease?	11
DK	23

Protective Measures: Regulation of Others

WORK

NBC: Do you think employers should be able to fire someone who has been diagnosed as having AIDS, or not?

	11/85
Yes	19%
No	64
DK/not sure/no opinion	17

NBC: Do you think people who have been diagnosed as having AIDS should be allowed to continue to work as long as they are able to, or don't you think so?

	11/85
Yes	67%
No	18
DK/not sure/no opinion	15

CBS: Should there be a law restricting where people with the AIDS virus can work, even though public health officials don't think that would control the spread of AIDS?

	10/86
Yes	28%
No	59
DK/not sure/no opinion	13

SCHOOL

ABC/WP, ABC/DN, CBS/NYT, CBS: Do you favor or oppose allowing students with AIDS to attend school if health officials say there is no danger?

	<i>ABC/WP</i>	<i>ABC/DN</i> ^a	<i>CBS/NYT</i> ^b	<i>CBS</i> ^b
	9/85	9/85	9/85	10/86
Favor	62%	39%	40%	56%
Oppose	31	55	27	17
DK/no opinion	7	6	17	15
Depends (volunteered)	—	—	16	12

^a Recently, New York City public school officials allowed a 7-year-old child with AIDS to attend class in Queens. Do you favor or oppose . . . ?

^b Should children who have AIDS be allowed to go to school, or not?

ABC/WP, ABC/DN, Gallup: If you thought a child with AIDS might be in your children's school, would you keep your children home or would you send them to school?

	<i>ABC/WP</i>	<i>ABC/DN</i> ^a	<i>Gallup</i> ^b
	9/85	9/85	3/86
Keep home	26%	48%	24%
Send to school	68	46	67
DK/no opinion	6	6	9

^a Many parents in Queens protested allowing the child with AIDS to attend school by keeping their own children home. If you thought a child with AIDS might be in your children's school, would you keep your children home or would you send them to school?

^b A 14-year-old Indiana boy who contracted AIDS through a contaminated blood transfusion was banned from attending school classes. After a county medical officer ruled that he posed no health threat to his classmates, he went back to school, but the parents of almost half the students at his school kept their children home. If you had children of this age, would you permit them to attend classes with a child who had AIDS, or not?

Gallup: If you learned that a child with AIDS was attending the same school as a child of yours, would you:

	8/85	11/86
Fight to have the AIDS child removed from school?	17%	10%
Keep your child at home?	8	7
Instruct your child not to have contact with the AIDS child?	25	27
Not worry about children passing AIDS to one another?	30	44
Don't know	20	12

ABC/WP, ABC/DN: School officials should tell parents if a child with AIDS is attending their child's school. Do you agree or disagree?

	ABC/WP 9/85	ABC/DN 9/85
Agree	78%	79%
Disagree	19	18
DK/no opinion	3	3

Public school employees found to have AIDS should be taken off the job.

Agree	47%	66%
Disagree	45	26
DK/no opinion	8	9

HOUSING

ABC/WP, ABC/DN: If it was proposed that an AIDS patient treatment and housing center be located in your neighborhood, would that upset you a great deal, only somewhat, very little, or not at all?

	ABC/WP 9/85	ABC/DN 9/85
A great deal	17%	19%
Only somewhat	27	28
Very little	23	20
Not at all	30	31
DK/no opinion	1	2

QUARANTINE

ABC/WP, ABC/DN, LAT, NBC: People with AIDS should be put into quarantine in special places to keep them away from the general public.

	ABC/WP	ABC/DN	LAT ^a	NBC ^b
	9/85	9/85	12/85	1/86
Agree	28%	42%	51%	31%
Disagree	65	48	40	57
DK/no opinion	7	10	9	12

^a Would you favor or oppose adding "AIDS" to the list of diseases that must be quarantined?

^b Do you think that people who are known carriers of AIDS should be separated from the rest of the population, or don't you think so?

REGULATION OF SEXUAL ACTIVITIES

NBC: Do you think governmental restrictions should be placed on the sexual activities of people who are known carriers of AIDS, or don't you think so?

	11/85	1/86
Yes	58%	51%
No	31	41
DK/no opinion	11	8

YCS: There should be no laws, either federal or state, regulating sexual practices—that's up to the individual to decide for himself or herself.

	1977	7/86
Agree strongly	45%	44%
Agree partially	25	25
Disagree	26	27
Not sure	4	4

TESTING

NBC, CBS: Do you think the U.S. military should test its personnel to see if they have been exposed to AIDS, or not?

	NBC	CBS ^a
	11/85	10/86
Yes	78%	72%
No	16	21
DK/no opinion	6	7

^a Do you think that testing for the AIDS virus should be required for people beginning military service, or don't you think so?

NBC: Do you think employers should test their employees to see if they have been exposed to the AIDS virus, or not?

	11/85
Yes	39%*
No	45
DK/no opinion	16

* Currently employed: 34%.

CBS: Would you favor a national policy that requires workers in general to be tested for the AIDS virus, or would that be an unfair invasion of privacy?

	10/86
Yes, favor	36%
No	53
Depends (vol.)	6
No opinion	5

CBS: Do you think insurance companies should be permitted to require people in groups with a high risk of getting AIDS to be tested for the AIDS virus before giving them insurance coverage, or is that unfair to people in these groups?

	10/86
Yes	40%
No	50
No opinion	10

EDUCATION

YCS: At what age do you think that children should *first* be taught about AIDS in school?*

	11/86
By the age of 8	23%
When 9 or 10	27
When 11 or 12	25
When 13 or 14	17
Or older than this	5
Not sure	3

Do you think that sex education courses for children who are eight should include information about:

	<i>Yes**</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Not Sure</i>
The dangers of AIDS	38%	56%	6%

Do you think that sex education courses for children who are twelve should include information about:

	<i>Yes**</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Not Sure</i>
The dangers of AIDS	93%	6%	1%

* Among those who agree that children should be taught about AIDS in school—83% of sample.

** Among those who think that sex education courses should be taught in school—86% of sample.

Gallup: Some people feel that an important way to combat AIDS is to provide more education in grade school about sex and sexually transmitted diseases, including the use of condoms, before students become sexually active. Others feel that this kind of education does more harm than good. Which comes closer to your view?

	11/86
More sex education	70%
Does more harm than good	25
DK	5

Protective Measures: Behavior Change

ABC/DN, ABC/WP, CBS/NT, Harris, NBC, CBS: Is there anything in particular you have done to avoid getting AIDS?

	<i>ABC/DN^a</i>	<i>ABC/WP^a</i>	<i>CBS/NT</i>	<i>Harris*^b</i>	<i>NBC*^c</i>	<i>NBC^d</i>	<i>CBS</i>	<i>CBS^e</i>
	9/85	9/85	9/85	11/85	11/85	1/86	10/86	10/86
Yes	35%	22%	13%	41%	11%	7%	18%	11%
No	65	77	85	57	88	93	80	86
DK	—	1	2	2	1	—	2	3

* No follow-up questions asked

^a Is there anything you yourself are doing to avoid exposing yourself to AIDS?

^b Do you take any special steps or precautions to avoid catching AIDS, or not?

^c Has public concern about AIDS caused you to change any part of your daily routine?

^d Since you became aware of AIDS, have you changed your sexual behavior in any way?

^e How about you personally? Have you changed your sexual habits because you are worried about getting AIDS?

If yes, what have you done?

	<i>ABC/DN^a</i>	<i>ABC/WP^a</i>	<i>CBS/NT^b</i>	<i>NBC^c</i>	<i>CBS^b</i>	<i>CBS^b</i>
	9/85	9/85	9/85	1/86	10/86	10/86
Limit number of partners	8%	6%	—	92%	—	—
Sex with one partner	8	10	—	—	3%	2%
Avoid homosexual acts/sex	—	—	1%	—	1	—
Cut down on sex	11	11	—	—	—	—
No sex	2	2	3	—	1	—
Use/partner use condom	2	2	—	49	—	—
Avoid homosexuals	13	17	1	—	—	—
Avoid people with AIDS	—	6	—	—	—	—
Avoid prostitutes	—	1	—	—	—	—
Socially careful	—	14	2	—	2	—
Careful who/what touch	—	—	1	—	3	—
Avoid needle drugs	—	6	—	—	—	—
Keep clean	—	5	1	—	3	—
Clean home/office more	—	1	—	—	—	—
Change public places I go	—	1	—	—	—	—
Avoid/more careful using public restrooms, etc.	—	25	1	—	—	—
Avoid/more careful using gyms, public pools, etc.	—	3	—	—	—	—
Use restrooms less	—	4	—	—	—	—
Avoid blood transfusions	—	11	1	—	1	—
Cut down/not giving blood	—	3	—	—	—	—
More careful/more careful selecting sexual partner	—	—	—	95	—	7
Other	77	12	—	—	4	1
No opinion	—	3	2	—	—	1

^a More than one response allowed. Percentages are of those saying yes.

^b Only one response coded. Percentages sum to those saying yes.

^c Respondents were specifically asked if they had done these three behaviors. Percentages are of those saying yes, they had done.

Gallup: Have you personally or have people that you know taken any of the following precautions to try to reduce the chances of contracting AIDS?

		7/83 ^a	8/85	11/86
Avoiding people you know or suspect to be homosexuals?	Yes	-	13%	18%
	No		77	72
	DK		10	10
Refusing elective surgery that would require blood transfusions?	Yes		21	27
	No		70	65
	DK		9	8
Taking any other precautions?	Yes		6	
	No		87	
	DK		7	
Using a condom?*	Yes			32
	No			55
	DK			13
Taking more care in choice of sex partners?*	Yes			58
	No			34
	DK			8
Avoiding certain places where homosexuals may be present?	Yes	21%	28	33
	No	67	65	55
	DK	12	7	8

* No trend information.

^a Are you or other people in your community taking extra steps to avoid being in places where homosexuals are likely to be, or not?




Figure 3. Weight of Party Identification

identification was more important to the vote of the television group than the newspaper group. Given both the social composition of television's audience and its programming, this is perhaps not surprising. In 1964, however, the weight of party dropped precipitously for both media-use groups, in part a consequence of the extensive defection of Republicans from Barry Goldwater. After 1964, the weight of party returned to "normal" for newspaper readers but not for television viewers. Candidate-specific factors—especially personal qualities—became increasingly important to the vote of television viewers after 1964.

Discussion

The data presented here support the notion that television has played a role in the gradual personalizing of American presidential elections. The short-term elements of elections, particularly voter reactions to candidates, have become more important at the expense of long-term

elements, such as party identification and citizen attitudes toward the parties. The weight of attitudes toward the parties (not shown here), as measured by open-ended questions like those used for the candidates, were once among the best predictors of the vote, but over the eight elections have become nearly irrelevant.

No simple argument is advanced here that television has caused a "politics of personality." Without comparable measures of voting criteria prior to 1952, we cannot know if candidate-orientedness was higher or lower in elections before television. The behavioral changes examined here are plausibly linked with other political and social changes, which are themselves related to the advent of television. The efficacy with which television reaches potential voters has changed the campaign behavior of candidates and the personal traits they stress. Campaign finance reform and the rising cost of television advertising has further encouraged candidates to accommodate the needs of television news organizations. And with the growth of primary elections, the mode of nomination has come to reinforce the mode of election. Nominees are apt to be those most skilled in electioneering by television.

These changes mean that the "reality" of the campaign available via other media, the word-of-mouth, differs from what it once was. Candidates run as people (consciously warm, benevolent people), and this is apparent whether one watches television, talks to friends who do, or reads newspaper accounts (written by journalists who watch the candidates perform for television).⁵

At the same time that television has supplanted the political parties as a central source of campaign information for voters, generational and social change has undermined the "New Deal" socioeconomic basis of the party alignment. This change has occurred within the context of broader social forces that have reduced the power of traditional institutions to exert social control. According to some observers, this "sociological release" leads toward individuation and away from categorization in object appraisal. Left without familiar guides in a

5. Changes in the content and appeal of political television interact with the changes in political campaigning to produce important methodological consequences for studies attempting to identify behavioral effects of television. Virtually everyone, regardless of their attention to the media, or the particular mix of media they employ, receives candidate-oriented information during presidential campaigns. People with little interest in politics may watch television news for its entertainment value; in reporting that they rely on television for campaign information they are grouped with citizens who are intensely interested in the campaign but who may lack the verbal skills to make efficient use of newspapers. Individuals who say they rely on newspapers are likely to watch television news, too. And those who avoid television news may not escape campaign spot advertising if they choose to spend an occasional quiet evening watching prime-time television. All of this hinders efforts to identify an independent effect of television by blurring the boundaries between the media-use groups.

"cold society," the individual must find other bases of choice. As Robert Lane has suggested, the voter may "rely on a kind of leadership selection process that is cognate to something he knows; his selection of friends" (Lane, 1978:444).

Thus what the evidence presented in this paper may demonstrate is not so much a reaction of voters to the particular stimuli of televised politics—although such a direct effect is plausible—as a more general increase in the importance of candidate factors resulting from various political changes in which television has played a role. Candidate-orientedness has increased for everyone, regardless of how they obtain campaign information.

While concern about the personal qualities of leaders is not misplaced, the trend toward greater candidate orientedness is rightly be-moaned. One hazard of this was expressed by Walter Lippmann, who warned against "the intensification of feeling and the degradation of significance" in politics (Lippmann, 1925). Citizens may be forced to "vote by feeling" because they feel they lack adequate information in an atomized political system.

A second hazard is that candidacies emphasizing personal qualities must necessarily be isolated, each one disconnected from those preceding and those following. Accountability and public control of public policy are dangerously attenuated because retrospective voting on substance may be irrelevant and prospective voting on substance may be impossible.

Television's effects on politics ultimately may depend more upon what citizens believe television can do than upon the medium itself. Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang expressed this notion well when they wrote:

... there is a widespread belief in the intimacy of television, and this, in itself, makes a difference. When the formats of political telecasts are adapted to this belief, they emphasize the personal qualities of politicians rather than his purely political qualifications, or how well equipped he is to handle a particular role. At the same time, viewers believe they have "seen for themselves," and their visual impressions suggest to them the "real" personal qualities of the familiar face. In all of this, the contribution of television is made through its sensory realism, through the emphasis it places on symbols directly accessible to experience. The heterogeneity of views on complex policy matters and public problems can be factored down to simple alternatives. The search for "truth" becomes a search for "trust." (Lang and Lang, 1968:210-211)

Television as an institution is not to blame, but neither is it simply a neutral tool. The trend toward a politics of personality is likely to be countered only through the revitalization of institutions that give continuity to politics and ones that encourage participatory rather than vicarious politics. Sadly, television today is neither of these.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG 1960s CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS

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Abstract A scattering of recent research has studied the current political beliefs and attitudes of individuals identified as "1960s activists." In contrast to much of the treatment accorded such people in the popular media, this research tends to find most of these activists currently liberal on a wide variety of political topics. However, in the absence of panel data, most of this research has had to assess any change in the activists' attitudes either by assuming the activists' past positions or by trusting to their retrospective reports.

In this paper we report on panel data from a large group of white activists, mostly students, who spent the summer of 1965 organizing voter registration drives in Southern black communities. In some specific areas on which the activists tended to hold rather extreme positions in 1965, they may have moderated by 1984. However, their overall pattern of response on a wide variety of issues is basically stable over this twenty-year period.

Apparitions from the 1960s haunt the nation's rostrums, debating the topics of today. Neither Jerry Rubin nor Abbie Hoffman occupies a position of power or excels in the arts or in sports or in any other field notorious. Yet the audiences come, and the mass media ogle these two middle-aged men whose celebrity rests wholly on the radical Yippie postures of their youth. Rubin is the star. His opinions, proscriptions, analyses, and persona have moderated with age. Although no Reaganite, he has come to see the virtues of hard work, the system, the society, and the coin of the realm. Hard as it may be to believe, he is

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now a stockbroker. He plays for us the prodigal son, lets us assign radicalism to the callowness of youth, and gives proof to the adage that age brings wisdom—or at least greater conservatism.

Hoffman has received less attention. Unrepentant, seemingly unchanged in philosophy, he argues still for the bankruptcy of the system, against the confinement of the mores, and for the ability of the middle-aged to retain the ideals and meanings of their youth. Of course, he is not himself as active nor as prominent as before. It is not his time. But he sees himself as having retained his moral and philosophical integrity. He is, perhaps, less interesting. Stability is seldom as good a story as change.

Let these two icons stand for opposing propositions about the philosophical life cycle of aging activists. DeMartini (1983:196) has summarized the literature, contrasting the position of Eisenstadt (1956), Parsons (1963), and fellow travelers with the views of Mannheim (1952), Braungart (1974), and others. The former take the "Rubin" view that "political protest [is] a result of youthful idealism which will mellow with age and the pressures of work-role socialization," while the latter see Hoffman as representing the expectation that "the unique historical experiences and family socialization of the youth generation lay the foundation for a political commitment that will influence future adult politics." Noting the meager supply of empirical research that might be used to adjudicate between these two positions, DeMartini nevertheless summarizes the available data. He concludes that Hoffman is probably somewhat more representative of the activists studied, although there is some truth to the "mellowing" hypothesis as well. The studies seem to suggest that former activists remain relatively active but that their activism moves toward more conventional political processes and away from uninstitutionalized practices such as demonstrations and civil disobedience.

Unfortunately, all of this research has severe shortcomings for addressing the central issues. As an example, consider the often-cited work of Nassi (1981). Thirteen years after the Free Speech Movement sit-in in Sproul Hall on the Berkeley campus (1964), she obtained a list of the "800" students who had been arrested (the *San Francisco Examiner* (1985), using presumably the same list, reports the number as 783). From that population Nassi finally generated a total of 30 respondents, all of whom lived in San Francisco. The *San Francisco Examiner's* recent special issue interviewed 49, which represented 38% of their selected subsample. In fact, five of the seven studies cited by DiMartini have 40 or fewer subjects and can hardly lay claim to representative samples. The two studies he reviews that have larger samples also make little effort to assure representativeness. For example, Meyer and Maidenberg (1970) used a mail-out and simply accepted the

low response rate that resulted. An equally important limitation of these two studies, however, is that each examines attitude change over a period of less than five years. Thus, neither can be said to follow the activists from "youth" to "maturity."

A second, equally important problem is that none of these studies actually measures attitude *change*, since they do not follow the activists' attitudes and beliefs over time. For example, Nassi reports on no measures of her subjects' attitudes or beliefs in 1964. At one point she says that "Their radicalism has . . . waned over the intervening years, and they seem less resolved that change occur only outside of the political system," but she has no data from which she could conclude that her subjects felt any differently in 1964 than they did in 1977. She has only her own (and the press's) assumptions about how these individuals would have answered similar questions when they were younger.

This limitation characterizes virtually all studies available to date. No measures of attitudes were taken while the subjects were active participants, so no changes in attitudes can be shown. Because indicators of prior activism are used to select the samples, radical attitudes are assumed to have characterized the samples at that earlier time. Lack of current activism, or moderate political attitudes, are then *assumed*, not shown, to represent change.

One study that does have panel attitude data for activists is DeMartini's own research (1985) using survey data collected by Jennings and Niemi (1981) in 1965 and 1973. The 1965 data, however, were collected when the subjects were high school seniors, before many had participated in any protests or demonstrations. The second wave was collected while several were still graduate students, and within four or five years of their activism. Again, however, DeMartini concludes that the data generally support the view that activists maintain their political attitudes over time, with many of their attitudes becoming even more radical. However, some of this change may reflect the effects of participation on attitudes rather than the effects of maturation or the passage of time.

The Present Study

In contrast to the very clear limitations of previous research regarding sampling and data quality, we here report on a unique data set: a panel study of 145 committed activists whose political attitudes were measured three times over a nineteen- to twenty-year period—a period that began in their youthful twenties and stretched into their middle-aged forties. The panel does not suffer so severely from the problems that

mitigate the value of previous research. The sample size is large. It represents a large fraction of the appropriate population, and we can get at least some feel for its representativeness. The attitudes at issue are measured both in 1965 and in 1984–85, so that individual change can be directly observed. In addition, our measures range over a variety of specific attitudes. Our analysis is therefore able to go beyond the simple trichotomy of “no change,” “more conservative,” and “more liberal.” More conservative regarding which issues, we can ask. More liberal how?

On the other hand, our analysis is constrained by decisions made 20 years ago. We can see change only in variables measured in waves 1 or 2. We didn't think then to ask about Israel or Palestinians, Feminism or Gay Rights, Deregulation or Tax Reform, or other issues that have become important in today's politics. In this business, foresight is rarely 20/20. Furthermore, the value of these data is limited by the absence of a clear comparison group. Still, we believe these data are relatively unique for the purposes at hand.

The first wave of these data was collected at the height of the civil rights movement—the summer of 1965. Mobilized by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headed by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., a large group of youthful volunteers fanned out over the black communities of the South, primarily to work on voter registration drives, but also to help with community organization and similar activities. During the training sessions conducted by SCLC prior to sending the workers into the field, 223 of the volunteers filled out a long questionnaire that we had prepared. After the summer program had ended, the workers filled out a second questionnaire that was sent to them by mail. Most of the volunteers were students, most were white, and most returned to their schools or home communities after the summer. Since the experiences and recruitment of blacks were so different for this group, and since so few of these subjects were black, we report here only on the whites. For a complete description of these first studies see Demerath, Marwell, and Aiken, 1971.

Two summers ago—nineteen years after the 1965 summer—we searched the country to find as many of these civil rights activists as we could, to see what had happened to them, and how they had changed, in nearly two decades. If they were twenty in 1965 their youth had gone by 1984. They were turning forty and middle-aged. It seemed an appropriate time.

The activists were not all easy to find. We are a mobile society. Nevertheless, we eventually got 145 of the activists to fill out a third wave of questionnaires. A check on some 13 background factors and approximately 20 attitudinal responses on the first wave of questionnaires revealed only one significant difference between those who re-

sponded and those whom we did not find or who did not respond: The respondents are disproportionately male. We believe that this disparity reflects our greater difficulty in locating women, presumably because so many changed their names. Eighty percent of those respondents we did find, male and female, answered the questionnaire.

Results

Before turning to the core of our analysis, it is probably useful to look at some general political information about these subjects. These non-panel data consistently support an image of stability in political matters. For example, these subjects are uniformly left in their voting patterns. Only two voted for Reagan in 1980; four voted for Ford in 1976, and not one voted for Nixon in 1972. However, 22% did vote for Anderson, about 7% have consistently voted for third parties, mostly radical, and only 3% or less do not vote.

In Table 1 we present the responses of our subjects to nine political attitude items taken directly from the Institute for Social Research's 1982 American National Election Study. Their mean responses are compared with those of ISR's national postelection sample, after the latter group is standardized on education and age to fit more closely the distributions of the activists on these variables. Since virtually none of the activists was under age 37 or over age 55 or had less than a high school degree plus some additional education, subjects from the national sample who fit those categories were excluded from the analysis. Weighting was done with the remainder of the sample.

A quick glance at the table reveals that all of our data manipulation was somewhat superfluous. The activists are so different from the population as a whole that the results would probably have been the same if they were compared to any age-education grouping. Simply stated, the activists and the comparison group differ significantly ($p < .001$) on every one of the nine items. The reason for this is quite clear. Except for the item on women's rights, the mean of the national sample is near the midpoint of the available response scale. Except for the item on abortion, the mean responses of the activists are closer to the liberal extreme of the available scale than to the midpoint. For all items, the activists are much more liberal than the general public, and in general their responses tend to be the most liberal possible.

Answers to all of these items would support the findings of other research on sixties activists: liberal then, they are liberal now. And the finding would be based on similar kinds of data—current attitudes are measured currently, while past attitudes are inferred from past behavior, or sometimes from the subjects' recall.

Table 1. Attitudes Toward Current Political Issues

	Means ^a	
	Activists	Public ^b
1. Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's handling of nuclear arms control?	5.59	2.68
2. Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's handling of the protection of the environment?	5.73	3.11
3. Do you approve or disapprove of President Reagan's handling of the balancing of the national budget?	5.37	3.28
4. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought about it much?	1.90	4.16
5. Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running businesses, industry, and government. Others feel that women's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale? Or haven't you thought much about this?	1.27	2.40
6. Some people feel the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought about it much?	2.18	4.44
7. Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought about it much?	2.38	4.61
8. Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place	5.33	3.60

Table 1. (Continued)

	Means ^a	
	Activists	Public ^b
yourself on the following scale, or haven't you thought about it much?		
9. There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the following opinions best agrees with your view? (Scale from "by law an abortion should never be permitted," to "by law a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.")	3.93	3.27

^a All mean differences in the table are significant at the .001 level (*t*-test). A low score indicates approval of President Reagan or agreement with the thesis of the question, a high score indicates disapproval and disagreement.

^b Means for the "public" are adjusted through weightings determined by the age and education standardizations described in the text. Data are from the 1982 ISR National Postelection Survey.

Results from our panel data are much more complex. There is no single message. We find stability and change, consistency and contradiction. Where there is change, it is often between an extremely liberal position and a more ordinary but still liberal response. Yet this may be change that is important—for it can signal new patterns of behavior and response.

In Table 2 the attitudinal questions on which we have repeated measures are divided into four sets, each with a somewhat different content. The separation is for ease of explication and is not based on any specific analysis. Although our previous work on the 1965 data used factor analytic techniques to establish scales combining many of these items, the relationships among the items did not remain stable over time, and changes (or stabilities) in these scales mask the actual patterns of response that appear in the individual items. For example, the first four items in Table 2 comprised a very strong "nonviolence" index in waves 1 and 2. In wave 3, the first three items continue to reflect basically the same content. However, the fourth item is clearly no longer behaving as part of the same group. A look at its content suggests that variance in response to the item may no longer reflect differences among subjects in their attitudes toward nonviolence so much as disagreements among them regarding the nature of the "current position" of blacks in the South and the United States. A more detailed discussion of this issue will require a separate paper.

Table 2. Attitudes Toward Political and Other Issues Among Civil Rights Volunteers, Spring 1965 (t1), Fall 1965 (t2), and Summer 1984 (t3)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
I. The South and the movement						
1. It is morally correct to use the threat of violence as a strategy to avoid violent attacks from others.	4.65	4.35	3.70	*	*	*
2. Violence is proper when it is the only way of defending yourself or others.	4.20	4.06	2.82		*	*
3. The civil rights movement may have to abandon the policy of nonviolence if long-established Southern customs are to be changed.	5.37	5.14	4.79		*	*
4. It would be better for the black to remain in his current position if violence were the only way to change that position.	4.62	4.65	4.78			
5. When the case does not concern black civil rights, the black usually receives a fair trial in a state or local court in the deep South.	5.30	5.19	4.44		*	*
6. Police in the deep South are generally recruited from among the least qualified segments of the population.	3.01	2.77	3.17			*
7. Most state and local courts in the deep South tolerate illegal police methods.	1.99	1.97	2.74		*	*

Table 2. (Continued)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
8. Most whites in the deep South feel a good deal of shame about segregation and would like an easy way to end it without a loss of pride.	3.76	4.37	3.95	*		*
9. The battle for Southern civil rights is basically over. The local blacks need no further help to reap the benefits; they can and should do it alone.	"	5.41	4.81			*
10. The only progress that can be expected in the deep South in the next ten years is token integration.	4.67	4.41	4.14	*	*	
11. Most whites in the deep South are willing to integrate in many areas, but they are prevented from doing so by the white power structure.	3.80	4.10	4.18	*	*	
12. Most whites in the deep South know that society is changing and that they will have to go along with integration in the end.	2.60	2.76	2.92		*	
13. The racial crisis in the U.S. should be resolved on a local level without the intervention of the federal government.	5.27	5.03	5.21	*		
14. Any lasting changes in civil rights in the South will have to come from the Southerners themselves rather than from outside pressures.	3.39	3.16	3.20			

Table 2. (Continued)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
II. American society and politics						
1. I favor having our government continue to give economic aid to other countries such as India/Nigeria.	1.83	2.03	2.83		*	*
2. The U.S. Justice Department does as much as it possibly can, given the laws on civil rights within which it must work.	3.33	4.39	4.92	*	*	*
3. In a democracy it is proper for a citizen to disobey any laws he thinks prejudicial or unjust.	a	3.18	3.00			*
4. In view of past discrimination blacks should now be given jobs ahead of whites.	a	3.73	3.45			*
5. The racial problem will only be solved when all lower class groups, white and black, combine in common struggle.	2.53	2.89	3.00	*	*	
6. The American political system has proven itself incapable of coping with the problem of discrimination against blacks.	4.17	3.96	3.71	*		
7. The continuing plight of American blacks has caused me to have grave doubts about the superiority of democracy as a political system.	4.35	4.35	4.57			
8. The problem of the black in America is basically economic.	3.22	3.36	3.36			

Table 2. (Continued)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
9. American culture is sick and moving along the road to destruction.	3.64	3.56	3.65			
10. Most northern state and local judges are usually willing to go along with a "frame" of anyone they consider to have "dangerous" ideas.	4.26	4.33	4.18			
11. I believe there is at least a 50-50 chance of nuclear war in the next ten years.	3.59	3.30	3.18		*	
12. The U.S. should try to initiate negotiations in an area like Vietnam/El Salvador and should avoid military participation.	1.76	1.71	1.77			
13. I believe that a larger proportion of the federal government's budget should be allocated to poverty, medical care, education, etc.	1.41	1.50	1.56			
14. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.	^a	5.23	5.04			
III. Relative importance of issues						
1. Reduction of poverty through political action	2.87	2.54	2.76	*		*
2. Increase student rights in American colleges and universities	4.26	4.18	4.54		*	*
3. Aid to foreign countries through VISTA and other programs	3.58	4.48	4.16		*	*

Table 2. (Continued)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
4. Ending capital punishment in the U.S.	3.77	3.90	4.17		*	*
5. World nuclear disarmament	2.13	1.76	1.76	*	*	
6. Reduction of juvenile delinquency in the U.S.	2.59	3.70	3.51			
IV. Other						
1. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.	a	3.69	5.10			*
2. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.	a	2.93	3.39			*
3. Most people just don't know what's good for them.	a	4.23	4.62			*
4. In this complicated world of ours, the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.	a	4.76	5.10			*
5. People should do what is morally right regardless of the consequences.	a	2.79	3.03			
6. You can't blame people for taking all they can get.	4.73	4.69	4.68			
7. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.	a	5.32	5.26			
8. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.	a	4.12	4.37			

Table 2. (Continued)

	Means			Significance		
	t1	t2	t3	t1-t2	t1-t3	t2-t3
9. It is said that American business organizations are unrivaled in their efficiency. The civil rights movement would do well to model itself along such lines.	^a	4.76	4.60			
10. The businessman and the manufacturer are more important to society than the artist and the scholar.	5.15	5.13	4.90			

NOTES: The response categories for all items in sections I, II, and IV were as follows: 1. Strongly agree; 2. Moderately agree; 3. Agree somewhat; 4. Disagree somewhat; 5. Moderately disagree; 6. Strongly disagree.

The response categories for all items in section III were as follows: 1. Much more important than black progress; 2. Somewhat more important than black progress; 3. About the same importance as black progress; 4. Somewhat less important than black progress; 5. Much less important than black progress.

^a This question was not asked in the first wave (t1) of the research.

* Change in the response over this period was significant at the .05 level.

The four rough areas into which we have divided Table 2 may be summarized as: attitudes toward the South and the civil rights movement, attitudes toward American society and politics in general, a panel of items in which several social issues are evaluated regarding their relative importance, and a residual category comprised mostly of general philosophical perspectives on life and human nature.

A preliminary scan of the table suggests that these content differences are related to patterns of attitude change. The first set of items, for example, seems to tap attitudes that underwent quite a bit of change over this time period. Since the set includes those items most directly involved with attitudes toward the South and the Southern civil rights movement, we believe that pattern of change makes sense. The South has changed, and the movement has changed. There is no reason to expect these former activists to be blind to such historical facts.

The first four items in the first set all pertain to attitudes toward nonviolence—an issue of paramount importance as a strategy and as a moral position to the pacifist Dr. King. Our data argue that a statisti-

cally significant reduction in the volunteers' commitment to nonviolence took place both during their stay in the South and after leaving the south. This change may be due to several different causes. Although we cannot demonstrate the validity of our interpretation, we generally think that the process was one of declining adherence to a radical position, once the immediate social ties supporting that position were removed. The volunteers were recruited, and trained in nonviolent response, by an organization explicitly committed to a philosophy of nonviolence. No wonder they gave nonviolent attitude responses during their training sessions. Frustrating and violent experiences in the South made nonviolence difficult for many, and even the liberal community in which most volunteers chose to live after leaving the South does not agree with a radical "turn-the-other-cheek" posture. Under such circumstances, a reduction in nonviolent attitudes on the part of the volunteers is surely what we should have expected.

On the other hand, it is important to note that even in 1984 (wave 3) most volunteers remained generally favorable toward nonviolence. If we dichotomize the items by collapsing all "agree" responses and all "disagree" responses, we find that most of the activists (57%) still do not believe that it is correct to use the threat of violence to avoid violence from others. A sizable minority (26%) do not even think violence is proper as a means of defending themselves. The activists, in other words, are a rather distinct group of people—still "leftish," still pacifist. There is stability. But there is also change in the moderation of their responses.

There is also change in many of the attitudes expressed toward the South and Southern whites in wave 2. In general, these changes reflect a softening of the strong hostility that was previously felt, especially toward Southern courts. The major reason for the change, we would guess, is that the South, especially Southern courts, *has* changed. But note again that the activists still dominantly believe that Southern courts tolerate illegal police methods (77% "agree") and that blacks do not get fair trials (80%).

Several additional items regarding the South show little aggregate change since wave 2. Many of them are attitudes strongly affected by the experience in the South itself (i.e., between waves 1 and 2) that have tended to stabilize over time, or even move back slightly toward the original wave 1 opinion.

The second set of questions contains many fewer items that reflect attitudinal change. Furthermore, those items on which the activists do seem to evidence aggregate change do not suggest a very clear pattern. There is some decline in support for foreign aid and of belief in the U.S. Justice Department, along with the continuation of a gradual increase

in pessimism regarding a future nuclear war. All these trends seem to suggest a continuing decline in trust for major federal government institutions. In days gone by, such attitudes would generally be interpreted as conservative in direction. In the language of the sixties they are consistent with more left-wing alienation. In contrast, the activists are now more likely to support problack job discrimination and also civil disobedience. These are unambiguously more radical positions. Again, none of these changes reflects a movement among the activists from preponderantly "pro" to preponderantly "anti" or vice versa. They are, instead, the aggregation of moderate changes in a moderate proportion of the group.

Consideration of the remainder of the items represented in this second set indicates a remarkable level of stability regarding a very wide range of issues. Particularly notable for anyone who expected to find high levels of "radicalization" in this group is the fact that there is little or no increase or decrease in radical antidemocratic sentiment, support for welfare, or broad anti-Americanism.

The third set of items in Table 1 has a different structure from the previous two sets and a very different result as well. In all three waves, the activists were asked to compare the importance of "black progress" with the importance of each of six other political goals. Two of these alternative goals did not change between waves 2 and 3 in the way the activists compared them with black progress. Three of the remaining four alternative goals—reduction of poverty, student rights, and ending capital punishment—declined in their perceived relative importance. Aid to foreign countries increased in perceived relative importance but only, we believe, because it had decreased so sharply between waves 1 and 2. We should note that of all the items, only nuclear disarmament was rated as more important than black progress on the average in any of the three waves, and only the reduction of poverty was ever considered near equal in importance. For the civil rights workers as a whole, all other goals were consistently rated as substantially less important than black progress.

The fourth set of items in Table 2 contains data regarding ten general attitudes that are not so clearly political, but which probably have political implications. The table indicates results that are similar to those reported for the previous three item sets—results that reflect both stability and change. The first four items in this set represent change. They show the activists becoming less "idealistic" and less cynical about the ability of most people to take care of their own ideas and decisions. The six subsequent items, which reflect little change, are mostly cynical or probusiness statements that never appealed to the activists in the first place. Since the activists responded so ex-

tremely to these items in 1965 they were unlikely to become even more hostile by wave 3, and we would be unable to capture any such change because of the ceiling on our scales, in any case.

Conclusions

The sense we have of the changes in these activists' attitudes is both that they were localized and that they generally reflect a softening, rather than a discarding, of fairly extreme positions held in 1965. Some of the changes came through the natural process of living for a long period of time as the most extreme person in one's group. Some of the change simply reflects changes in the world to which the activists were responding. As is the case in most studies of this kind, it is very difficult for us to convincingly disentangle age from period effects in attitude change. The tenor of the times, rather than the experiences of their years, may influence their ideas in certain directions.

In all, however, we see much more stability than change in the activists' general ideological stance. They may be somewhat softer and less likely to take extreme positions. They may be uncertain about the utility of certain kinds of activities in which they once believed. On the whole, however, the group remains liberal, attitudinally committed to the needs of minorities and other disadvantaged groups. Our own sense is that these changes are mostly the product of age, not period. They reflect more or less what we would expect of somewhat more mature and complex individuals who have held on to their essential beliefs.

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UNDER WAY AND HERE TO STAY PARTY REALIGNMENT IN THE 1980s?

HELMUT NORPOTH

Abstract In recent years, the Republican party has sharply narrowed the Democratic edge in overall party identification. Using *New York Times*/CBS News surveys (1980–1986) and earlier NES/CPS surveys, this analysis probes several explanations for that partisan change: generational replacement, conversion, and mobilization. The findings rule out conversion, give some support to mobilization, but emphasize the historically unique surge toward the GOP among the young since 1980. This break with the parental partisan legacy signals the prospect of a party realignment through generational replacement.

Ever since Eisenhower's presidential campaign conquered the White House, the emergence of a Republican majority in the American electorate has been the object of much speculation. Some observers have eagerly prophesied that prospect, but others have shrugged it off as wishful thinking. Each new Republican conquest or successful defense of the White House revives the speculation, while electoral analysts sort out the evidence pro and con. That a party realignment is overdue, many would agree, but that one is actually under way, and that whatever is under way is here to stay, many would dispute.

There is no denying that over the last three decades Republicans have done exceedingly well in winning presidential elections. Although, for the most part, they faced a Congress controlled by the other party, they could often rely on enough conservative members of Congress to govern effectively. In that sense, a party realignment may have long been consummated, but that it is not the same as saying that the Republican party has displaced the Democrats as the favorite of the American electorate.

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Our interest focuses on the basic partisan loyalties of American voters, commonly known as their "party identifications" (Campbell et al., 1960). While no immutable biological trait, this identification is no fickle opinion swaying with the prevailing wind. To be sure, a good portion of voters will not be guided by their identifications in casting their votes in any given election, but in most cases their party identifications have survived such acts of infidelity. Though aided by defections of Democratic voters, Eisenhower's and Nixon's victories failed to upend the basic partisan division and instead turned out to be "deviating elections." Given the nature of party identification, a shift of basic loyalties massive enough to produce a realignment is bound to be a rare event.

Historically, party realignments have occurred in cyclical fashion: in the 1830s, 1860s, 1890s, and 1930s. The 1970s hence were due for another; and indeed there was no lack of symptoms. The majority party suffered from a sharp division over policy issues and along broad ideological lines. A seemingly hopeless combination of high inflation, unemployment, and no growth befell the national economy, undermining the historic reputation of the Democrats as the party of prosperity. Meanwhile in 1980, the Republican presidential candidate promised both a radical departure from the traditional New Deal policies and a resolution of the national condition diagnosed as "malaise" by the incumbent. Carter then became the first (elected) president to be voted out since 1932, when Hoover's defeat ushered in the New Deal realignment.

Notions of Party Realignment

Like few other notions, "party realignment" intrigues politicians as much as it does journalistic and scholarly observers of politics (see Key, 1955; Campbell et al., 1960; Phillips, 1969; Burnham, 1970; Broder, 1972; Sundquist, 1973; Petrocik, 1981). The most common notion of realignment is one where the overall balance of party support in the electorate shifts from one party to another. This may happen abruptly in a "realigning election" (Campbell et al., 1960: ch. 19) or, as Key (1955) called it, a "critical election." But it may also happen more gradually in a realigning era, by means of a "secular realignment."

Another notion of realignment focuses on the composition of a party's electoral support rather than on the aggregate balance of the total electorate (Petrocik, 1981). Here the key aspect concerns the social groups that comprise a party's electoral coalition. A realignment occurs in the sense that one or more core groups of party A move to align themselves with party B, like blacks moving toward the Demo-

cratic party, white southerners toward the Republican party. So long as the flows across party lines roughly match one another the overall balance in the electorate may not shift to any significant degree. Nevertheless, this sorting out of party clienteles most likely results in a changed policy outlook of the parties so as to accord with the demands of the newly dominant groups within the respective party coalition.

Partisan Change in the 1980s

The Reagan victories have produced their share of tantalizing hints of realignment in one form or another. The March 1981 *New York Times*/CBS News survey found the Democratic lead in party identification cut in half, down to 8 points from 16 a year earlier, with Republicans forging ahead of Democrats among self-identified conservatives (Clymer, 1981). Overall, conservatives outnumbered liberals by a 2-to-1 margin, but that had been true throughout the 1970s; so it seemed now as if partisan ties were realigning to fit voters' ideological identifications more appropriately.

During the 1984 campaign, the partisan division showed the Democratic lead narrowed to only five points (late October *Times*/CBS survey), while days after the election, in fact, the Republican share was found to be equal to the Democratic share, 32 to 32 (Clymer, 1984). Never before during the last 35 years had the GOP managed to make such strides in ousting the Democrats as the electorate's most preferred party. To be sure, a year and a half later, some of the Republican gains in party identification have evaporated. Parity with the Democrats days after the election has given way to a steady six-point gap (*Times*/CBS surveys pooled July 1985–Feb. 1986). Is this going to be a replay of what happened in the wake of Eisenhower's and Nixon's victories in 1956, 1968, and 1972, when gains reported for the GOP soon vanished (Converse, 1976:124)?

Thus far, the post-1984 gains have at least shown partial staying power. They have greatly narrowed the Democratic lead and not given way to the familiar 17-point lead enjoyed by the Democrats throughout the 1972–1980 period in NES/CPS surveys. Is this then the harbinger of a slow but ultimately full-fledged realignment? What in particular is fueling the shift toward the GOP? And where does it leave the New Deal Democratic coalition?

Collapse of the Democratic Coalition?

Studies of presidential voting for quite some time have read like obituaries for the Democratic coalition forged in the New Deal era. No

Table 1. The Democratic Coalition 1985-1986

	Percent Democratic of Identifiers	Group Size
Blacks	90%	13
Big city resident	71%	12
Poor (<\$12,500)	66%	16
Union household	66%	21
Catholic	59%	28
Southerner	56%	33
Electorate	55%	—

SOURCE: Five *New York Times*/CBS News surveys conducted between July 1985 and February 1986; 8,187 respondents combined.

doubt, Democratic candidates for the presidency have not fared well among several mainline groups composing the "Democratic coalition." But, according to *Times*/CBS surveys taken between July 1985 and February 1986, not a single one of the six groups commonly counted as the components of the Democratic coalition has moved into the Republican fold. Blacks, big city residents, the poor, and union households continue to favor the Democratic party by lopsided margins, as can be gathered from Table 1. Most southerners and Catholics also still prefer the Democratic party to the GOP.

To be sure, the southern share is now close to the national norm. Southerners have fallen in line with nonsoutherners. This did not happen overnight, but through a slow process of "convergence" that has been under way for over half a century. If one extrapolates trend lines derived by Converse (1966:221) for partisan loyalties in the South and outside during the 1950s, one would have predicted 1983 as the year of convergence. Had it not been for southern blacks turning increasingly Democratic, convergence would have come earlier. Among southern whites, the once virtually unanimous support for the Democratic party has been steadily declining, from an 80-to-20 edge in 1952 to a 56-to-44 split in 1984 (NES/CPS survey, reported by Weisberg, 1985). By early 1986, the GOP had reached statistical parity with the Democratic party in this group (*Times*/CBS surveys July 1985-Feb. 1986). The Republican party, one might say, has neutralized this large Democratic support group, but so far not succeeded in drawing it into its own orbit.

Mechanisms of Partisan Change

In reflecting on how something like the party balance in the electorate shifts, one instinctively reaches for "conversion." A rise of the proportion of Republicans logically would seem to stem from individuals abandoning their Democratic identification in favor of one with the GOP. A *New Yorker* cartoon on 24 December 1984 deftly captured this process with the caption: "My God! I went to sleep a Democrat and I've awakened a Republican." Either because they are profoundly dissatisfied with the performance of Democrats in office or cannot accept key policies these Democrats "convert" to Republicanism. Such conversion, though in the opposite partisan direction, is stressed by several accounts of the 1930s realignment (Sundquist, 1973:3; Ladd and Hadley, 1978:66; Erikson and Tedin, 1981:962).

This interpretation of the 1930s realignment squares with the "revisionist" view that treats an individual's party identification as subject to revision by vote decisions, retrospective judgments, and issue orientations that challenge one's partisanship (Jackson, 1975; Fiorina, 1981; Page and Jones, 1979; Franklin and Jackson, 1983). Critical realignments simply occur on occasions when short-term forces run so massively against the majority party as to convert a large segment of the electorate to the minority party.

A rival account of partisan change, on the other hand, does not involve individuals changing their minds about anything. Instead it focuses on change in the composition of the electorate. Through births and deaths the population changes constantly. Only a small proportion of the 1930s electorate, for example, is still part of the electorate today. In fact, given the rate of "generational replacement," it is surprising how little many things in the aggregate change.

The "generational" school of thought has a well-established tradition in the treatment of partisanship (Abramson, 1975; Beck, 1974; Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings and Niemi, 1974, 1981). According to this view, the partisan balance shifts when young voters enter the electorate with an imprint that distinguishes them from the rest of society. So long as this new generation maintains that imprint as it ages and manages to impress it on its own offspring, the whole society gradually takes on the outlook of that generation. Party realignment thus proceeds gradually, with the overall balance shifting as the new generation grows up and the older cohorts die out.

Why young voters should be the vanguard of partisan change is less obvious than it might seem. Contrary to a common stereotype, the young as a whole are little concerned with politics; they do not go to the polls in large numbers and the big ideological issues do not touch them any more than the rest of society. It is not intense politicization,

but the lack of it, as Campbell et al. (1960:156) argue, especially the lack of firm party attachments, that makes it likely for the young to be swayed by the prevailing tides; those tides clearly favored the Democrats in the 1930s. Once the party tie is knotted time will tighten it and protect it against slippage, which is why older voters steeped in Republican loyalties were unlikely recruits for the Democratic party in the 1930s.

A third account of partisan change also does not require conversion of partisans, but focuses on that portion of the electorate which is not aligned with any party. Andersen (1979) points to the "mobilization" of heretofore nonpartisan members of the electorate into the ranks of partisanship as the key to the 1930s realignment. It was the success of the Democratic party in capturing the big bulk of "non-immunized voters—whether immigrants, new voters, or those who for some reason have abstained from voting" (Andersen, 1979:18). In our time, the heavily documented dealignment of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976; Norpoth and Rusk, 1982; Wattenberg, 1984; Beck, 1984) creates a window of opportunity for realignment by mobilizing the unaligned.

Birth Year and Partisanship

The generational hypothesis, which requires a distinctive behavior among the young, receives considerable support. *Times/CBS News* surveys in 1984 showed the under-30 cohort to favor the GOP over the Democratic party (Clymer, 1984). "To Republicans dreaming of a historic 'realignment' in their favor, this was the best news of all in the 1984 election" (Plissner, 1985). Yet, striking a contrary note, Miller (1986) argued that it was the oldest citizens who were responsible for the overall GOP gain.

To examine more closely the prospect of generational change, Figure 1 depicts the partisanship of the American electorate grouped in 4-year birth cohorts. Approximately 8,000 cases were combined from the five *Times/CBS* surveys in late 1985 and 1986. Note that the percentage Republican among party identifiers is charted, those percentages being based on an average of 300 cases of party identifiers per cohort. This figure draws the profile of an electorate in which the Democratic party dominates all but four cohorts. Cohorts of voters born after 1906 and before 1955 consistently favor that party. The age midsection of the electorate includes the New Deal generation and much of its offspring. The heavy Republicanism of the oldest cohort (1895–1906) signals, we think, the legacy of the pre-New Deal era, in which the Republican party dominated the party system. It is astounding that the dominant




Figure 1. Percent Republican among Party Identifiers by Birth Year (July 1985–February 1986, New York Times/CBS News Surveys).

partisan flavor of this group can still be detected, more than sixty years after partisan ties must have been formed. Our finding confirms the generational fault line separating those born before 1905 and after 1910, which was discovered by *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960:154).

Other than the very old, it is only the young that favor the Republican party. Those born since 1955, who were at most 30 years old in late 1985, either prefer the GOP to the Democratic party or are evenly split. On the whole, Republican support among the 30-and-under cohorts comes to 54% compared to only 42% in the rest of the electorate. *Times/CBS* surveys conducted between November 1984 and June 1985 closely replicate the "bathtub" pattern of Figure 1 (see Norpoth, 1985; Clymer, 1985); and so do results of Gallup polls charted by Ladd for 1985 (Ladd, 1986; also *Public Opinion*, 1985). Younger cohorts are rallying to the Republican party while the rest of the electorate, except for the pre-New Deal cohorts, continues to back the Democratic party.

Now perhaps this Republican surge of the young is quite typical for times when the party's candidate does well in presidential elections, the young being most easily swayed by the prevailing tides and lacking firm attachments. This suspicion can be easily dispelled. As Table 2 bears out, the under-30 group has kept its distance from the GOP in

Table 2. Percent Republican of Party Identifiers among Young Adults (Under 30 Years of Age)

Year	Republican	(N)
1952	29%	(214)
1956	34%	(184)
1960	35%	(74)
1964	29%	(194)
1968	35%	(139)
1972	32%	(353)
1976	31%	(316)
1980	35%	(624)
1984	49%	(1948)

SOURCE: 1952–1976, University of Michigan CPS/NES surveys (preelection); 1980, *New York Times*/CBS surveys, Aug. and Sept.; 1984, *New York Times*/CBS surveys, Aug.–Oct.

previous Republican victories. Neither 1952 and 1956 nor 1968 and 1972 showed the young with pronounced Republican leanings. The youthful surge to the GOP noticeable in 1984 stands out as a novelty.

Who Are the New Republicans?

Much has been made of the "Yuppie" generation as a group receptive to the GOP appeal and a core group of the new Republican coalition. Agewise, this group of now-grown-up baby boomers would be concentrated among the cohorts born between 1947 and 1958 in Figure 1. Yet, as Figure 1 shows, only the very youngest of them, those born between 1955 and 1958, show any drift toward the GOP. But, of course, "Yuppie" does not just mean young, but also affluent. Indeed, among those born between 1946 and 1960 with incomes over \$35,000, the Republicans do outnumber Democrats 57% to 43% in the surveys examined here. The more affluent baby boomers clearly have a soft spot for the Republican party. But then, that is true for affluent voters born before 1946 as well; among them, Republicans lead Democrats 54% to 46%. Yuppie Republicanism, it seems, has more to do with affluence than with youth. For the most part, the youthful surge toward the GOP is a post-Yuppie phenomenon.

Not surprisingly, the majority of voters under 30 cast their votes for Reagan in 1984. While no higher, according to the *Times*/CBS exit poll,

Table 3. Reagan Job Rating, Ideology, and Political Trust:
The Young (18-30) vs. the Rest of the Electorate

	Young	Rest of Electorate
Reagan Job Rating		
Approve	70%	61%
Disapprove	22%	27%
(N)	(1,934)	(4,152)
Ideology (Self-placement)		
Liberal	25%	19%
Moderate	39%	40%
Conservative	32%	35%
(N)	(1,945)	(4,141)
Trust in Government		
Always/most	52%	43%
Some/never	47%	54%
(N)	(1,009)	(2,231)

SOURCE: *New York Times*/CBS News surveys, July 1985–Feb. 1986.

than among the rest of voters, such strong support for the Republican candidate is not common for the young. Only in one other election did the under-30 group vote strongly for the Republican candidate: in 1956. It is worth noting that not Eisenhower nor Nixon nor Reagan himself in their first elections would have won office had all voted the way the young did (Gallup, 1976).

Whether voting or not, people under 30 give Ronald Reagan high marks of approval for his performance as president: 70%, according to the July 1985–February 1986 *Times*/CBS surveys, as tabulated in Table 3. Among the rest of the electorate the rating is "only" 61%. On the other hand, and surprisingly in view of ideological interpretations of partisan change, the young are not any more conservative than the general electorate; if anything, slightly more of them call themselves liberals than is true for the more Democratic rest of the electorate. On specific issues like abortion, support for affirmative action, and U.S. involvement in war, Plissner (1985) also finds the young more liberal than the rest of society.

While it is true that young conservatives profess a high loyalty toward the GOP, that holds for older conservatives as well. It is among self-described moderates under 30, on the other hand, where the GOP

scores big gains compared to what it commands among older moderates. This too makes it difficult to interpret the youthful surge to the Republican party as an ideological crusade for conservatism. Reagan's appeal apparently has not fueled an ideological conversion. —

On trust in government, the young come out more on the trusting side than do their elders. While greater trust has often been found among the young (Jennings and Niemi, 1974:142), political trust overall has been on the decline since the late 1960s, with signs of improvement coming late during the first Reagan term (*Times/CBS* surveys of June 1983). Among the young a revival of political trust, approval of Reagan's job performance, and Republican identification go hand in hand.

Change of Party Identification, 1976–1986

As suggestive of generational change as the youthful surge toward the GOP in the early 1980s appears to be, the evidence so far involves only snapshots, albeit several ones, taken recently. To establish more conclusively how much generational replacement, by comparison with conversion and mobilization, accounts for partisan change, we must chart partisanship over a longer period. Ideally this would require a panel, which would begin at the time of an individual's partisan socialization. Unfortunately, no such data set is at hand, and in the absence we shall improvise by charting the partisanship of several birth cohorts from the point where they entered the electorate to the present. Given the recent history of "dealignment" we have also included independents (together with DK responses) in this tabulation. It is quite true, and nothing new, that while the young may favor one party over the other they also profess independence in large numbers.

The 1963–1966 cohort is the one that as a whole came of age, politically speaking, with the 1984 election. The oldest within that group we already catch in 1982, when they turned 18. While mostly independent, the partisans favor the Republican side, as can be seen in Table 4. Moreover, the Democratic share of this cohort falls way short of the party's share among established voters while the Republicans take a bigger share. As new 18-year-olds swell this young cohort in subsequent years, the GOP edge is confirmed. As a whole, the young adults of 1984 have the markings of a GOP generation right from the start, signaling a major break with the dominantly Democratic legacy of their parents.

The next oldest cohort, comprising voters born between 1959 and 1963, came of age in the 1980 election. At that time, this cohort slightly favored the Democratic party, although nearly one-half preferred independence. The Democratic lead remains fairly constant for the next

Table 4. Party Identification by Birth Cohorts, 1976–1985

					1983		1984		1985	
	1976	1980	1981	1982	A	B	A	B	A	B
Cohort Born 1963–1966										
Rep.	—	—	—	28	31	30	30	30	34	33
Dem.	—	—	—	26	28	31	29	28	29	27
Ind./DK	—	—	—	45	40	42	42	42	37	40
(N)				225	268	382	532	1090	835	765
Cohort Born 1959–1962										
Rep.	—	25	26	26	24	20	26	30	31	34
Dem.	—	31	30	30	31	33	32	30	30	28
Ind./DK	—	43	45	45	44	47	41	41	39	38
(N)		616	606	616	420	455	671	1135	809	794
Cohort Born 1955–1958										
Rep.	16	19	26	23	24	21	25	26	29	31
Dem.	37	35	33	32	34	38	31	32	30	30
Ind./DK	47	46	40	46	42	42	43	42	41	39
(N)	203	754	537	647	433	474	735	1099	795	833
Cohorts Born Before 1955										
Rep.	24	23	25	23	24	23	25	26	29	28
Dem.	40	42	37	41	41	43	41	39	39	40
Ind./DK	37	35	37	36	35	34	34	34	33	31
(N)	2645	6066	4511	4613	3223	3262	4939	7525	5502	5311

SOURCES: For 1976, University of Michigan CPS/NES survey; for 1980–1985, 43 *New York Times*/CBS News surveys: 1983A: Jan–Jun 1983; 1983B: Jul–Dec 1983; 1984A: Jan–Jun 1984; 1984B: Aug–Oct 1984; 1985A: Dec 1984–Jun 1985; 1985B: Jul 1985–Feb 1986.

three years, but gives way in the second half of 1984. The Republican edge of this cohort is of most recent vintage (1985/86) and reflects the effect of current forces. At the same time, the starting configuration (1980) of this cohort indicates that the partisan legacy of the parental generation has not been effectively transmitted.

The next cohort (1955–1958), which came of age in 1976, begins with a partisan division that reflects the parental pattern more closely. Furthermore, its Democratic edge of 21 points approximates that found for high school seniors in 1965 by Jennings and Niemi (1974:39). Still, both parties appear to have lost ground, and equally so, among the young in

1976. In 1965, the then 18-year-olds divided 43 to 21 between the two parties, whereas by 1976 almost half of the then 18- to 21-year-olds chose independence—from parties and probably other strictures as well. During the next 10 years this cohort experiences a remarkable partisan odyssey. While setting out on a steady Democratic course, the group is diverted to the GOP in the wake of Reagan's victory over Jimmy Carter, but reverts back to Democratic bearings by late 1983 until it is swept into a virtual standoff between the two parties after the 1984 election. Admittedly, the partisan buffeting of this cohort exposes the vulnerability of partisanship among young adults.

The rest of the electorate, born before 1955, who had come of age by 1972 at the latest, meanwhile proceeds at a comparatively glacial pace through the last 10 years. The 40-to-24 Democratic edge of 1976 turns into a 40-to-28 one by 1985/86. No doubt the GOP has scored some gains, though in the aggregate exclusively at the expense of independents. There is no sign of Democratic bloodletting; no net conversion, in other words. To be sure, party identification is no immutable trait and the Reagan victories in 1980 and 1984 raise the Republican share a bit, but in the end the impression of partisanship among established voters is one of a continuing though lessening Democratic advantage. The lessening, it must be emphasized, arises entirely from Republican mobilization of independents.

Conclusions

Unlike the 1950s and late 1960s, when prophecies of Republican realignments (Phillips, 1969) remained unfulfilled, the 1980s provide more compelling clues that such a realignment is now under way. What is new is that the younger cohorts profess a marked loyalty to the GOP. No such shift was noticeable at earlier "realignment opportunities."

The youthful surge toward the GOP definitely marks a major disruption of the normal pattern of parental socialization. Young adults coming of age since 1980 have largely abandoned the predominately Democratic identification of their parents. How and why Democratic parents were unsuccessful in imparting their partisanship to their offspring, whether it was a case of mistaken partisan identities, as Converse (1975) suggests for the 1930s realignment, or whether short-term forces outside the home erased the parental imprint, these are questions that future research must address.

One thing is certain, and contrary to some common expectations: there is no evidence that conservatism fuels the youthful surge toward the GOP. Also, the Yuppie phenomenon apparently has little to do with it. Compared with older voters, the young, if anything, prove more

liberal than their elders. And among the young the GOP shows the greater strength in the post-Yuppie cohorts. The surge is remarkably broad among the young, felt also somewhat among women and blacks.

There is also no evidence that the Republican party has managed to convert Democrats to any significant degree. Among voters over 30, the Democratic party has protected its share remarkably well over the past ten years. Our findings give no hope to Republican strategists, or reason for alarm among their Democratic counterparts, that Democratic conversion/defection will turn the GOP into the nation's majority party.

Where the GOP has succeeded, however, is in making inroads among the "growth" group of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the independents. This mobilization has helped narrow the partisan gap in the overall electorate, but has so far failed to reverse it. To some extent, independent mobilization may be considered commonplace and not a harbinger of realignment. Some partisan sorting out among independents typically takes place through the life cycle. If it did not, the shares of both parties would slowly erode since new entrants into the electorate generally show up with lower partisan commitments than their elders (Jennings and Niemi, 1974:39). On the other hand, the mobilization of independents might not appear so commonplace anymore. It certainly failed to materialize in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This failure in fact sharply depressed the overall level of partisanship and contributed to dealignment (Norpoth and Rusk, 1982). At a minimum, the changes of the 1980s point to the end of this contribution. Perhaps what we are seeing now is that partisans who deserted the parties then are returning to them now, though not quite evenhandedly so.

There can be no denying that the Republican surge goes hand in hand with Ronald Reagan's popularity—his initials, curiously enough, spell Republican Realignment. Among the young, where the GOP is now dominant, President Reagan enjoys peak ratings. Skeptics of the realignment scenario, of course, will pounce on this correlation as evidence of no lasting impact meriting the label "realignment." Isn't it true, after all, that the last two years in which Republicanism has flourished so much are also the years in which Reagan's job ratings have done so, staying above the 60-point mark consistently? By contrast, didn't the GOP's post-1980 gains fizzle as soon as Reagan's appeal dimmed? And does not the partisan odyssey of the 1955–1958 cohort, who came of age in 1976, bear out how fickle the young really are in their basic political attitudes?

Granted, much of the partisan change we are witnessing is inspired by Ronald Reagan's performance in office as judged by the public, perhaps in comparison to that of his Democratic predecessor. But that

seems insufficient reason to dismiss changes in party identification as insignificant. Most historical realignments required a measure of performance by the leader of the newly dominant party after the nation had faced a crisis of traumatic dimensions; or at least a measure of public faith in such performance. For all we know from sketchy opinion polls of the early and mid-1930s, FDR received exceedingly high approval ratings in those years. Almost certainly, opinion surveys of that time would have shown high FDR approval rating going hand in hand with Democratic identification among the young—a partisanship that largely endured.

For Ronald Reagan to have a similar impact on the young and their Republican inclinations depends in large part on whether his performance ratings stay high long enough. The newly formed ties to the GOP among the young require reinforcement during the early adult years. But from a certain point on they acquire enough staying power to weather disappointments and survive in the absence of the conditions that inspired them. Assuming that Ronald Reagan maintains a respectable job rating for the remainder of his term that point may not be far off.¹

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1. Recent events seem to negate this assumption. In the wake of the Iran–Contra revelations, Ronald Reagan's approval ratings fell from 67% to 46%, according to the November 1986 *New York Times*/CBS News survey. Some will conclude that this drop spells the obituary for any GOP realignment. Almost certainly, a collapse of the Reagan presidency would prove them right. But short of such an event, a diminished approval rating by itself need not doom the realignment prospect. It must be remembered that Reagan's ratings in the two years following his landslide reelection reached heights unusual for a second-term president. An approval rating in the mid-50% range would still be considered "respectable" in the sense meant above.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND OPINION CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND

JAMES W. LAMARE

Abstract Conflict between groups, including nations, seemingly leads to solidarity among the people in each collectivity. Testing this proposition at the international level is difficult owing to methodological problems of data gathering. This paper reports upon the impact of an international controversy upon national opinion consolidation. After the New Zealand government banned nuclear-capable ships from the country, the United States retaliated through public denunciation of this action and mild sanctions. Poll information suggests that, as a result of this dispute, New Zealanders put aside their preexisting political and social differences on the issue of nuclear weapons in their country and rallied behind their government. Over time, however, this consolidation effect shows signs of disintegration: social and, especially, political cleavages have begun again to discriminate opinion on the question of nuclear weapons in New Zealand.

Three decades ago Coser (1956:12), drawing upon a much earlier observation by Sumner (1906:35), noted: "It seems to be generally accepted . . . that the distinction between 'ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups,' is established in and through conflict." Studies under experimental conditions confirm that conflict stemming from sources outside a collectivity ordinarily creates solidarity among group members (Austin and Worchel, 1979; Sherif, 1962; Tajfel, 1981). Generalization of this consolidation effect to the natural setting of international controversy seems relatively straightforward, at least at the theoretical level. Systematic observation of the impact of international crisis upon domestic public opinion, however, poses significant methodological problems (Converse, 1965).

Opinion polling and the outbreak of conflictual events rarely coin-

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cide; consequently, research in this area is highly dependent upon indirect measures. It is customary in the United States, for instance, to evaluate presidential popularity when international disputes occur. The almost inevitable rise in public goodwill toward the president during these times is interpreted as an indication of collective consolidation (Benson, 1982; Lee, 1977). Interestingly, protracted unresolved disputes usually lead to an unraveling of consensus.

This paper investigates the impact of international conflict upon public opinion through the deployment of more direct tools of measurement. The case covers New Zealand, which has become embroiled in a controversy with its ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) defense treaty partners over the propriety of permitting nuclear-capable U.S. warships to berth in its harbors. The 1984 election of a Labour government committed to a ban on port calls by nuclear-powered or -armed vessels (which had previously been granted access to the country's waters) put New Zealand on a collision course with the United States. Secretary George Shultz, who was in New Zealand within days of the electoral victory of the new government, promptly announced that the United States would frown upon a shift in this policy.

The issue came to a head in February 1985 when the United States requested port access for one of its ships (the *U.S.S. Buchanan*). The Labour government would grant permission to berth only if it could be assured that the *Buchanan* was not nuclear-powered or carrying nuclear weapons. The United States refused to violate its long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying the nuclear capability of its naval vessels. The proposed visit was canceled; military sanctions against New Zealand (including a stoppage of intelligence information and spare parts for military equipment) were invoked; and, at least in Congress, threats of economic reprisals were made. New Zealand, echoing the U.S. cry of betrayal by a friend, served notice of its intention to enact its nuclear ban into law. Some eighteen months of negotiation between the two parties failed to resolve the conflict. In August 1986 the United States officially proclaimed that New Zealand was no longer a functioning member of the ANZUS alliance, having in effect withdrawn itself from the treaty as a result of its antinuclear policy.

Public opinion toward nuclear ship visits has been monitored in New Zealand both before and after this controversy erupted.¹ These data

1. The information comes from opinion polls of the New Zealand public conducted by the Heylen Research Center, the country's foremost commercial and political polling organization. Heylen employs a multistage, stratified sampling frame to select respondents. Personal interviews are conducted with the person who had the last birthday in the residence chosen in the sample draw. Each survey contains 1000 New Zealanders, aged 15 or over. Repeated callbacks insure a response rate over 85% in each poll. The sample

provide a basis for analysis of change in views occasioned by the nuclear ships controversy as it unfolded over time.

Findings

In 1983, a year prior to the conflict, a national sample of New Zealanders was asked: "Would you approve or disapprove of *nuclear armed* warships of New Zealand allies visiting New Zealand ports?" Forty percent of the public opposed such visits. Immediately after the change of government in July 1984 another sample was asked: "Do you approve or disapprove of the Labour Government policy to ban the entry of *nuclear weapons* into New Zealand?" Fully 76% of the respondents favored the government's ban, a support figure that reappeared in March 1987 when the same question was put to yet another national sample.

On the face of it, the government's new position (and the conflict it provoked) precipitated a major change in public sentiment—an uncommon finding in other research probing the relationship between public policy and opinion (Page and Shapiro, 1983). Conceivably, some of this opinion motility is an artifact of question wording. Antagonism toward "nuclear weapons" in general and partiality toward the "Labour Government" in particular could affect the meaning imputed to postelection questions. Other polls conducted over the same time frame, however, have solicited feelings about "nuclear armed" vessels and generally confirm the overwhelming support given to the government's ban. Armed ship visits were opposed by around 60% of a national sample polled in August 1984 (National Research Bureau, 1984) and by 72% of the residents of Auckland surveyed a month later (Crothers and Murray, 1985). Finally, a national poll conducted in May 1986 revealed that two-thirds of New Zealanders agreed with stopping port calls by "nuclear armed" ships (Defence Committee of Enquiry, 1986:70).

Assuming that opinion change is not merely a methodological fluke, what was the source of this remarkable shift in perspective? Table 1 suggests that a consolidation effect occurred in New Zealand. That is, international discord over the nuclear ships issue activated most of the public to rally around their government. Before the controversy (the 1983 column) some traditional lines of social and political cleavage

is weighted by a household size factor in order to reduce sampling error. The weighted sample numbers 2000 and is representative of New Zealanders living in areas with 2500 or more people. This paper is based upon a detailed study of surveys administered in August 1983, August 1984, and March 1985. Heylen is gratefully acknowledged for the release of these data and assumes no responsibility for the analysis or interpretation presented.

Table 1. Changes in Opinion toward Nuclear Weapons in New Zealand: Percentages Approving Ban

	1983	1984	% Change 1983-84	1985	% Change 1984-85
Entire Sample (N)	40% (1,980)	76% (1,975)	+ 36*	77% (1,978)	+ 1**
Gender					
Men	37	75	+ 38*	73	- 2**
Women	43	78	+ 35*	80	+ 2**
Cramer's V		.23	.05		.13
Age					
15-24 years	49	78	+ 29*	82	+ 4*
25-39 years	44	83	+ 39*	77	- 6*
40-54 years	33	72	+ 39*	81	+ 9*
55-plus years	33	72	+ 39*	70	- 2*
Cramer's V		.17	.08		.06
Socioeconomic Status ^a					
High	38	77	+ 39*	NA	
Middle	38	72	+ 34*	NA	
Low	46	83	+ 37*	NA	
Cramer's V		.14	.09		
Party Choice					
Labour	53	83	+ 30*	92	+ 9*
Third party ^b	55	83	+ 28*	75	- 8*
National	23	63	+ 40*	55	- 8*
Cramer's V		.28	.15		.30

Source: Heylen Research Center.

* $p \leq .01$, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.** $p \leq .05$, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.^a Socioeconomic status is a combined measure of income, education, occupation, and family size.^b For 1983, "third party" refers to Social Credit (now New Zealand Democratic), Values, and "other"; for 1984 and 1985 it includes Social Credit, Values, and the New Zealand party. In each sample some 350 respondents were excluded because they failed to choose a party.

correlated with opinion. Port calls were slightly less favored by lower-class respondents (Cramer's $V = .14$). Men were somewhat more inclined than women to welcome ship visits (Cramer's $V = .23$). Younger New Zealanders were not as disposed to the berthing of nuclear warships as their older compatriots (Cramer's $V = .17$). Most pronounced, party choice divided opinion. Labour and third-party enthusiasts were markedly more negative about nuclear ship visits than were partisans of the then ruling National government (Cramer's $V = .28$).

After the conflict broke, as indicated in the 1984 column of Table 1,

ranks closed behind the Labour government's antinuclear policy. Within each stratum a large movement of opinion favorable to the ships ban was recorded. While some variation among social and political groupings remains evident, a decline in the strength of association between opinion and socioeconomic status (Cramer's $V = .09$), gender (Cramer's $V = .05$), age (Cramer's $V = .08$), and even party (Cramer's $V = .15$) had occurred. International conflict with the United States seems to have bred national solidarity in New Zealand.

Alternatively, it could be argued that the public was simply adopting signals emitted from opinion leaders. Prior research into opinion change posits a learning model of adaptation, with followers receiving and accepting ideational stimuli from leaders such as government officials (McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Page and Shapiro, 1984). It may well be that some New Zealanders—notably Labour party supporters—merely imitated nuclear opinion cues emanating from party and government leaders. However, the leadership model, standing alone, fails to account for the fissure that occurred in the National party. Whereas only 23% of National supporters took an antinuclear stand in 1983, a year later—even after a crushing electoral defeat—their approval of the ban on nuclear weapons rose to 63%. Most of the rank and file National partisans moved to the nuclear-free position of the Labour government in sharp contrast to the publicly expressed pronuclear stance of their party's leadership.

Although the evidence points to an integrative explanation of the dramatic public swing behind the government's ships ban, it would be incorrect to interpret this opinion rally solely as a symptom of either unadulterated or enduring nationalism for several reasons. First, the drift of opinion exhibits a more discerning pattern of response than an interpretation of sheer patriotism would predict. On the question of entry of nuclear-powered vessels into the country's ports, the public veers toward government policy, but to a significantly lesser extent than the shift and support prompted by the prospect of having nuclear weapons in New Zealand. Between 1980 and 1985 a steady, incremental 18% increase in opinion opposed to nuclear propelled ships was recorded: this is half the total amount of change that occurred over only twelve months (1983–1984) on the nuclear arms issue. This difference in view suggests that the consolidation effect is more conditional than crude nationalism would entail. A concern about the liability of nuclear weapons within their territorial boundaries heightened mobilization of many New Zealanders behind their government's position.

Nor does consolidation translate into blatant anti-Americanism. When the public was queried in February 1985 about the possibility of a *nonnuclear* U.S. warship making a port call, nine out of ten approved of such a stopover. To be sure, an uneasy, critical feeling toward the

United States has developed in the wake of the conflict. By March 1985, the public was evenly split (45% in each camp) in choosing between maintaining "defense ties with the U.S. or allowing ships that could be *nuclear-armed* into New Zealand ports." A slim majority (53%) said that their country had not "neglected her share of responsibility under the ANZUS agreement." The same percentage remarked that New Zealand had not been "treated fairly by U.S. officials following the ban on nuclear ships." Underscoring the magnitude of this feeling is the fact that responses to these three items cluster together, giving clear shape to a unidimensional attitude structure. Factor analysis shows loadings of .71 (break defense ties), .68 (neglect treaty obligations) and .58 (treated fairly by the United States). Accordingly, a scale of strained friendship was constructed.² Respondents' scale scores are directly correlated with opinion toward the government's nuclear ship stance ($D_{yx} = -0.69$). Approval of the ban flows on to a defensive, fretful (albeit not totally hostile) view of the United States; disapproval of the ban structures a favorable, sympathetic disposition toward the American position in this dispute.

Moreover, public opinion began changing as the nuclear ships controversy became prolonged. A year after the initial round of the conflict (in September 1985), for instance, New Zealanders divided evenly in their evaluation of their government's "current handling of the nuclear ships issue with the United States." (Heylen Research Center, 1985). Indeed, by March 1985—some seven months after the conflict had started—sociopolitical alignments had begun again to differentiate opinion on the ship ban.

At first glance, as indicated at the top of the 1985 column of Table 1, the public rally behind their government continued unabated: 77% still supported the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This figure, however, masks some interesting movement within discrete segments of New Zealand society. Views toward nuclear ship visits came to be slightly correlated with gender (Cramer's $V = .13$). Within age groups, some shift in sentiment also occurred. Specifically, respondents between 25 and 39 years old fell in their approval of the ban, while somewhat older (40 to 54 years of age) New Zealanders improved their support for the government's antinuclear policy. Most dramatically, party division in opinion resurfaced. The relationship (Cramer's V) between partisan-

2. The scale of strained friendship is a factor scale. Each respondent's score is based upon the following calculation:

$$SSF = flv_1(v_1 - \bar{X}_{v1})/SD_{v1} + flv_2(v_2 - \bar{X}_{v2})/SD_{v2} + flv_3(v_3 - \bar{X}_{v3})/SD_{v3}$$

Where: SSF is the respondent's score on the scale of strained friendship; v is the variable measured by the question; fl is the factor loading of the variable; $\bar{X}$ is the mean score of the variable; and SD is the standard deviation of the variable.

ship and nuclear view has risen from .15 in 1984 to .30 in 1985.³ While Labour adherents *increased* their approval of the government's policy since 1984 by 9%, National and third-party partisans each *decreased* their support by 8%. Thus sustained high marks for the ban mostly reflect an accretion of goodwill for the Labour government from its natural constituents. Indeed, the fact that nine out of ten Labourites have fallen in step behind the government suggests that a ceiling in public commitment to the nuclear weapons ban may have been reached.⁴

Conclusion

The research presented here indicates that international conflict leads to national solidarity, even when the dispute is between historically friendly countries. New Zealanders generally rallied to the support of their government after it invoked a ban on port access to nuclear ships and, in so doing, upset its ANZUS treaty partner—the United States. Large segments of the New Zealand public—even traditional political opponents—pulled together immediately after the disagreement commenced. Approval of the government's action precipitated irritation with the United States over its handling of this issue. However, the consolidation effect never crystallized into abject or overt hostility toward America. Moreover, with opinion showing signs of again becoming structured along social and, especially, party lines, solidarity appears to be weakening over time.

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3. There is no evidence to support the proposition that party realignment has been occasioned by a change of opinion on the ships issue.

4. A 1986 poll of a representative sample of 1600 New Zealanders conducted by the National Research Bureau further documents the growing impact of party choice on views toward nuclear-armed ship visits. While most Labour supporters (84%) still stand with the government's policy, only four of every ten National supporters now approve of the ban. The relationship (Cramer's *V*) between opinion on ships and party preference is .32 (calculated from Defence Committee of Enquiry, 1986:71).

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THE POLLS—A Report

THE WELFARE STATE IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

TOM W. SMITH

Over the last three years the Polls have examined in some detail attitudes of Americans toward the welfare state.¹ In this article we add a cross-national perspective to the analysis of attitudes toward the welfare state. The data are drawn primarily from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) (Smith, 1986a, 1986b), as well as from the earlier Political Action study (Barnes et al., 1979; Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1979). ISSP is a continuing annual program of cross-national collaboration. It brings together preexisting national social science projects and coordinates research goals, thereby adding a cross-national perspective to the separate national studies. Topics of collaboration are selected by the group, and a draft questionnaire is designed in British English. After translation into the various national languages using standard techniques of parallel and back translation, the instrument is pretested by each participant. The final content of the annual module is then set by the group and administered by the individual survey organizations. To date, joint research has been carried out on the role of government (1985), social support (1986), and social inequity (1987). In addition to the United States, Austria, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, which participated in the role of government questions analyzed here, Australia, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Hungary are now collaborating in ISSP. Technical details on the ISSP surveys appear in Table 1.

The Rise of the Welfare State

Over the last century all industrial nations have become welfare states. Each has adopted a broad set of social welfare programs to protect its

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1. For previous Polls articles on public attitudes toward the welfare state in the United States see Shapiro and Gillroy, 1984a, 1984b; Shapiro and Smith, 1985; Shapiro and Young, 1986; and Shapiro et al., 1987.

Table 1. Technical Information on ISSP Role of Government Surveys

Country	Organization	Field Dates	Sample Procedure	Response Rate ^a	Sample Size	Methods	Population
USA	NORC	2-4/1985	FP	71%	677	Supplement	18+
Austria	Institute for Sociology, Graz University	5-6/1986	FP	73%	987	Supplement	16+
Germany	Zentrum für Umfragen Methoden und Analysen	Summer/1985	FP	42%	1048	Mail	18+
Italy	Eurisko	9-10/1985	PQ	n.a.	1500	Personal	18-74
UK	SCPR	4-6/1985	FP	63%	1502	Supplement	18+

Notes: FP = full probability; PQ = probability with quotas; n.a. = not applicable.

^a Response rate equals rate on main survey times response rate on supplement (when applicable).

citizens from such vicissitudes of life as unemployment, poverty, illness, and aging and to compensate for inequities arising from industrialization. Collectively the social welfare programs such as unemployment compensation, health care, retirement benefits, and the like are designed to provide all citizens with security and a minimum standard of living. Furthermore this protection is defined as a fundamental right of citizenship, as an entitlement owed the citizen. While all industrial nations have adopted the welfare state philosophy, they have differed significantly in how completely they have embraced the welfare state, on how extensive and how generous the protections have been. The United States in particular has been the reluctant bride of the welfare state, instituting national programs later than most countries, enacting relatively limited programs in such areas as health care and family allowances, and spending a lower share of its national income on social welfare than most European nations (Armour and Coughlin, 1985; Abrahamson et al., 1986; Mommsen, 1981). Many explanations have been offered for the discrepancies: the failure of a socialist party to successfully contend for political power in the United States, the weakness of the labor movement, the existence of a racial underclass, the (possibly) greater social mobility in the United States, and so on (Leibfried, 1978; Hewitt, 1977; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981; Wilensky, 1975; Tomasson, 1983; Pescosolido, Boyer, and Tsui, 1985). Here we examine the relationship between the welfare state and the policy preferences and ideologies of the citizenry.

Attitudinal Differences Among Nations

The contemporary attitudes and policy preferences of the citizenry in the United States, Austria, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom match the differences that exist in the historical development and current implementation of the welfare state. America has generally been less supportive of principles underlying the welfare state and less eager to expand its scope. Leveling is not nearly as popular a goal in the United States as in the European nations. This does not seem to arise because Americans are convinced that their society is more open and thus that leveling naturally occurs across generations (see section on *Leveling*). In terms of both intergenerational opportunity and chances for women, Americans are near the middle of the five nations in their evaluations of the openness of society (see *Intergenerational Opportunity* and *Gender Opportunity*). While they show about an average willingness to take steps to equalize conditions for women, they show by far the lowest level of support for reducing differences between classes.

Americans are likewise the least inclined to favor various governmental programs to regulate the economy (see *Economic Regulations*). In terms of wage/price controls, employment creation schemes, governmental ownership, and other economic matters the United States routinely shows the lowest level of support. In contrast, the Italians are generally the most enthusiastic for such regulations. For example, while 51% of Americans favor government programs "supporting declining industries to protect jobs," such programs are endorsed by 76% of Italians.

Americans are also less supportive of such social welfare entitlements as health care, retirement benefits, housing, and jobs (see *Welfare Programs*). As with regulations, Americans are lowest in support, while Italians are generally at the top of the scale. This reticence about expanding the welfare state does not seem rooted in concerns about taxes and government spending (see *Government Spending and Taxes*) since the United States and the European nations differ little in their attitudes toward taxes (about two-thirds of everybody thinks income taxes are too high) and the United States is actually most likely to consider business taxes too low. Social welfare spending (for health, retirement, and unemployment) is somewhat less supported in the United States than in Italy or the UK, but differs little from Austria and Germany. The difference here may be that all European countries actually spend proportionally more than the United States, but at least Americans are no more opposed to their relative burden than Europeans, and their perceived burden does not readily explain their lower support for welfare programs.

A hint of the underlying differences comes from inspection of attitudes on education (see *Education*). Americans are at the top of the list in their support for more educational opportunity and near the middle in their support for educational spending and assistance. Compared to their low support for other entitlement programs, their support for education is *relatively* strong. However, what they really warm to is not the specific programs to assist education but the ideal of expanded opportunity (see *Government Spending and Taxes* and *Education*). As Wilensky (1975) has noted, education is associated with equality of opportunity, in contrast to most other welfare programs, which are related to absolute equality.

As Coughlin (1980) has noted, there seems to be a consistent ordering of nations on their current level of welfare efforts and the public support for such efforts.² Americans have a less elaborated welfare system because they want and demand less, while Europeans have

2. The ranking by percentage of gross domestic product spent on social welfare in 1977 was Germany (23.4%), Italy (22.8%), Austria (21.1%), United Kingdom (17.3%), and the United States (13.7%) (Armour and Coughlin, 1985:780).

more because they want more. While a complex array of historical and structural factors explain why the current differences have evolved, one factor seems to be differences in ideological paradigms. The United States is an opportunity society where a chance to achieve entails a tolerance of some inequality as a natural repercussion of such an open system. In sharpest contrast, Italy is a security society that wants extensive protection from inequities and hardships. The other European nations tend to fall between the Italian and American poles, although closer to the Italian side than the American. While industrialization leads to the establishment of the welfare state in response to inequities and sufferings, the extent and nature of the welfare state varies across advanced nations, and this variation in programs mirrors differences in public policy preferences and underlying public ideologies of opportunity, equality, and government action.

Except as noted, data in this article are from ISSP. (For some questions, data for Austria are not available.) A merged tape is being prepared by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany. Individual national data sets have been released by each participating organization. For further details contact the ISSP secretariat, Roger Jowell, SCPR, 35 Northampton Square, London, ECIV OAX England.

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 Political Action—An Eight Nation Study: Machine-Readable Codebook, Study No. 765. Cologne.

Leveling

Some people think those with high incomes should pay a larger proportion (percentage) of their earnings in taxes than those who earn low incomes. Other people think that those with high incomes and those with low incomes should pay the same proportion (percentage) of their earnings in taxes.

Do you think those with high incomes should pay a much larger proportion, pay a larger proportion, pay the same proportion as those who earn low incomes, pay a smaller proportion, pay a much smaller proportion?

	USA	Germany	Italy	UK
Much larger	17.0	37.5	32.2	23.7
Larger	39.7	51.0	50.2	50.7
Same	37.7	10.0	13.3	22.1
Smaller	0.8	0.0	0.5	0.8
Much smaller	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1
Can't choose	4.7	1.4	3.6	2.6

What is your opinion of the following statement?

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the difference in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Agree strongly	13.4	36.7	29.5	32.4	22.2
Agree	18.1	29.6	26.9	36.3	29.6
Neither agree nor disagree	20.7	21.4	23.5	17.5	24.6
Disagree	31.3	7.3	10.0	11.8	17.6
Disagree strongly	16.5	4.9	10.1	2.0	6.0

On the whole do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . .

Reduce income differences between the rich and poor.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	15.3	37.8	25.9	46.0	45.5
Probably should be	20.6	33.8	37.1	35.1	24.6
Probably should not be	25.0	15.0	23.6	9.2	13.7
Definitely should not be	29.2	5.2	6.9	5.4	10.2
Can't choose	9.9	8.2	6.6	4.3	6.0

Now we would like to know how you feel about some of the particular issues and problems that people often talk about these days. We would like to know (a) how important these issues and problems are in your view, (b) how far you feel the government has responsibility for them, and (c) how well the government is handling these problems. . . .

Tell me how much responsibility you think the government has for dealing with the problem. Is it something that you feel is (1) essential for government to do, (2) something that government has an important responsibility to do, (3) some responsibility to do, or (4) no responsibility at all to do?

Trying to even out differences in wealth between people.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	13.0	25.9	29.4	39.7	25.4	38.4	31.7	25.9
Important responsibility	18.7	41.6	41.6	32.1	26.5	43.2	43.3	32.1
Some responsibility	32.3	28.3	23.9	20.3	32.9	14.6	20.3	26.3
No responsibility at all	36.0	4.1	5.2	8.0	15.2	3.8	4.7	15.5

SOURCE: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1979.

NOTES: USA = United States, AU = Austria, FRG = Germany, IT = Italy, UK = United Kingdom, NL = The Netherlands, SW = Switzerland, FIN = Finland.

Intergenerational Opportunity

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

A person whose parents are rich has a better chance of earning a lot of money than a person whose parents are poor.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Agree strongly	29.6	41.0	23.2	36.2	28.8
Agree	37.3	32.5	46.5	35.6	43.3
Neither agree nor disagree	12.4	14.3	17.7	13.1	12.8
Disagree	17.3	9.2	9.8	11.3	13.2
Disagree strongly	3.4	2.9	2.8	3.8	1.9

A person whose father is a professional has a much better chance of getting ahead in life than a person whose father is a factory worker.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Agree strongly	19.0	39.7	18.3	33.9	22.3
Agree	32.5	33.9	45.1	36.7	46.0
Neither agree nor disagree	19.1	12.9	18.6	12.7	16.3
Disagree	24.9	10.8	14.2	12.2	13.5
Disagree strongly	4.4	2.8	3.7	4.5	1.8

In America what you achieve in life depends largely on your family background.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Agree strongly	10.6	21.5	7.8	22.2	16.5
Agree	19.9	29.8	27.1	40.9	35.6
Neither agree nor disagree	20.2	27.0	29.4	21.3	17.5
Disagree	40.9	18.5	28.3	13.0	26.2
Disagree strongly	8.3	3.2	7.4	2.7	4.1

Gender Opportunity

Would you say that opportunities for a college education are, in general, better or worse for women than for men?

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Much better	1.8	0.8	0.7	1.3
Better	6.8	1.5	4.0	2.1
No difference	75.3	72.0	81.4	68.9
Worse	10.5	17.6	8.1	15.0
Much worse	0.8	1.6	1.2	1.5
Can't choose	4.8	6.5	4.5	11.2

How about job opportunities for women—do you think they are, in general, better or worse than job opportunities for men with similar education and experience?

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Much better	3.0	0.4	1.0	1.8
Better	7.1	0.7	6.4	4.8
No difference	31.7	11.5	47.3	37.3
Worse	49.2	57.6	40.0	47.2
Much worse	4.2	27.3	2.2	4.6
Can't choose	4.8	2.6	3.2	4.3

And how about income and wages—compared with men who have similar education and jobs, are women in general paid better or worse than men?

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Much better	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.5
Better	1.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	1.7
No difference	19.7	11.0	11.3	70.6	30.6
Worse	64.6	60.6	61.9	22.2	55.9
Much worse	7.6	20.2	20.4	1.0	4.8
Can't choose	5.7	7.6	5.8	4.5	6.4

Here are three things the government might do. Some people are in favor of them while other people are against them. Please circle one number for each statement to show how you feel.

The government should increase opportunities for women in business and industry.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	18.1	38.6	39.6	14.7	16.4
In favor of	30.8	35.9	32.5	37.1	39.9
Neither in favor nor against	34.8	20.6	23.2	31.4	33.3
Against	13.5	4.1	3.4	14.1	8.9
Strongly against	2.8	0.7	1.3	2.7	1.5

The government should increase opportunities for women to go to college.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	13.9	22.3	22.3	9.6	11.4
In favor of	30.5	25.9	20.2	28.0	33.6
Neither in favor nor against	38.6	42.3	48.0	48.9	45.9
Against	14.8	6.6	6.6	11.0	7.9
Strongly against	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.5	1.2

Women should be given preferential treatment when applying for jobs or promotions.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	5.7	7.1	3.0	4.8	2.9
In favor of	7.9	12.8	7.5	15.6	4.5
Neither in favor nor against	27.9	46.7	47.7	35.2	27.6
Against	42.5	22.7	23.0	33.1	46.4
Strongly against	15.9	10.8	18.8	11.3	18.5

Economic Regulations

Do you think that . . .

All employees should be required to retire at an age set by law.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Agree strongly	4.8	27.9	11.2	44.1	19.7
Agree	12.8	29.8	31.8	34.3	35.1
Neither agree nor disagree	17.3	20.8	20.9	12.7	17.7
Disagree	44.3	17.2	28.7	7.7	23.3
Disagree strongly	20.8	4.3	7.3	1.2	4.2

Here are some things that government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.

Control of wages by legislation.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	8.5	26.3	10.5	31.2	10.3
In favor of	14.3	31.9	17.1	41.7	22.2
Neither in favor nor against	22.9	22.5	20.3	14.6	21.2
Against	38.4	12.1	21.6	10.9	36.0
Strongly against	15.9	7.2	30.6	1.6	10.3

Control of prices by legislation.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	8.1	56.0	28.0	53.7	20.5
In favor of	29.5	30.6	27.5	37.1	39.7
Neither in favor nor against	21.7	7.4	9.5	5.0	15.8
Against	30.4	4.1	17.1	3.7	20.0
Strongly against	10.3	2.0	17.9	0.5	4.0

Cuts in government spending.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	40.8	53.1	39.8	34.5	11.1
In favor of	39.5	28.5	36.8	33.5	27.0
Neither in favor nor against	11.5	14.2	15.3	20.3	24.4
Against	6.6	3.2	5.5	10.5	28.9
Strongly against	1.5	0.9	2.5	1.1	8.6

Government financing of projects to create new jobs.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	27.9	28.3	30.2	55.6	37.4
In favor of	41.5	43.6	41.2	35.7	50.2
Neither in favor nor against	15.9	22.3	15.2	6.3	7.9
Against	11.2	4.4	8.8	2.0	3.7
Strongly against	3.5	1.5	4.6	0.4	0.8

Less government regulation of business.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	15.0	17.6	13.5	11.9	13.1
In favor of	33.6	28.9	27.7	29.6	41.5
Neither in favor nor against	32.3	37.3	31.7	38.1	34.0
Against	15.9	12.9	18.7	17.5	9.5
Strongly against	3.2	3.2	8.3	2.9	1.9

Support for industry to develop new products and technology.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	21.7	29.9	31.0	26.6	37.4
In favor of	48.4	36.2	44.3	47.7	53.3
Neither in favor nor against	19.6	26.0	17.5	18.0	7.4
Against	8.6	6.3	4.9	6.7	1.6
Strongly against	1.6	1.6	2.3	1.0	0.3

Supporting declining industries to protect jobs.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	17.2	18.9	24.5	35.3	18.8
In favor of	34.1	27.4	33.4	41.1	30.9
Neither in favor nor against	23.9	23.4	14.3	12.5	21.2
Against	20.0	20.3	16.5	9.6	25.3
Strongly against	4.9	10.0	11.2	1.6	3.8

Reducing the work week to create more jobs.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Strongly in favor of	5.6	13.8	21.7	27.5	15.7
In favor of	20.3	22.0	28.8	36.9	34.1
Neither in favor nor against	27.5	22.1	19.8	19.9	22.8
Against	34.2	25.5	15.6	12.9	23.6
Strongly against	12.4	16.7	14.1	2.8	3.8

On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . .

Keep prices under control.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	30.3	48.2	24.7	75.0	60.1
Probably should be	44.7	41.9	49.6	22.0	31.5
Probably should not be	14.5	5.1	19.0	1.5	5.1
Definitely should not be	7.8	1.2	4.8	0.4	1.8
Can't choose	2.9	3.6	1.8	1.0	1.5

Provide industry with the help it needs to grow.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	15.6	21.9	10.6	33.1	53.0
Probably should be	42.6	45.4	40.1	47.7	40.1
Probably should not be	23.8	19.6	37.7	12.6	3.5
Definitely should not be	10.8	3.4	6.4	2.7	0.9
Can't choose	7.1	9.6	5.2	4.0	2.5

What do you think the government's role in each of these industries should be.

Electric power.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Own it	5.6	21.1	18.3	32.3	25.3
Control prices and profits but not own it	58.9	53.3	60.3	54.1	42.8
Neither own it nor control its prices and profits	30.0	8.2	16.4	3.6	25.4
Can't choose	5.6	17.5	5.0	9.9	6.5

Local mass transportation.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Own it	9.6	26.2	23.3	29.0	17.7
Control prices and profits but not own it	43.0	42.7	52.7	56.6	36.6
Neither own it nor control its prices and profits	38.9	11.4	17.6	4.6	39.4
Can't choose	8.4	19.8	6.4	9.9	6.3

The steel industry.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Own it	2.5	19.2	8.0	18.4	16.4
Control prices and profits but not own it	32.0	38.5	42.0	53.6	30.3
Neither own it nor control its prices and profits	55.8	18.2	40.4	8.9	41.9
Can't choose	9.7	24.0	9.6	19.1	11.4

Banking and insurance.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Own it	2.6	12.7	4.8	21.3	8.4
Control prices and profits but not own it	44.4	44.5	51.3	56.4	31.5
Neither own it nor control its prices and profits	44.1	22.0	36.8	9.1	49.0
Can't choose	8.9	20.7	7.1	13.1	11.0

The automobile industry.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Own it	2.2	6.6	2.2	13.0	8.0
Control prices and profits but not own it	33.3	35.2	38.6	58.6	29.0
Neither own it nor control its prices and profits	56.4	31.8	51.9	13.8	53.2
Can't choose	8.0	26.3	7.3	14.6	9.8

Welfare Programs

On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . .

Provide a job for everyone who wants one.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	12.9	44.7	34.9	51.2	36.7
Probably should be	20.3	35.9	45.2	37.2	32.4
Probably should not be	33.3	12.4	15.4	7.1	16.1
Definitely should not be	28.0	2.6	2.8	3.0	10.8
Can't choose	5.6	4.5	1.6	1.6	4.1

Provide health care for the sick.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	35.5	64.3	53.4	86.0	85.6
Probably should be	46.3	31.7	43.6	12.9	13.2
Probably should not be	11.9	1.3	2.1	0.1	0.6
Definitely should not be	4.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Can't choose	2.0	2.3	0.6	0.7	0.3

Provide a decent standard of living for the old.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	41.9	63.5	55.4	81.0	78.2
Probably should be	44.9	33.8	40.5	17.4	19.6
Probably should not be	9.1	1.3	2.9	0.4	1.1
Definitely should not be	2.4	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.5
Can't choose	1.7	1.3	0.8	1.0	0.6

Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Definitely should be	14.7	16.2	23.2	38.7	42.8
Probably should be	33.0	46.5	59.7	43.6	39.0
Probably should not be	30.2	18.8	11.2	10.3	10.3
Definitely should not be	15.2	10.1	3.0	4.2	3.7
Can't choose	6.8	8.4	2.9	3.2	4.2

If the government *had* to choose between keeping down inflation or keeping down unemployment to which do you think it should give highest priority?

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Keeping inflation down	39.2	23.8	33.0	28.0	28.3
Keeping unemployment down	44.5	53.5	50.9	63.5	63.5
Can't choose	16.3	22.7	16.1	8.6	8.2

Now we would like to know how you feel about some of the particular issues and problems that people often talk about these days. We would like to know

(a) how important these issues and problems are in your view, (b) how far you feel the government has responsibility for them, and (c) how well the government is handling these problems. . . .

Tell me how much responsibility you think government has for dealing with the problem. Is it something that you feel is (1) essential for government to do, (2) something that government has an important responsibility to do, (3) some responsibility to do, or (4) no responsibility at all to do?

Looking after old people.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	41.1	43.5	51.0	69.2	57.7	43.1	38.9	47.6
Important responsibility	40.3	45.1	42.4	22.8	30.5	50.3	50.5	48.4
Some responsibility	17.8	11.1	6.2	7.6	11.1	6.0	10.2	3.7
No responsibility at all	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.3	0.2

Seeing to it that everyone who wants a job can have one.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	34.2	59.0	60.0	78.9	54.6	49.1	49.2	57.7
Important responsibility	37.4	35.2	33.5	14.9	30.8	41.1	39.9	36.1
Some responsibility	24.0	5.2	6.1	5.4	13.1	7.7	10.0	5.2
No responsibility at all	4.4	0.6	0.4	0.8	1.5	2.1	0.9	1.0

Providing good medical care.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	41.9	62.2	62.7	79.3	73.5	55.1	47.5	54.5
Important responsibility	35.6	31.7	31.5	16.3	21.1	38.2	38.1	40.1
Some responsibility	19.6	6.0	5.5	3.9	5.0	6.2	13.0	5.1
No responsibility at all	2.9	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	1.4	0.3

Providing adequate housing.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	25.4	36.7	39.1	69.3	60.6	52.4	27.4	30.1
Important responsibility	37.5	44.2	45.5	22.4	27.0	41.4	43.1	47.3
Some responsibility	32.3	18.4	14.1	7.3	11.6	5.8	26.2	19.9
No responsibility at all	4.9	0.7	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.4	3.3	2.7

SOURCE: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1979.

Government Spending and Taxes

Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area.

Remember that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it.

The environment.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	9.7	32.2	42.5	16.4	6.3
Spend more	31.7	36.8	38.6	42.0	29.1
Spend the same as now	42.8	23.2	15.6	29.4	54.1
Spend less	9.6	1.9	1.2	6.6	4.5
Spend much less	1.7	0.4	0.3	1.0	0.6
Can't choose	4.4	5.3	1.8	4.7	5.4

Health.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	12.6	21.5	18.8	32.6	35.6
Spend more	46.0	37.1	32.6	46.8	52.2
Spend the same as now	33.0	36.5	39.9	13.5	10.8
Spend less	5.2	1.4	6.5	4.3	0.5
Spend much less	1.7	0.4	0.6	1.1	0.3
Can't choose	1.7	3.1	1.6	1.7	0.7

The police and law enforcement.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	9.6	4.2	8.6	11.0	8.4
Spend more	40.2	16.7	20.4	35.0	30.4
Spend the same as now	42.6	56.3	59.7	39.6	53.3
Spend less	4.3	12.7	7.1	7.9	4.3
Spend much less	0.8	2.7	1.2	1.9	1.8
Can't choose	2.4	7.4	3.0	4.5	1.8

Education.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	21.4	8.4	9.4	16.0	22.2
Spend more	43.3	25.9	30.0	44.5	51.6
Spend the same as now	29.1	52.0	52.0	31.7	22.9
Spend less	3.5	7.4	5.9	3.9	1.8
Spend much less	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.3	0.2
Can't choose	2.1	5.4	1.7	3.6	1.3

The military and defense.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	7.7	2.8	1.5	2.9	5.0
Spend more	11.8	9.5	4.4	8.4	12.1
Spend the same as now	36.9	36.7	30.0	30.9	43.8
Spend less	26.0	25.9	31.8	27.8	24.5
Spend much less	14.0	17.8	29.9	25.4	12.5
Can't choose	3.7	7.3	2.4	4.6	2.1

Retirement benefits.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	12.3	12.1	10.4	22.3	25.3
Spend more	29.3	36.7	35.3	51.9	49.3
Spend the same as now	41.0	45.6	48.9	19.8	23.5
Spend less	10.2	1.4	3.3	3.1	1.0
Spend much less	2.7	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.1
Can't choose	4.3	3.8	1.5	2.3	1.0

Unemployment benefits.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	7.2	3.0	7.6	15.3	12.0
Spend more	17.0	11.2	26.0	39.2	28.2
Spend the same as now	48.9	41.2	50.5	24.7	38.7
Spend less	16.6	28.9	10.2	9.8	14.5
Spend much less	6.7	9.7	2.6	6.6	4.1
Can't choose	3.8	5.9	3.0	4.3	2.4

Culture and the arts.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Spend much more	3.7	2.3	2.0	6.8	1.2
Spend more	10.8	8.3	11.0	24.6	8.0
Spend the same as now	39.2	41.1	48.8	45.7	35.3
Spend less	23.7	27.6	24.1	10.8	30.8
Spend much less	14.8	12.3	9.5	5.9	20.2
Can't choose	7.8	8.3	4.5	6.2	4.5

Do you consider the amount of federal income tax that your household has to pay is . . .

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Much too high	22.9	21.3	16.4	29.7	20.6
Too high	37.3	44.7	41.5	39.3	35.1
About right	29.9	19.8	26.8	25.9	25.4
Too low	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5
Much too low	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2
Pay no tax	5.8	7.2	11.2	3.2	15.3
Can't choose	3.6	6.3	3.8	1.5	2.9

Do you consider the amount of tax that business and industry have to pay is too high or too low?

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Much too high	4.7	12.0	2.1	21.8	9.3
Too high	12.2	27.6	15.6	29.0	30.4
About right	29.4	19.8	68.2	18.0	30.8
Too low	33.0	2.6	12.3	8.9	5.6
Much too low	9.2	0.5	1.7	3.9	1.3
Can't choose	11.5	37.5	0.0	18.5	22.6

Education

How do you feel about opportunities for young people to go to college. Should opportunities be . . .

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Increased a lot	44.3	5.5	9.8	8.5	29.3
Increased a little	25.1	13.7	21.2	30.2	26.0
Kept the same as now	23.9	47.2	43.8	37.6	34.6
Reduced a little	3.5	18.5	16.0	15.4	4.1
Reduced a lot	0.8	1.3	2.4	2.6	1.0
Can't choose	2.7	13.7	6.8	5.5	4.9

Some people think the government should provide financial assistance to college students. Others think the government should not provide such aid. In each of the circumstances listed below should the government provide grants that would *not* have to be paid back, provide loans which the student *would* have to pay back, or should the government not provide any financial assistance?

For students whose parents have a low income.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Government grants	42.7	51.8	76.9	81.4
Government loans	52.0	45.1	17.6	16.3
No government assistance	4.5	1.3	3.3	0.9
Can't choose	0.8	1.8	2.2	1.4

For students who have outstanding grades in high school.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Government grants	35.1	42.3	63.3	66.0
Government loans	53.3	51.4	21.0	27.2
No government assistance	9.5	2.2	10.9	2.4
Can't choose	2.1	4.0	4.8	4.5

For students who have average grades and middle income parents.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>UK</i>
Government grants	14.4	10.3	23.2	42.5
Government loans	66.1	69.5	35.8	44.6
No government assistance	16.3	15.9	33.4	7.1
Can't choose	3.1	4.3	7.6	5.8

Now we would like to know how you feel about some of the particular issues and problems that people often talk about these days. We would like to know (a) how important these issues and problems are in your view, (b) how far you feel the government has responsibility for them, and (c) how well the government is handling these problems. . . .

Tell me how much responsibility you think government has for dealing with the problem. Is it something that you feel is (1) essential for government to do, (2) something that government has an important responsibility to do, (3) some responsibility to do, or (4) no responsibility at all to do?

Providing good education.

	<i>USA</i>	<i>AU</i>	<i>FRG</i>	<i>IT</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>SW</i>	<i>FIN</i>
Essential responsibility	47.3	48.0	55.2	66.4	68.4	64.4	46.6	39.7
Important responsibility	35.7	41.6	37.6	26.7	24.0	33.9	42.3	48.1
Some responsibility	14.4	9.9	6.9	6.0	7.2	1.5	10.0	11.3
No responsibility at all	2.5	0.5	0.3	0.9	0.4	0.2	1.1	0.9

SOURCE: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, 1979.

NOTE

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